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INTRODUCTION 
It is not a matter of surprise to us that we find scant treatment of the 
body in the fragments left us by early Greek philosophers. If the nobler 
part of man, to wit, the human soul, was scarcely conceived to be more than 
a quantitative or qualitative arrangement of water, air, fire, or the atoms, 
we can hardly expect that any sketch of the place that the body occupies in 
the life of the soul would have found space in the earliest systems of 
philosophy. 
Plato, indeed, did devote attention to the study of man, but his doc-
trine falls short of a satisfactory solution of the nature of man as that 
nature is testified by our own experience. In the Platonic system, the body 
contributes nothing to the nature of man, nothing essential to the soul's 
perfection in knowledge, and nothing to its happiness. Rather, would Plato 
have us look upon the body as a weight upon the soul, a hindrance and a bur-
den to it. Let us briefly consider each of these points. 
First of all, the body apparently contributes nothing to the nature of 
the soul. This Plato would have to hold if he asserted, as, in fact, he did, 
that the soul was created apart from the body for which it had no aptitude 
nor inclination. It must then have been fashioned in the full perfection of 
its nature. The Demiurge, Plato tells us, created souls, not in proportion 
to the number of bodies to which they were to be united, but rather accord-
ing to the number of stars, to which stars they were to return if they lived 
i 
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well their time of probation. Furthermore, there could have been nothing in 
the nature of human souls which required human bodies, for the Platonic 
creator placed some souls nin the earth, and some in the moon, and in the 
other stars which are the vessels of time,"l the choice, it would seem, de-
riving from no special distinction in the nature of the souls. To the 
youn~er gods had been assigned the task of forming the human body and of 
giving to the souls destined for these bodies something that was yet lacking 
to them. 
• • • and when he had sown them he committed to the younger 
gods the fashioning of their mortal bodies, and desired 
them to furnish what was still lacking to the human souls 
and make all the suitable additions, and rule and pilot 
the mortal animal in the best and wisest manner Which they 
could and avert from him all but self-inflicted evils.2 
This addition that the lesser gods made seems at first sight to contra-
diet the notion that souls were created in the full completion of their 
natures. If they were, then, why should the makers of the body be requested 
to supply what souls lacked? The explanation, if it is the correct one, 
only strengthens the former assertion, for souls, as the Demiurge formed 
them were perfect with no special powers which required human organs for 
their exercise, but when they were obliged to go into human bodies they 
needed something added to what they had already received to fit them for 
their new office. The following citation seems to warrant the interpreta-
tion just given. 
1Plato, Timaeus, 42, (Translation by B. Jowett, Hearst's International 
Library Company, New York, 1914). 
2Ibid. 
Now, as they were implanted in bodies by necessity, and 
were always gaining or losing some part of their bodily 
substance, in the first place there was a necessity that 
they should have sensation and be affected all in the 
same manner by external force; and in the second place, 
they must have love which is a mixture of pleasure and 
pain; also fear and anger, and the feelings which are 
akin or opposite to them; ••• 3 
iii 
What the souls seem to have lacked and what the lesser deities supplied 
ware the passions, the sensitive powers of the human soul. What is of in-
tarest here and to the point is that the body apparently contributed nothing 
in the way of completing the nature of the soul. Although this portion of 
Plato's thought is found in his m~~hical account of creation which does not 
admit of too serious an interpretation, still his teaching on pre-existence 
and the burden of the body substantiate this position. 
For Plato, the whole nature of man was soul, and only soul. This he 
does not explicitly state except in the doubtfully authentic dialogue, First 
Alcibiades, and in one other text which seems clearly to express the under-
lying idea in Plato's whole exposition of the relation of soul and body. 
Now we must believe the legislator when he tells us that 
the soul is in all respects superior to the body, and 
that even in life what makes each one of us to be what 
~~~only the soul; and that the" bodyfOliowsus 
about in the likeness of each of us, end that, therefore, 
when we are dead, the bodies of the dead are rightly said 
to be our shades or images, for tr~t the true and immor-
tal being of each of us which is called theiSoul goes on 
her way to other gods-; • • 4 - -- -
If man is entirely soul, he is not a unity, for he has a body attached 
to him which must necessarily be a complete substance if the soul is, and 
!Ibid. 
~· XII, 959. (Emphasis mine) 
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of two complete substances united together there cannot result an essential 
unity. The unity of man is sacrificed, but the nobility of the rational 
soul preserved. But if the human soul were such a noble and self-sufficient 
being, why, then, should it ever have been united to a body? Is this sub-
jection to life in a human body a punishment inflicted on the soul for an 
offense committed in some previous state? That view-point Plato attributed 
to the Orphic poets,S and although he did not explicitly endorse it, he cer-
tainly considered the body no blessing, since he could say: "the connection 
of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of tham, as I am ready 
to maintain quite seriously."6 
Indeed, the body is a prison to which the soul has been confined. We 
are not, then, astounded at the definition by which Plato distinguishes it: 
"the grave of the soul which may be thought to be buried in this present 
life."7 Why buried? Because the soul had lived before, delighting in that 
vision of "beauty shining in brightness" which it had enjoyed in that other 
existence in which the body had had no part. In that blessed state souls 
had lived an exquisite life, for then they were pure, and "not yet enshrined 
in that living tomb which we carry about, now that we are imprisoned in the 
body as in an oyster shell."8 "Living tomb" and "oyster shell" are, to say 
the least, not very flattering epithets by which to designate the human body, 
but Plato was forced to view the mortal frame of man in this light since he 
5cratylus, 400. 
SLaws, VIII, 828. 
'l'Cratylus, 400. 
8Phaedrus, 250. 
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expressly stated that souls had contemplated the absolute ideas and had been 
nourished on the divine beauty, wisdom, and goodness, and only descended 
from their exalted height to earthly shrines because of some weakness that 
interfered with the soul's contemplation of the ideas. Thus he tells us 
that "• •• the soul w~~ch has seen most of truth shall come to the birth as 
a philosopher, or artist, or musician, or lover; that which has seen truth 
in the second degree shall be a righteous king or warrior or lord ••• "9 and 
so on down to the ninth degree which determines the soul to birth in a 
tyrant. 
It is not difficult to see why the body in such a system will have no 
share in the soul's growth in knowledge. Rather than a source of under-
standing, it is a cause of the soul's forgetting those truths it had pre-
viously known. The soul is deceived by the senses which are unreliable wit-
nesses since they do not report on the absolutes which alone are real. The 
soul can best find truth when she is wholly recollected in herself and has 
the least possible intercourse with the body. 
What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of know-
ledge? - is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, 
a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and 
hearing any truth in them? Are they not, as the poets 
are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet if 
even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be 
said of the rest of the senses? ••• Then when does the 
soul attain truth? for in attempting to consider any-
thing in company with the body she is obviously deceived? 
••• Then must existence be revealed to her in thought, 
if at all? Yes. And thought is best when the mind is 
gathered into herself and none of these things trouble 
9Ibid., 246-249. 
her-- • • • And in this the philosopher dishonors the body; 
his soul runs away from the body and desires to be alone 
and by herself.lO 
vi 
The soul considers the body as hindering it in the contemplation of ideas in 
their highest purity, for to this it attains in its perfection when the soul 
goes to the true essences with the mind alone. 
• • • he attains to the knowledge of them in their high-
est purity who goes to each of them with the mind alone, 
not allowing when in the act of thought the intrusion or 
introduction of sight or any other sense in the company 
of reason, but with the very light of the mind in her 
clearness penetrates into the very light of truth in each; 
he has got rid as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of 
the whole body, which he conceives of only as a disturbing 
element, hindering the soul from the acquisition of know-
ledge when in company with her--is not this the sort of 
man who, if ever man didi is likely to attain to the 
knowledge o£ existence?l 
Not only is the body a check upon knowledge because she is a deceiver, 
but also by reason of the care she demands and the turmoil of the passions 
which prevent a man from giving his whole attention to contemplation. 
And when they consider all this must not true philosophers 
make a reflection of which they will speak to each other 
in such words as these: We have found, they will say, a 
path of speculation which will bring the argument to a con-
clusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul 
is mingled with this mass of evil, our desires will not be 
satisfied, and our desire is of the truth. For the body 
is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere 
requirement of food.12 
Plato then lists as other properties of a body which serve as a burden to the 
soul, subjection to disease, its "loves, and lusts, and fears and fancies," 
1°Phaedo, 65. 
llrbid., 66. 
12rbid., 66. 
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and every sort of evil and idol which prevent people from having "so much as 
a thought." He further remarks that all troubles such as wars, fighting, 
dissens!ons, and the like are all to be traced back to the love of money and 
the love of money to the service required by the body. Then he concludes 
that even if "there is time and inclination towards philosophy, yet the body 
introduces a turmoil and confusion and fear into the course of speculation, 
and hinders us from seeing the truth." Plato then crystallizes his whole 
thought in a short sentence: ''and all experience shows us that if we would 
have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, and the soul in 
herself must behold all things in themselves:" That blessed state we must 
not hope to attain while we live, but after death, for when the soul is 
united to the body she cannot have pure knowledge. She must then expect 
true knowledge, if she is to have it at all, only after death, for then, 
"and not till then the soul will be in herself alone and without the body. «13 
Clearly, then, the body is considered by the Platonic soul to be a 
veritable burden to it, and from the fact that it is an obstacle to know-
ledge, it follows that it is likewise an obstacle to happiness, for happi-
ness is "the possession of the good,n14 and the highest good is wisdom, "the 
one true coin for which all things ought to exchange.•rl5 Having considered 
that all other desirable objects are goods, not in themselves, but in their 
use, and that this use is given by the possession of wisdom, he concludes 
13rbid. 
14symposium, 204. 
15Phaedo, 69. 
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that'wisdom is the only good and ignorance the only evil.ul6 To be happy, 
therefore, every man must strive "to make himself as wise as he can.nl7 
Now, to become wise is to become godlike,18 and in this process of 
divinization, the body is again more of a hindrance than a help. The soul 
must, consequently, flee from the body. It must be purified to attain to 
this true wisdom, and what, Plato asks, is Purification but the liberation 
of the soul from the body? 
And what is purification but the separation of the soul 
from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the 
soul gathering and collecting herself into herself, out 
of all the courses of the body; the dwelling in her own 
place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as 
far as she can--the release of the soul from the chains 
of the body.l9 
The soul is ever seeking release from the body, and, indeed, it is the 
special study of philosophy to master the art of body-separation, for "the 
true philosophers, and they only, study and are eager to release the soul. 
Is not the separation and release of the soul their special study?"20 The 
wise man who seeks to possess wisdom, and, consequently, happiness, must 
"disregard the things of the body," and "Instead of caring about them, des-
pises anything more than nature needs." He is "entirely concerned with the 
soul and not with the body." Indeed, he "would like as far as he can, to be 
quit of the body and turn to the soul," and thus it is that "philosophers, 
above all other men, may be observed in every sort of way to dissever the 
16Euthydamus, 281. 
l'iibid., 2s2. · 
18fheaetetus, 176. 
19phaedo, 67. 
2orbid. 
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soul from the body.n21 Philosophy is looked upon as a merciful ch~pion 
coming to deliver this noble being of the human soul, imprisoned in a body, 
~astened and glued" to that which is no help but a burden to it, and philo-
sophy it is which gently leads the soul to the realm of truth from which she 
is excluded by contact with a body.22 
The body thus contributes nothing to the soul's happiness in this life 
since it is regarded by the soul as "that heavy, weighty, earthly element of 
sight" by which the soul is "depressed and dragged down again into the visi-
ble world,n23 and from the company of this, its enemy,24 it ever strives to 
be liberated. Neither has the body any part in the happiness of the soul 
after death, for the Platonic soul, duly purified, will "live henceforth 
altogether without the body, in mansions fairer far than these.n25 
Thus has Plato conceived the place that the body occupies in the life o 
the soul, and although we can readily sympathize with his zealous care to 
escape mastery of the soul by the body, we cannot conclude that he has ade-
quately accounted for human beings as they appear to us. With his idea of a 
soul as an immortal being whose very essence is "self-motion," and because 
of this self-motion must have had no beginning since "the self-moving is the 
beginning of motion; and this can neither be destroyed nor begotten,n26 with 
such a notion as this, if it be Plato's real thought rather than his mythical 
21Phaedo, 64. 
22rhid., 83. 
23rbid., 81. 
241"bTcf., 67-68. 
2Srbid. 
2~drus, 245. 
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description of the soul's creation, then we can readily understand why the 
body was violently united to the soul and why it constituted such a weight 
upon the soul. Indeed, we may be tempted to say that the soul is a god, and 
during the time of its confinement it seeks to be true to its own divine self 
and act in accordance with its divine nature. This, M. Gilson, referring to 
the Platonic doctrine, expresses very aptly in the following passage. 
When a philosopher thus reaches the intelligible world, 
he does not strictly speaking, divinize his soul: his 
soul is a god in its own right. He does not even, 
strictly speaking, immortalize his soul: his soul is 
an indestructible life; it is immortal in its own right. 
A philosopher is a human soul which remembers its own 
divinity and behaves as becomes a god.27 
* * * * * * * 
But Plato was a pagan, and as such, his erring thought found no re-
strictions laid upon it by revelation. Was it, then, a peculiarly pagan 
attitude--this minimization of the body's place in the life of the soul, and 
have all Christians, fortified by the doctrine of the satisfaction the Crea-
tor found in all his works, given to the less noble part of man its share in 
his life? We all know that this has not been the case, and a brief sketch 
of that pre-eminently saintly Christian and profound philosopher, st. Augus-
tine, will make us appreciate all the more readily the task achieved by the 
Angelic Doctor in his enlightened and thoroughly common-sense description of 
human nature. 
Plato had felt no need to safeguard the unity of man, for Plato did not 
27Etienne Gilson, God~ Philosophy, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 
1941)' 29. 
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consider •man' as the work of the creator, and, therefore, not a part of a 
harmonious whole, the elements of which were meaningful and wisely arranged. 
st. Augustine found himself in somewhat of a different position. A Christian 
could not tolerate any theory of man which would make of him something un-
natural, a composite whose two parts were united together, as it were, by 
force, and, therefore, not originally intended the one for the other. Will 
the Christian Augustine, then, maintain the unity of man and sacrifice the 
immortality of the individual soul, as was done, apparently, by Aristotle,28 
or will he make man to be all soul or all body? It is not easy to get at the 
roots of the Augustinian solution. Certainly we can say that he wanted to 
preserve both the unity of the man and the immortality of his soul, but did 
not justify his position and perhaps, we may add, acknowledged that he saw 
no way in which to explain the mystery. 
The question of whether man consisted of only the soul or only the body 
was raised by St. Augustine when he sought the object that would make a man 
happy. Obviously, the beatitude of man would require to be something above 
man's nature. It was, therefore, necessary to determine, if possible, that 
nature. He thus presents the question: 
Nee nunc definitionem hominis a me postulandum puto. Illud 
est magis quod mihi hoc loco quaerendum videtur, cum inter 
omnes pene constat, aut certe, id quod satis est, inter me 
atque illos cum quibus nunc agitur hoc oonveniat, ex anima 
et corpore non esse composites, quid est ipse homo, utrum-
que horum nominavi, an corpus tantummodo, an tantummodo 
anima. Q.uanquam enim duo sint, anima et corpus, et neutrum 
vocaretur homo, si non esset alterum (nam neque corpus homo 
28Aristotle, ~Anima, III, 5, 430a20. 
esset, si anima non esset; nee rursus anima homo, si ea 
corpus non animaretur;) fieri tamen potest ut unum horum 
et habeatur homo et vooetur.29 
xii 
He then asks whether we should consider the union of soul and body like 
to that which exists between two objects harnessed to the same thing. Or 
should we think of the soul's relation to the body as the relation of the 
light to the case in which it is contained? Or again, may we say that the 
soul is the horseman, and the body its horse? These are just so many diffi-
culties which the Saint confesses are not easily solved, or if they are 
readily solvable they require time and strength to probe them which he will 
not devote to the task in this present instance.30 A little further on, he 
seems to dismiss the subject vdth the reflection that whether soul and body 
make the man, or soul only, or body only, is not the important question, but 
rather this: what is it that gives perfection to the soul?31 
1~, for the holy Bishop of Hippo, is,indeed, a composite of body and 
soul. "Sic, cum quaeritur ex quibus sit homo compositus, respondere possum: 
ex anima et ex corpore;"32 However, the definition that he considers most 
suited to man as viewed by men attributes the nature of man to the soul, and 
not to the body as a necessary part of that nature. How otherwise can we 
interpret the well known definition: "Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima 
rationalis est mortali atque terrene utens corpore"?33 The same idea he 
29st. Augustine, De Moribus Ecclesiae, I, IV, 6, (Opera Omnia, J. P. Migne, 
Paris, 1861) XXXII. 30Ibid. 
31~., I, V, 7. 
32ne Quantitate Animae, I, 2 (:Migne, XXXII). 
33]e Mar. Eccl., I, XXVII, n.52. 
---
, 
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expresses elsewhere in a slightly different terminology: "Quid est homo? 
Anima rationalis habens corpus.n34 
That is how st. Augustine defines man, but when we find that he has 
designated the soul as "substantia quaedam rationis particeps, regendo cor-
pori acco:mmodata,"35 we may ask, with M. Gilson,36 how the man differs from 
his soul if the definition of each is identical. However, st. Augustine 
still maintains that the union of body and soul must constitute a unity, and 
an essential unity. In speaking of the Incarnation, he states that the Word 
united to the flesh made but one person, "Sicut anima habens corpus, non 
facit duas personas, sed unum hominem.n37 And again when speaking of the 
interior and exterior man referred to in the Scriptures to the effect that 
man serves God's law with his mind, and the law of sin with his flesh, he 
insists that both actions derive from one and the same principle, for man is 
one, and it is the very same man who sins whether it be by his mind or by his 
body. 
Denique ita conclusit: 1 Igitur ipse ego mente servio legi 
Dei, carne autem lege peccati 1 (Rom., VII, 19-25) 'Ipse 
ego', inquit. Non enim duo sumus-Inter nos contrarii de 
diversis principiis venientes; sed 'ego ipse' mente servio 
legi Dei, carne autem legi peccati; quamdiu languor obluc-
tatur saluti.38 
There can be no doubt that St. Augustine is concerned to safeguard the 
unity of man, but if man is a rational soul using a body, it seems fairly 
34In Joannis Evangelium, Tract., XIX, v, 15 (Migne, XXXV). 
35De Quant. Animae, XIII, 22. 
36E; Gilson, The Spirit ~Medieval Philosophy, translated by A.R.C.Downes, 
(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1930) 174. 
37In Joan. Evan., Tract., XIX, v, 15. 
38'fbid., Tre:ct7, XLI, viii, 11. 
-
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obvious that he would make a one out of two substances which seem to be cam-
plete wholes, an impossibility both mathematically and philosophically. As 
M. Gilson noted,39 with the principles that the Christian Plato has formula-
ted, he can hardly justify his conclusion as to man's unity, though St • 
.Augustine himself might be the first to object to such a criticism. 
Now, in such a doctrine concerning the union of the soul with the body, 
what place can be expected to be reserved for the body? First of all, we 
must observe that st. Augustine vehemently denies that the body is bad in 
itself. That had been the heresy of the b~ichaeans, and their saintly op-
ponent is at pains to refute them, and that in a very virile manner.40 
The very conception that st. Augustine had as to this being a universe 
wherein things could not better be, necessitates this optimism of the worth 
of the human body in itself and the good of its union with the human soul. 
In speaking of the justice of God which sustains and arranges and holds all 
things in the best possible manner, he states: "qua [justitia] etiam factum 
est, ut non modo sint omnia, sed ita sint, ut omnino melius esse non pos-
sint.n4l The human body, then, as part of this harmonious whole, is a de-
cided good, and anyone who denies that the human body and its members are 
the work of God may be considered accursed.42 
All that the body has it owes to the soul, life, integration, preserva-
tion, and all the rest. 
39Gilson, The Sp. of Med. Phil., op. cit., 174. 
40contra Faust\iiii Maii'i'CE:aeum, XXI,v, 9,(:Migne, XLII). 
4lne Quant. Animae, XXXIII, 75. 
42'COntra Faustum ~·· XXI, 9. 
,. 
••• corpus hoc terrenum atque mortale praesentia sua [i.e., 
by the presence of the soul] vivifioat; colligit in unum, 
atque in uno tenet, diffluere atque contabesoere non sinit; 
alimenta per membra aequaliter, suis cuique redditis, dis• 
tribui facit, congruentiam eius modumque conservat, non 
tantum in Eulchritudine, sed etiam in crescendo atque 
gignendo.4 
The body does, indeed, depend upon the soul in the Augustinian system, 
but in what sense, if any, can the soul be said to depend upon the body? 
Does the rational soul require a body for the beginning of its existence? 
concerning the first soul, st. Augustine seems to have held that it was 
created before its body, as he states in the following: 
Credatur ergo, si nulla scripturarum auctoritas seu veri-
tatis ratio contradioit, hominem ita factum sexto die, ut 
corporis quidem humani ratio causalis in elementis mundi; 
anima vero jam ipsa crearetur sicut primitus oonditus est 
dies, et creata lateret in operibus Dei, donee eam suo 
tempore sufflando, hoc est inspirando, formate ex limo 
corpori insereret.44 
With regard to the origin of all other human souls, except for his com-
plete faith in God's creation of them directly or indirectly, he is silent 
repeating over and over again in his refutation of a young man who presumed 
to knowledge on that score that he himself did not feel qualified to make 
any certain statement concerning the soul's origin, and that the young man 
would do well to share his hesitation on the subject. 
Quod ei ne contingat, quanto melius tenet de animae origine 
cunctationem meam, ne audeat affirmare, quod nee humana 
ratione oomprehendit, nee divina auctoritate defendit; ne 
cogatur insipientiam profiteri, dum veretur ignorantiam 
oonfiteri.45 
43De Q.uant. Animae, XXXIII, 70. 
44D; Genesis ad Litteram Imperfectus, VII, 24, n.35, (1figne, XXXIV). 
45De Anima et Ejus Origine, I, xiii, n.l6, (Migne, XLIV). 
.And also: 
(nihil enim horum tanquam oertum affir.mamus, sed quid horum 
verum sit adhuc quaerimus.)46 
'What St. Augustine does not hesitate to proclaim with certainty is that 
the soul is not united to the body because of a punishment inflicted on it in 
view of another existence prior to that of its life in a human frame. Indeed 
he waxes indignant at a certain Vincentius Victor, the same who held positive 
opinions about the soul's origin, because the latter said that the soul de-
served to be polluted by the body.47 No less will St. Augustine permit the 
body to be considered as alien to man's nature, for he observes that the en-
tire nature of man is spirit, soul, and body, and spirit and soul are identi-
cal. 
Nature carte tota hominis est spiritus, anima et corpus, 
quisquis ergo a natura humana corpus alienare vult, 
desipit.48 
The soul was not united to the body by force. It was made to be placed 
in a body, and it has a natural desire for that body. 
Sed si ad hoc fit anima, ut mittatur in corpus, quaeri 
potest utrum, noluerit, compellatur? Sed melius credi-
tur hoc naturaliter vella, id est, in ea nature creari 
ut velit, sicut naturale nobis est valle vivere.49 
However, strongly as he holds this natural desire of the soul for its 
body, he gives no philosophical justification of it. Y~en, for example, he 
inveighs against Victor for the erroneous judgments put forward by the latte~ 
46Ibid., I, xvii, 27. 
47ne Anima et Ejus Origins, III, v~~~, n.ll. 
48Ibid., IV-;-11, n.3, for the passages concerning soul and spirit, ~·· IV, 
iiir, n.l9, also, Ibid., IV, xxii, n.36. 
49 -De Gen. ad Litt., VII, 37, n.38. 
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he contents himself with repeating before each new tenet that he denies, that 
the young man may not hold such views if he wishes to be a Catholic. Thus: 
"Noli credere, nee dicere, nee docere, 'Quod anima meruerit esse peccatrix 
ante omne peccatum•, si vis esse catholicus.n50 Now, why would not St. 
Augustine attempt a philosophical demonstration concerning the points he 
criticized in his opponent, notably that concerning pre-existence of souls 
and the body looked upon as a punishment? Was his reticence because he could 
not see any natural reason for the union of soul and body and, therefore, had 
to content himself with submissive faith? At any rate, he states quite 
plainly that the body is man's heaviest burden, owing to original sin. This 
has happened by God's most righteous laws, a well-knovm fact, but an impene-
trable mystery. 
Sed inter omnia quae in hac vita possidentur, corpus homini 
gravissimum vinculum est, justissimis Dei legibus, propter 
antiquum peccatum, quo nihil est ad intelligendum secretius.51 
The soul is united to the body for reasons know.n to the Creator. Such a 
being as man, composed of body and soul, is a unit in an order wherein all 
things are most beautiful, for the Supreme and true God judges a thing to be 
most beautiful when it is as it is. "Id enim iudicavit esse pulcherrimum, 
ut esset quidquid est, quomodo est.n52 No one, therefore, should take it ill 
that the soul should be united to the body, for so great and divine an order 
could not better be connected. "Quae cum ita sint, quis ·est qui iuste 
stomachetur quod agenda atque administrando corpori data sit, cum tantus et 
50ne Anima et Ejus Origine, III, viii, n.ll. 
5lne Mor. Eccl., XXII, 40. 
52~ Quant. Animae, XXXVI, n.ao. 
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tam divinus rerum connecti melius non possit;"53 
The body, consequently, cannot be termed the body of this death except 
because of original sin.54 It is fallen man, not natural man, that st. 
Augustine describes, and fallen men we are, in very truth. Why not content 
ourselves with such a picture and strive to free ourselves from a burden felt 
by all of us? Such a treatise will not satisfy us precisely because we know 
that there was a first man, and that first man had a nature like unto our 
own, and in that nature free from the evil effects of sin he lived at least 
for some time. The soul and body of that first man, essentially comparable 
to ours, were united naturally. Why should this have been so, if the first 
man, too, were only a soul using his body? It is extremely beautiful--this 
description of the perfect order of the universe, and the unfathomable good 
of a human oomposite,--constituted just as it is and in no other way--, but 
we may be permitted to ask why, if the Augustinian soul has no need of its 
body, should its union vdth that body be such an admirable thing, God's wis-
dom excluded, which, of course, st. Augustine would ~ver exclude? True 
enough even the Augustinian soul makes use of the senses.55 This use of the 
senses, we may add, is not identical with a need for them. Their chief need 
would be for knowledge, but the soul, according to our great saint, does not 
understand by any help from the body, but rather when it wishes to under-
stand it turns away from the body. "Non enim id agit, nisi qui intelligit: 
nee corpus intelligit, nee animus auxiliante corpore intelligit; quia cum 
53Ibid., XXXVI, n.82, et sqq. 
54ne Peccato Originali, II, XLI, n.37, (~ligne, XLIV). 
55ne Quant. Animae, XXI, n.:35. 
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intelligere vult, a corpore avertitur. 1156 
We can see, moreover, from his doctrine on sensation that he will not 
permit any action of the body on the sou1.57 Sensation does not pertain to 
the human composite; it is wholly and entirely an action of the soul. Still 
there appears to be some dependency of the soul on the body for contact, at 
least, with the exterior sensibles, but St. Augustine, possessed as he is by 
that principle that the lower cannot act upon the higher,56 can only reach 
the conclusion that the whole problem is a paradox, and the union of a spiri-
tual substance with a corporeal one a mystery which he cannot understand. 
"Quia et iste alius modus, quo corporibus adhaerent spiritus, at anim.alia 
fiunt, omnino mirus est, nee comprehendi ab homine potest, et hoc ipse homo 
est.n59 M. Gilson in treating of this particular problem in St. Augustine's 
doctrine assures us that one will seek in vain for a solution of this 
enigma.so 
A partial explanation of the problem may, however, be found by a dif-
ferent approach to the difficulty. Although it may be true that the lower 
cannot act upon the higher, still the higher can act upon the lower, and this 
is precisely what happens in the Augustinian account of sensation. The soul 
is in the body to give life to that body and to maintain it. In its role, 
then, of anirrAtor and protector, the soul must be cognizant of what is taking 
56ne Immortalitate Animae, I, 1, (Migne, XXXII). 
57For a lucid exposition of the doctrine of st. Augustine on sensation con-
sult E. Gilson, Introduction ~ l'Etude de Saint Augustin, (J. Vrin, Paris, 
1929) 71-66. - --
56ne ?~sica, VI, 5, n.8, also De Genes. ad Litt., XII, 16, n.32-33. 
5Sfie Civ. Dei, XXI, 10, 1. Quoted in GiiSon;-op. cit., 30. 60Clilson, Introd. 8. l'Etude ~~·Aug., 2,f• cit., "6'0.' 
~ 
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place in the body subject to her care. If there is any increase or decrease 
in the functioning of the corporeal organs, the soul must be aware of it and 
turn her attention to the re-establishment of harmony disturbed by an outside 
influence on the body. 61 The definition of sensation as stated ~the philo-
sopher of Hippo expresses this idea in a carefully worded formula: "passio 
corporis per seipsam non latens animam.n62 It is not fitting here to add 
more about this definition, but we should like to observe, as did st. Augus-
tine himself, that the soul is not in the body to be acted upon or to re-
ceive; she is there to act and to give.63 
This does indeed establish the problem in a new light, but it only 
deepens the mystery of a noble soul united to a body to which it gives every-
thing, and from which it apparently receives nothing in return. The soul, 
as judged by its office in sensation, becomes the servant of the body, while 
remaining essentially superior to the corporeal part of man. The metaphysi-
cal principle underlying such a doctrine and one that gives to it its true 
character is in the words of a profound student of st. Augustine, "la servi-
tude d'une lme qui se mets au service d'un corps, bien qu'elle lui demeure 
irreductiblement transoendante jusque dans l'acte mame de la sensation par 
lequel elle s'y soumet.n64 
The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the body figures 
Sln e Musica, VI, 5, 
62ne Quant. Animae, 
63D; Musica, VI, 5, 
S4-G·l "t ~ son, ~· ~·· 
n.9. 
XXV, n.48. 
n.9. 
83. 
~------------------~ 
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scarcely at all in the soul's growth in knowledge. 65 What man knows, he 
knOWS by reason, and sense perception is not knowledge. "Et omne quod scimus 
ratione scimus: nullus igitur sensus scientia est. Quidquid autem non 
latet, ad scientiam pertinet: ad nullum sensum pertinet non latere, •• • 1166 
Human reason and knowledge transcend the sense organs in such a way as 
not to depend, it would seam, upon these channels at all. The soul must re-
cede from the sensibles and seek the pleasure that is within. 
Humana vera anima per rationem atque scientiam, de quibus 
agimus, quod sunt ista longe praestantiora sensibus, sus-
pendit sa a corpore quantum potest, at ea quae intus est 
libentius fruitur voluptate; quantoque in sensus declinat, 
tanto magis similiorem hominem pecori facit.67 
Now, St. Thomas would never gainsay the primary excellence of reason 
and knowledge over the senses. He would likewise concede the necessity of 
withdrawal from sense indulgence, and, therefore, he would grant with the 
Christian Plato, that the soul should not waste time on the senses beyond the 
limit determined by nature. "Quamobrem, quamvis aliud ex alio inciderit 
libenter, taman in eo sermone demoror, quo admonatur anima, na se, ultra 
quam necessitas cogit, refundat in sensus;"68 But he does differ in fixing 
those natural limits of the part played by the sense organs. The Augustinian 
65charles Boyer, s.J., in his Essais sur la Doctrine de Saint Augustin, 
(Beauchesne et ses Fils, Paris, 193zr-166-183, considers that there is in 
St. Augustine a doctrine of abstraction, in its basic principles, not un-
like Thomistic abstraction. He likewise holds that the differences be-
tween Thomism and Augustinianism in what regards the union of soul and body 
have been exaggerated, for he states: "Ces differences sont plut~t dans 
le degre d'ach~vement at de precision que dans la substance de la doc-
trine." 170. 66ne Quant. Animae, XXIX, n.57. 
6'lne Quant. Animae, XXVIII, n.54. 
68"fbid., n.55. 
-
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soul withdraws from the senses into itself to become a child of God; the 
Thomistic soul goes to itself and God through the senses. Thus st. Thomas 
would understand in a somewhat different manner the procedure implied in the 
following statement: "• •• sed ab his potius ad seipsam colligat. at re-
puerascat Deo: quod est novum fieri, vetere exuto;"69 
We may conclude, therefore, that the human body has no essential part in 
the life of the soul, according to the teaching of St. Augustine. Union of 
soul and body is a natural thing--even a good; the body naturally belongs to 
the soul in this life, and in the next something will be wanting to the 
soul's complete fulfillment if it has not its body. 
• • • inest ei naturalis quidem appetitus corpus adminis-
trandi; quo appetitu retardatur quodammodo ne tota inten-
tione pergat in illud summum coelum, quamdiu non subest 
corpus, cujus administratione appetitus ille conquiescat.70 
But a justification of the union of soul and body and a description of the 
body's place in the life of the soul which satisfies us it would be difficult 
to find in the writings of the great philosopher and bishop of Hippo. It 
matters little whether we grant that he outlined in broad design the same 
sketch st. Thomas was to complete in clear and skilful drawings in the same 
masterly way he marked out the reconciliation of faith and reason treating of 
their respective merits and their interaction; we must admit that it is to 
the greatest of the Scholastic philosophers that we owe the rational justifi-
cation of the union of soul and body and a description of the true and vital 
place played by the body in the life of the rational soul. 
xxiii 
At first sight, it might seem, that St. Thomas also has not devoted much 
space to a treatment of the human body. In his treatise on man, he himself 
declares that he will consider man's nature in relation to its spiritual as-
pect and not in relation to its material side except in so far as the 
material part has bearing on the spiritual part. "Naturam autem hominis con-
siderare pertinet ad theologum ex parte animae, non autem ex parte corporis, 
nisi secundum habitudinem quam habet corpus ad animam.n71 
The concern, then, of the Angelic Doctor, seems primarily and entirely 
to be taken up with the rational soul. A detailed account of the essence of 
the soul, its powers and its operations can, therefore, be sought and found 
in his philosophy, but no such complete and all-embracing delineation of the 
human body can be discovered therein. Vfu may, consequently be tempted to 
think that again in this system the body has been neglected, but a glance at 
the text just quoted will quickly dissipate all fears on that score. St. 
Thomas there states that he will not treat of the human body except in so 
far as it is related to the soul, but for those who know the intimate rela-
tion which exists between the soul and its body in the doctrine of st. 
Thomas, it will not be difficult to conclude that the human body holds a 
place of no little importance in the writings of this learned Saint. Thus 
we may discover in his works a sketch of the body, its nature, constituent 
parts, and disposition such as will be necessary to portray its close rela-
tionship to the rational soul. 
7lst. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.75, a.l.Prol., (Ed. Leonine, 
Rome, 1888). 
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It is the purpose of this thesis to investigate that part which St. 
Thomas gives to the human body in the life of the rational soul and, there-
fore, to seek in the treatises of the eminent theologian an account of the 
body in so far as it influences the soul. We shall consider: 
First, the place that the human body has in the beginning 
of the rational soul in the perfection of its nature. 
Secondly, the share that the body has in all the operations 
of the soul, particularly in its highest operation; namely, 
understanding. 
Thirdly, the disposition required of the body for its 
intimate relation to the soul. 
Fourthly, the problem of whether or not the body can be 
considered an impediment to the soul. 
Fifthly, the place of the body in the final happiness of 
the soul. 
Precisely because man is a compound of body and soul, we shall see that 
the body occupies an important and necessary place in the substantial, acci-
dental, and final perfection of this nobler part of man's nature. In view 
of the relationship that it bears to the rational soul, the body is, con-
sequently, not excluded from the attention of the greatest of the Schoolmen 
nor is it, in any real sense, minimized. 
A brief sketch of the task undertaken thus presented, we shall turn to 
the consideration of the dependence of the rational soul on the body for the 
beginning of its existence. In this first chapter, as well as in the sub-
sequent ones, we shall be guided by the desire to adhere as closely as pos-
sible to the actual expressions and argumentation adopted by the Angelic 
Doctor, convinced, as we are, that st. Thomas better than anyone else, ex-
lains St. Thomas. 
CHAPTER I 
THE RATIONAL SOUL NEEDS THE BODY FOR 
THE BEGINNING OF ITS EXISTENCE 
In the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, great care is taken to safe-
guard the unity of man. It is for this reason that the body plays such an 
important place in the life of the soul. Man, for the Angelic Doctor, is 
neither a soul, nor a body, nor a soul enclosed in or merely using a body; 
man is a composite of body and soul. His very unity derives from the close 
and intimate union of these two parts. The relationship of the body to the 
soul will, therefore, be no merely accidental one, but one that is truly 
essential. We shall devote the following pages to a study of the first im-
portant part the body has in the life of the soul. 
The rational soul depends upon the body in the sense that it begins to 
exist only in the human body. That the soul is a subsistent being, that it 
is in itself nobler than the body, and that the soul does not exist for the 
body, but rather the body for the soul, st. Thomas certainly admits,l but 
that the rational soul can begin its existence in the perfection of its 
nature outside the human body, he will not grant, for he tells us: 
" • • • 
anima, quamvis non dependeat a corpore quantum ad suum esse vel quantum ad 
suum finem, dependet taman quodammodo quantum ad suum principium. n2 
1A discussion of the being of the soul may be found in: st. Thomas Aquinas, 
2Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l a • 2, c., also Contra Gentiles, II, 68. St. Thomas Aquinas, In II Sent., d.XVII, q.2.a.2.ad 4um, (Mandonnet, 
Lethielleux, Paris, 192"9; I"''). --
1 
~----------------~ 
2 
The reasons that are given for the necessity that devolves upon the 
rational soul's receiving its existence only in the body may be summarized 
as follows: First, the perfection of the nature of the human soul requires 
that it should begin to exist only in a human body;3 secondly, the soul is 
related to the body as form to matter, to constitute one being, and in one 
and the same being, man, for example, the form or the act cannot precede the 
matter or the potency;4 thirdly, no reasonable cause can be assigned for 
the union of the soul with the body if the soul were created in its perfect 
natural state without the body;5 fourthly, since matter is the principle of 
individuation, there could be no distinction between this soul and that soul 
if they were created before their union with their determinate matter;6 and 
fifthly, the rational soul needs the senses, and it would not have been fit-
ting for it to have been created without a body equipped with sense organs.7 
We shall now consider the first proof; namely, that the perfection of 
the nature of the human soul requires that it should begin to exist only in 
a human body. The soul is an incomplete substance, a part, but only a part 
of human nature; the body, likewise, is an incomplete substance, also only 
a part of human nature. But God created all things in a sta.te of natural 
perfection, for what is perfect should precede what is imperfect. There-
fore, it was necessary that the soul should receive its existence in the 
3st. Thomas Aquinas, Q. Disp • .£!Pot., q.3, a.lO, c. (Marietti, Tarini, Rom 
Italy, 1927, I). 
4st. Thomas Aquinas, Cont. Gent., II, 83, also Ibid., 89, (Bertrand, Barri, 
Ducis, Paris, 1878).----
5st. Thomas Aquinas, Q. Disp • .£! ~·, q.3, a .• lO, c. 
6Ibid. 
?cont. ~·, II, 83. 
,-: ______ _ 
3 
human body, as st. Thomas states in this underlying principle: "• •• res 
creatae sunt a Deo in sua perfectione naturali. Perfectum enim naturaliter 
d.it . f t n8 praece ~mper eo urn, • • • The soul was, therefore, not created without 
the body, nor the body without the soul because such an order would have been 
contrary to the first formation of things: "Sed contra rationem perfectionis 
primae institutionis rerum est, quod Deus vel corpus sine anima, vel anima 
sine corpore fecerit cum utrumque sit pars humanae naturae."9 
The rational soul, for st. Thomas, although it is only a part of human 
nature, is nevertheless a "hoc aliquid," a this particular thing, but it is 
not this particular thing in the sense that it is complete in its being and 
in its species, but only in the sense that it is this particular thing in 
act. This may, perhaps, appear in a clearer light by noting the three mean-
ings which st. Thomas attaches to the expression, "hoc aliquid." "Hoc ali-
quid" may beapplied to matter, to form, and to the composite. In each case 
the meaning will be different. \~en the term is applied to matter, it does 
not mean that matter is this particular thing in itself, but only that it is 
in potency to become so. "Materia quidem. est, quae secundum se non est hoc 
aliquid, sed in potentia tantum ut sit hoc ali quid. "lO YJhen we apply the 
term to a form, vre mean that the form is this particular thing in act. 
"Forma actu est, secundum quam jam est hoc aliquid in actu. nll However, it 
8Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.lO, c. 
9 -- um. Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.4, ad 3 • 
lOst. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotilis Librum De Anima Commenta.rium, II, lect. 
1, n.215, (Pirotta., N~rietti, Tarini, Rome;-Ita.ly, 1924), also Sum. Theol., 
I, q.75, a.2, ad 1um. 
llibid. --
-
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is only of the composite that we can truly say that it is this particular 
thing. (This applies only to composite substances in the material order, for 
separate substances, although not composed of matter and form, are still "hoc 
aliquid" since they are subsistent in act and complete in their nature): 
Substantia vero composita est, quae est hoc aliquid. Dicitur 
enim esse hoc aliquid, id est aliquid demonstratum quod est 
completum in esse et specie; et hoc convenit soli substantiae 
compositae in rebus materialibus. Nam substantiae separatae, 
quamvis non sint compositae ex materia et forma, sunt tamen 
hoc aliquidi cum sint subsistentes in actu et completae in 
natura sua. 2 
Now, the human soul can be said to be this particular thing in so far as 
it can subsist in itself, but because it has not a complete species in it• 
self, but is a part of a species, it is not entirely true to say that it is 
this particular thing. 
Anima autem rationalis, quantum ad aliquid potest dici hoc 
aliquid, secundum hoc quod potest esse per se subsistens. 
Sed quia non habet speciem completam, sed magis est pars 
speciei, non omnino convenit ei quod sit hoc aliquid.l3 
It is because the soul is not complete in its species that it requires 
its proper matter for its completion in its proper species, and this is like-
wise the reason why a body cannot be said to be united to it accidentally • 
• • • licet anima habeat esse completum, non tamen sequitur 
quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur; tum quia illud idem 
esse quod est animae, communicat corpori, ut sit unum esse 
totius compositi; tum etiam quia etsi possit per se sub-
sisters, non taman habet speciem complet~; sed corpus ad-
venit ei ad completionem speciei.l4 
We find the same idea in this passage: 
12Ibid 1 • 
1
3Ibid. 
4- um Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, ~!__· (Marietti, Rome, Italy, 1927, II). 
~-------------. 
Anima autem non habet perfectionem suae naturae extra corpus, 
cum non sit per se ipsam species completa alicujus naturae. 
sed sit pars humanae naturae:l5 
5 
It is evident that St. Thomas teaches that the soul does not in itself 
constitute a distinct species, but why precisely should that be the case? 
The answer lies in the type of spiritual substance the soul is. It is nobler 
than matter, but less noble than purely intellectual substances; it is on the 
horizon of corporeal and separate substances, "• •• manifestum est quod ipsa 
in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta.nl6 The soul 
is an intellectual substance, that is true. but it requires help which the 
organs of the human body can give to it for its act of intelligence. The 
body is, consequently. naturally united to it to complete the species of the 
soul. "Quia taman ipsum intelligera animae humanae indiget potentiis quae 
per quaedam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex 
hoc ipso declaratur quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad complendam speciem 
humana.m.nl7 
Since, therefore, the human soul has not what is required for the proper 
operation of its species, it is not complete in that species, as st. Thomas 
insists upon again and again: "Non enim aliquid est completum in specie, ni• 
si habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propria.m operationem ipsius speciei.n18 
The human soul must begin to exist in the human body precisely because 
it is a part, and only a part, of human nature. Now no part separate from 
ll5Q. Disp. De Pot •• q.3, a.lO, c. SQ. Disp. De An~ma, q.l, a.l, c. 
17 ---l~ont~ GQnt., II, 68. 
Q. Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.l, c. 
~--------------~ 
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its whole has the perfection of its nature. Thus if the soul were created 
before the body, it would be an imperfect thing, "• •• nulla pars habet per-
fectionem naturae separata a toto. Unde anima, cum sit pars humanae naturae, 
non habet perfectionem suae naturae nisi in unione ad corpus;"l9 
Furthermore, it is not fitting that the soul should exist in an imper-
feet state, that is, apart from the body, before it has existed in a perfect 
state, that is, in union with the body, for the perfect precedes what is im-
perfect in the order of natural things. "Perfectum autem est prius imper-
fecto, in rerum naturalium ordine. Non igitur competit naturae ordini quod 
ani~A fuerit prius creata corpore exuta, quam corpori unita.n20 
The rational soul, consequently, is united to the body because of the 
good which is its substantial perfection; namely, the completion of the human 
species, and also because of the good which is its accidental perfection; 
namely, that it should be perfected in knowledge by reception from the sensi-
bles, for this manner of understanding belongs to the nature of man: 
••• anima unitur corpori et propter bonum quod est perfec-
tio substantialia, ut scilicet compleatur species humana; et 
propter bonum quod est perfectio accidentalis, ut scilicet 
perficiatur in cognitione intellectiva, quam anima ex sensi-
bus acquirit; hie enim modus intelligendi est naturalis 
homini.21 
That the body is for the perfection of the soul and what part it plays in the 
accidental perfection to Which we have referred, will receive further con-
sideration vmen we treat of the need for the body, in the follovdng chapter. 
l9Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Creat., 20 - ...;..~--:::":' 21~~t. ~·, II, 83. Q. Disp. E! Anima, q.l, a.l, 
q.l, a.2, ad sum., (Marietti, II). 
r:---------. 
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We have seen, then, that it would have been unfitting for the soul to 
have been created without the body because its nature requires it to be uni-
ted to a human body, and God would not have created it in the perfect natural 
state its species required, had He not united it to a body immediately. 
Manifestum est enim quod Deus primas res instituit in per-
fectu statu suae naturae secundum quod uniuscuiusque rei 
specie exigebat. Anima autem, cum sit pars humanae naturae 
non habet naturalem perfectionam nisi secundum quod est 
corpori unita. Unde non fuisset conveniens animam sine 
corpore creari.22 
st. Thomas strongly insists upon the naturalness of the union between 
soul and body. Indeed he states that if the soul were not capable of being 
united to the body, it would be of a different nature, ff • • • si anima non 
esset corpori unibilis, tunc esset alterius naturae;n23 It is in very truth 
so natural for the human soul to be united to the body that a soul never 
united to a body so as to make one being would not be a human soul, for what 
is beside nature cannot be always: "Alllplius, anima humana naturali ter uni-
bilis est corpori. Anima igitur quae numquam corpori unitur ad aliquid con-
stituendum non est anima humana quia quod est praeter naturam non potest esse 
semper.n24 
It is unnatural for the soul to be without the body because without its 
corporeal complement, it lacks the perfection of its nature. With unnatural 
and imperfect things, it would not have been fitting for God to have begun 
22 
2 Sum. Theol., I, q.90, a.4.c. ~II Sent., d.I, q.q.2, a.4, _ad 1um. 24 __ _ 
Cont. Gent., IV, 37. 
----
Eis work, for if God did not make man without a hand or foot, which are 
natural parts of man, still less did He make a soul without a body: 
Si enim anirrAe naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine cor-
pore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens 
non habet suae naturae perfectionem. Non fuit autem con-
veniens ut Deus ab imperfectis suum opus inchoaret, et ab 
his quae sunt praeter naturam: non enim fecit hominem 
sine manu aut sine pede, quae sunt partes naturales 
hominis. hrulto igitur minus fecit animam sine corpore.25 
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This leads us to the second proof that the soul receives existence only 
in the human body, and this proof is based upon the principle that the 
rational soul is the substantial form of the human body, and together with 
the human body, constitutes one being. Now in one and the same being, act 
is not prior to potency, as we shall explain further on, (Vide footnote 53). 
Therefore, the soul which is the act of the body, is not prior to, but simul-
taneous with, the human body. 
To begin with, the rational soul is not just a subsistent being; it is 
a form, a substantial form. For the soul to be a substantial form, two con-
ditions are required: first, it must be the principle of substantial being 
to that of which it is the form; and secondly, from its union with matter, 
there should be effected one, and only one, being. 
Ad hoc enim quod aliquid sit forma substantialia alterius, 
duo requiruntur. Quorum unum est ut forma sit principium 
essendi substantialiter ei cujus est forma: principium 
autem dico non effectivum, sed formale, quo aliquid est 
et denominatur ens. Unde sequitur aliud, scilicet quod 
forma et materia conveniant in uno esse quod non contingit 
de principia effective cum eo cui dat esse; et hoc esse 
est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est una 
25sum. Theol., I, q.llS, a.3, o. 
L 
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secundum esse ex materia et forma constans.26 
The rational soul is the principle of substantial being to the human 
body, for the form and the act of a thing is that whereby a thing from a po-
tential being is made into an actual being: "Quod autem ut forma propria 
anima corpori uniatur, sic probatur, illud quo aliquid fit de potentia ante 
actu ens, est et forma et actus ipsius."27 now, the soul communicates that 
existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, and one being thus 
results from the matter and the rational soul: "• •• anima illud esse in 
quo ipsa subsistit communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellec-
tiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ip-
sius animae.n28 
The soul is, therefore, the form of the body because it actualizes the 
body, gives it being: "Corpus autem per animam fit actu ens de potentia 
existente. Vivere enim est esse viventium ••• n29 That by which the body 
lives is the soul, and the soul is that by which the human body has being in 
act. "Manifestum est enim, id quo vivit corpus, animam esse; vivere autem 
est esse viventium: anima igitur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. 
Hujusmodi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana corporis forma."30 In 
nature, matter has being only through the form, and the form coming to the 
matter bestows being on that matter. "In natura igitur rerum corporearum 
materia non per se participat ipsum esse, sed per formam; forma enim adveni-
26cont. Gent., II, 68. 
2irbid. ,--sr; 
28sum: Theol., I, q.76, a, 1, _ad _sum. 
29-Cont. Gent., II, 62. 3o--Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, c. 
~-----------. 
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ens materiae facit ipsam esse actu, sicut anima corpori."31 
It should be clear enough, then,, that the soul is the form of the body, 
since it gives being to the body, actualizes what was being only potentially. 
Is the soul on that account a substantial form or an accidental form? The 
substantial form gives being simply to its subject; an accidental form gives 
it being, not being simply, but only in respect to something else, that it 
should be colored, or large or small, or soma other like quality, which 
quality would be only an accidental one. By an accidental form, a thing be-
comes such a thing; by a substantial form, a thing becomes a being. "Est 
autem hoc proprium formae substantialia quod det materiae esse simpliciter; 
ipsa enim est per quam res est hoc ipsum quod est. Non autem per formas 
accidentales habet esse simpliciter, sed esse secundum quid; puta esse mag-
num, vel coloratum, vel aliquid tale."32 
If, therefore, the form does not give being simply to a thing, but 
comes to it already existing in act, that form will not be a substantial 
form. "Si qua ergo forma est quae non det materiae esse simpliciter, sed ad 
veniat materiae jam existenti in actu per aliquam formam, non erit forma . 
substantialia. rt33 
But since the soul does give being to the body, and being simply, it is 
a substantial form. Moreover, it is because the soul is the substantial 
form of the body that it must be so closely united to it since being belongs 
31Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Great., q.l, a.l, c. 
32Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.9, c. 
33Ibid; This-same distinction between substantial and accidental form is 
-clearly expressed in ~E! Anima, II, lect.l, n.224. 
~-· --------~ 
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to a thing more closely and immediately than anything else. "• •• inter 
omnia, esse est illud quod immediatius et intimius convenit rebus ••• ; unde 
oportet, cum materia habeat esse actu per formam, quod forma dans esse ma-
teriae, ante omnia intelligatur advenire materiae, et immediatius ceteris 
sibi inesse.n34 
This point may appear in a clearer light if we consider what st. Thomas 
says when commenting upon Aristotle's definition of the soul, that it is the 
act or form of a physically organized body having life potentially. He in-
vites us to observe that the soul is the form of the physically organized 
body having life potentially, and not merely having life. For, he tells us 
the body having life is understood to be the living composite substance. 
This composite does not belong to the definition of the form, that is to say, 
the form is not the whole composite. The matter of the living body is that 
which is related to life as potency to act, and this act is the soul by 
which the body lives. 
Dixit autem 1habentis vitam potentia' et non simpliciter 
habentis vit~. Nam corpus habens vit~ intelligitur 
substantia composita vivens. Compositum autem non poni-
tur in definitions formae. Materia autem corporis vivi 
est id quod comparatur ad vitam sicut potentia ad actum: 
et hoc est anima, actus, secundum quem corpus vivit.35 
The intellectual soul is the first act by which man lives, and feels, 
and knows, and moves because nothing acts except so far as it is in act, and 
a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now, life is shown through 
various activities, but the first principle of each of these activities is 
34Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.9, c. 35rn De Anima, II, leot.l, n.222, also Cont. Gent., II, 68-69, and 89. 
~---------. 
the soul. 
Manifestum est autam quod primum quo corpus vivit, est 
anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas ope-
rationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo prime 
operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est anima: 
anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus, et 
movemur secundum locum; at similiter quo prime intelli-
gimus.36 
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This does not mean, however, that it is the soul that lives, and feels, 
and moves, and knows. For St. Thomas, it is the man that acts, and this 
leads us to the second condition necessary for the soul to be the substan-
tial form of the body; namely, that soul and body should form one and only 
one substance. One thing cannot result from the union of two substances 
existing in act and complete in their species, but a unity can result from 
the combination of two incomplete substances, and soul and body are sub-
stances of this kind. "• •• ex duabus substantiis actu existentibus et 
perfectis in sua specie et natura non fit aliquid unum. Anima autem et 
corpus non sunt hujuronodi, cum sint partes humanae naturae; unde ex eis 
nihil prohibet fieri unum."37 
Soul and body, since they constitute one being, cannot be united by 
way of contact, properly so called, for such a union is only between bodies, 
and the soul is not a body. 
36 
Similiter autem patet quod substantia intellectualis non 
potest uniri corpori per modum contactus propria sumpti. 
Tactus enim nonnisi corporum est; sunt enim tangentia 
quorum sunt ultima simul, ut puncta, aut lineae, aut 
superficies, quae sunt corporum ultima, non igitur per 
Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.l, c. 
3
'7Q.""""Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.2, ~ ~· 
~----------. 
' 
modum contactus substantia intellectualis corpori uniri 
potest.38 
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Neither can the union of soul and body be that of virtual contact, which 
is that by which one thing touches another but is not itself touched by that 
other. It is by this sort of contact that a heavenly body touches an ele-
mental body, in so far as it changes the elamental body but is not itself 
changed by the contact. "Corpora enim coelestia tangunt quidem hoc modo 
elementaria corpora, in quantum ea alterant; non autem tanguntur ab eis, 
quia ab eis non patiuntur.tt39 Now, although a heavenly body can, in a sense, 
be said to be united in this way to the elements, such a union does not make 
one thing simply, for a thing has unity from the same cause that it has be-
ing. " ••• ab eodam ali quid habet esse et unitatem: unum enim et ens se 
consequuntur."40 Since the heavenly body does not give being to the object 
it touches, it does not make one thing simply. Such a union would not suit 
soul and body. 
Sic igitur substantia intellectualis potest corpori unlrl 
per contactum virtutis. Quae autem uniuntur secundum 
talem contactum non sunt unum simpliciter. Sunt enim 
unum in agendo et patiendo, quod non est esse unum sim-
pliciter. Sic enim dicitur unum quomodo et ens. Esse 
autem agens non significat esse simpliciter. Unde nee 
esse unum in agendo est esse unum simpliciter.41 
Now, the human composite must be a thing which is simply one, but there 
are three ways in which a thing may be said to be simply one: an indivisible 
38cont. Gent., II, 56. 
39Ibid.-
40-Ibid., 73. 
41-Cont. Gent., II, 56. 
--
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one, a continuous one, or an essential one.42 Now, an intellectual substance 
and a body cannot form together the kind of one that is indivisible, for the 
one that they will constitute obviously must be composed of two substances. 
Nor can they form together the one which is continuous because parts of the 
continuous are parts of quantity, and it is clear that there is no quantity 
in an intellectual substance. 
Unum autem simpliciter tripliciter dicitur: vel sicut in-
divisibile, vel sicut continuum, vel sicut quod est ratione 
unum. Ex substantia autem intellectuali et corpore non 
potest fieri unum quod sit indivisibile. Oportet enim 
illud esse compositum ex duobus. Nee iterum quod sit con-
tinuum, quia partes continui quantae sunt.43 
It remains, therefore, to determine whether the union of body and soul 
can result in the one which is essential. From two things which are per-
manent, essential unity does not result except from substantial form and its 
matter, for from a substance and an accident, for example, a man and his 
clothes, there cannot result a substance that is one essentially. "Ex duobus 
autem permanentibus non fit aliquod ratione unum, nisi sicut ex forma sub-
stantiali et materia. Ex substantia enim et accidente non fit ratione unum; 
non enim est eadem ratio hominis et albi."44 
If the soul were in the body as a sailor in a ship, the soul would 
doubtless move the body, but it would not with the body constitute one thing, 
for the union would, in that case, be only a virtual one. Nor can the soul 
42For examples of these three types and further explanation consult Aristotl~ 
Metaphysics, v, 7, 1015bl7-1017a (Richard McKeon, The Basic Works of 
4 Aristotle, Random House, New York, 1941). 3cont. Gent., II, 56. 
44:Ibid".-
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be related to the body as a man is related to his clothes, because the union 
existing between a man and his clothes is only an accidental one since the 
soul, in such a union, would constitute the entire essence. 
In refuting those who held that the whole nature of man was in his soul, 
and that man was not a unity consisting of two incomplete substances but a 
soul related to its body as a driver to the thing he moves, St. Thomas states 
that this opinion cannot be maintained because in that case the soul would 
not give species to the body and its parts; whereas the contrary is true, for 
we know that ~~en the soul departs, the various parts of the body retain 
their names only in an equivocal sense. The eye of a dead man, for instance, 
is only called an eye equivocally as that of a painted or stone eye. 
Ita si anima asset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, non daret 
speciam corpori, neque partibus ejus; cujus contrarium ap-
paret ex hoc quod recedente anima, singulae partes non re-
tinent pristinum nomen nisi aequivoce. Dicitur enim oculus 
mortui aequivoce oculus, sicut pictus aut lapideus; et 
simile est de aliis partibus.45 
This same thought of the soul's bestowal of species on the body appears 
in practically the same phrasing when St. Thomas proves that a spiritual 
substance can be united to a body and that it must be united to it as form 
to matter. Thus: 
Si enim anima non uniretur corpori ut forma, sequeretur 
quod corpus et partes ejus non haberent esse specificum 
per animam; quod manifeste falsum apparet; quia recedente 
anima non dicitur oculus aut caro et os nisi aequivoce. 
Sicut oculus pictus vel lapideus. Unde manifestum est 
quod anima est forma et quod quid erat esse hujus corpo-
ris; id est a qua hoc corpus habet rationem suae speciei.46 
45 
46Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, c. Q. Disp. De Spiritu. Great., q.l, a.2, c. 
~-----
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That the soul could not give species to the body if it were in it only 
as a sailor is in his ship is evident because the soul would then be only a 
mover, and the thing moved does not derive its species from that which moves 
• • • mobile non sortitur specie.m a suo motore. Si igitur 
anima non conjungitur corpori nisi sicut motor mobili, cor-
pus et partes ejus non consequuntur speciem ab anima. Ab-
eunte igitur anima, remanebit corpus et partes ejus ejusdem 
spec~e~. Hoc autem est manifeste falsum; nam caro, et os, 
et manus, et hujusmodi partes, post abcessum animae, non 
dicuntur nisi aequivoce, cum nulli harum partium propria 
operatic adsit, quae speciam consequitur. Non igitur uni-
tur anima corpori solum sicut motor mobili, vel sicut homo 
vestimento. 47 
Furthermore, the soul cannot be united to the body as a sailor to his 
ship because, since such a union would be accidental, death which effects 
their separation would not be a substantial corruption. But we know that 
death does bring about the dissolution of the composite; this, therefore, 
could not be true. "Et praeterea si anima asset in corpore sicut nauta in 
navi, sequeretur quod unio animae et corporis asset accidentalis. Mors 
igitur, quae inducit eorum separatione.m, non asset corruptio substantialia; 
quod patet esse falsum."48 
The composite substance ~nich is the result of soul and body united is, 
therefore, one being essentially, not accidentally, nor virtually, as we 
have seen. It is one precisely because the composite receives its being 
from the form. Before the advent of the form, the composite may be said to 
have existed potentially, but it did not have being actually. II • • .materia 
47c ont. Gent., II, 57. 4SQ:-is'isp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, c. 
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est ut potentia respectu formae, et forma est actus ejus; et iterum natura 
constituta ex materia et forma, est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse, in 
quantum est susceptiva ejus."49 
That soul and body should combine to form one being is absolutely neces-
sary in the doctrine of st. Thomas, for it is always the man that feels and 
lives and knows. It is true that the soul is the first principle of these 
operations, but we cannot say that the soul kn~•s, or feels, or acts; it is 
the man that performs those activities.50 Moreover, things different in be-
ing cannot produce an action which would be one in origin. YAny agents act-
ing together can perform the same action, such as rowing a boat. The termi-
nation of such an action would be one, but on the part of the rowers them-
selves there would be many actions by many actors. now, although the soul 
has a proper operation in which the body has no share, for example, under-
standing, there are, however, some operations which are common to body and 
soul working together, such as to fear, to be angry, and the like, for these 
happen by some change in a determinate organ of the body. This makes it 
clear that there are operations pertaining to the composite, and soul and 
body must, therefore, be one being, and not each a distinct being. 
Item, impossibile est quod eorum quae sunt diversa secundum 
esse sit operatio una. Dico autem operationem unam non ex 
parte ejus in quod terminatur actio, sed secundum quod 
egreditur ab agente. Multi enim trahentes navem, unam 
actionem faciunt ex parte operati, quod est unum, sed tamen 
ex parte trahentium sunt multae actiones, qui sunt diversi 
impulsus ad trahendum ••• Quamvis autem animae sit aliqua 
operatio propria, in qua non communicat corpus, sicut 
!~Q. Disp. ~ Spiritu. Great., q.l, a.l, c. 
~· Theol., I, q.76, a.l, c. 
intelligere; sunt tamen aliquae operationes communes sibi 
et corpori, ut timere, irasci, et sentire, et hujusmodi. 
Haec enim accidunt secundum aliquam transmutationem ali-
cujus determinatae partis corporis. Ex quo patet quod 
simul sunt animae et corporis operationes. Oportet igi-
tur ex anima et corpore unum fieri, et quod non sint 
secundum esse diversa.51 
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It is quite evident, therefore, that since being and operation belong 
neither to the form alone nor to the matter alone, but to the composite, 
being and action are attributed to two substances which stand to each other 
as form to matter, for we say that a man is healthy in body and health, and 
that he is knowing in knowledge and soul; knowledge is the for.m of the soul 
knowing, and health is the form of the healthy body. But living and feeling 
belong to both soul and body, for we live and sense as man, not in just the 
soul, nor in just the body, but the soul is still the principle of life and 
feeling,--and is, therefore, the form of the body. 
Amplius, quia tam esse quam etiam operari non est solum 
formae nee solum materiae, sed conjuncti, esse et agere 
duobus attribuuntur, quorum unum se habet ad alterum si-
cut forma ad materiam, Dicimus enim quod homo est sanus 
corpore et sanitate, et quod est sciens scientia et 
anima. Quorum scientia est forma animae scientis, et 
sanitas corporis sani. Vivere autem, ac sentire attribu-
itur animae et corpori. Dicimur vivere et sentire anima 
et corpore, sed anima taman sicut principia vitae et 
sensus. Est igitur anima forma corporis.52 
The two requirements to be fulfilled in order that a substances may be 
the substantial form of a thing have, consequently, been verified in the 
rational soul. The rational soul is a substantial form, first, because it 
gives being simply to the body, that is to say, it communicates existence to 
51
cont. ~·· II, 57. 
52 Ibid. 
~
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the body; and secondly, because together with the body it constitutes one 
bein0, since the composite receives its being from the soul, and before the 
advent of the soul has being only in potentiality. 
Now, since the soul is the substantial form of the human body, it is 
natural that it should be united to its proper matter. To be separated from 
the body is unnatural to the soul, as we shall show in the final chapter. 
since, therefore, union with the body is according to nature, and separation 
from the body not in accordance with nature, it is fitting that what is 
natural should precede what is unnatural, and that the soul should be first 
united to the body before being separated from it, and should, therefore, 
receive existence only in the human body. This is fitting because what be-
comes a thing according to nature is in it "per se"; whereas, that which be-
coms a thing beside nature is in it only accidentally and always follows 
what becomes the thing "per se." Therefore, the soul was not created before 
the body to which it is united. 
Amplius, unicuique formae naturale est propriae materiae 
uniri; alioquin constitutum ex forma et materia esset ali-
quid praeter naturam. Prius autem attribuitur unicuique 
quod convenit ei secundum naturam quam quod convenit ei 
praeter naturam; quod enim convenit alicui praeter naturam, 
inest ei per accidens; quod autem convenit ei secundum 
naturam, inest ei per se: quod autem per accidens est, 
semper posterius est eo quod est per se. Animae igitur 
prius convenit esse unitam corpori quam esse a corpore 
separatam. Non est igitur creata ante corpus cui unitur.53 
There is, however, one sense in which we may say that the soul precedes 
the body, and another sense in which we may say that the body precedes the 
53~.~·~ II, 83. 
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soul. Soul and body, as we have said, are related to each other as act and 
potency. Now, in nature whatever is in potency to become something must be 
actualized by something already in act. However, in one and the same thing 
potency is prior to act. 
Actus autem, ••• natura est prior potentia. Est enim 
finis et complementum potentiae. Sed ordine generationis 
et temporis, universaliter loquendo actus est prior po-
tentia. Nam id quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum 
per aliquid ens actu. Sed in uno et eodem potentia est 
prior actu. N~ aliquid est primo in potentia, et postea 
actus fit.54 
Now, the human body is matter proportionate to the human soul, for it is 
related to it as potency to act: "• •• corpus humanum est materia propor-
tionata animae humanae; comparatur enim ad eam ut potentia ad actum;"55 But 
the human body from being potentially human is made actually so by the coming 
of the human soul. In this sense, then, matter does precede the soul in 
point of time, matter considered as being in potentiality to form; it is 
then not human in act but only in potentiality, for when it is human in act, 
as perfected by the human soul, it is neither prior nor posterior to the 
soul, but simultaneous with it. 
Corpus igitur hurranum, secundum quod est in potentia ad 
animam, utpote quum nondum habet animam, est prius tem-
pore quam anima; tunc autem non est humanum actu, sed 
potentia tantum; quum vero est humanum actu, quasi per 
animam humanam perfectum~ non est prius neque posterius 
anima sed simul cum ea.s 
The soul in the sense that it has the being which it communicates to its 
;~~Anima, II, lect.l, n.228, also Cont. ~·, II, 89. 
Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, ad sum. 
ssc t . - --on • Gent., II, 89. 
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matter can likewise be said to be prior to the matter which it will take to 
itself, but in the being of the composite there is no true priority, for body 
and soul are created simultaneously, and the being of the composite is the 
being of the form. 
Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod 
est subsistens ••• esse formale principium essendi ma-
teriae, quasi esse suum communicans materiae; non est enim 
inconveniens quod idem sit esse in quo subsistit compositum_ 
et forma ipsa, quum compositum non sit nisi per formam ••• o7 
The second proof, then, that the rational soul receives existence only 
in the human body is based upon the principle that the soul is the substan-
tial form of the body, and although it actualizes the body, which is its pro-
per matter, it does not begin to exist .apart from the body because its being 
does not subsist apart from the being of the composite, as st. Thomas states 
when he concludes the statement just quoted with the words: "• •• nee 
seorsum utrum.que subsista.t. n58 
A third proof that the soul begins to exist only in the body is found 
in the impossibility of sufficiently accounting for its union vdth the body 
if it already existed and had the completion of its nature, "• • • si anima 
rationalis extra corpus oreata fuit, et ibi habuit sui esse naturalis com-
plementum, impossibile est convenientem causam assignare unionis ejus ad 
corpus."59 
Now, if the soul pre-existed, it must have been united to the body 
either by force, or by nature, or by deliberate choice, or by divine ordi-
57Ibid., 68. 
58cont. Gent., II, 68. 
5~isp. De Pot., q.3, a.lO, c. 
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nance. 
It could not have been joined to the body by force because that would 
make of the resultant composite the effect of violence and thus opposed to 
nature. We cannot admit that the human composite is something unnatural~ for 
we have proved that the soul is the substantial for.m of the body~ and the 
form of a natural thing is its nature; "Item, natura est secundum quam res 
aliqua dicitur res naturalis. Dicitur autem res naturalis ex hoc quod habet 
formam ••• Forma igitur rei naturalis est ejus natura.n60 As we have al-
ready shown that St. Thomas insists upon the naturalness of the union between 
soul and body~ we need only mention here that the thought of any union which 
would be the result of force is repugnant to us, for we cannot suppose that 
man is an unnatural being. Furthermore~ intellectual substances are in a 
higher order than are the heavenly bodies~ and if nothing violent can be 
found in these latter, much less can it be found in the former. Therefore, 
we must conclude that rational souls are not united to their bodies by force. 
This is the argument which St. Thomas gives vmen he investigates the possi-
bility of violence as a cause of union: 
Si autem violenter (omne autem violentum est contra naturam), 
unio igitur animae ad corpus est praeter naturam; homo igi-
tur, qui ex utroque componitur, est quid innaturale; quod 
patet esse falsum. Praeterea, substantiae intellectuales 
altioris ordinis sunt quam corpora coelestia; in corporibus 
autem coelestibus, nihil invenitur violentem neque contra 
naturam; multo igitur minus in substantiis intellectualibus.61 
Souls created before their bodies would not be united to them by nature, 
60cont. Jent., IV, 35. 
6lcont. Gent., II, 83. 
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ror if it is nature that unites them, souls would have had a natural desire 
ror union with their bodies from the first moment of their creation. Now the 
natural appetite is immediately operative unless it is in some way hindered, 
as is clear from an observation of the movements of heavy and light bodies. 
Therefore, if pre-existing souls were endowed with this natural desire for 
union with bodies, they would have been inunediately united to them unless 
they were prevented. But everything that impedes the exercise of a natural 
appetite does so by violence. It would follow, therefore, that it was by 
violence that souls were at some time separated from their bodies. This con-
sequence would be unfitting since there can be nothing violent in substances 
such as rational souls, as has been shown. 
Si autem naturaliter animae sunt oorporibus unitae, naturali-
ter igitur animae in sui creatione appetierunt corporibus 
un1r1. Appetitus autem naturalis statim prodit in actum, 
nisi sit aliquid impediens, sicut patat in motu gravium et 
levium; natura enim semper uno modo operatur. Statim ergo 
a principia suae creationis, fuissent corporibus unitae, 
nisi asset aliquid impediens. Sed omne impediens execu-
tionem naturalis appetitus, est violentiam inferens. Per 
violentiam igitur fuit quod animae assent aliquo tempore a 
corporibus separatae; quod est inconveniens, tum quia in 
illis substantiis non potest esse aliquid violentum, ut 
supra ostensum est, tum quia violentum et quod est contra 
naturam, quum sit per accidens, non potest esse prius eo 
quod est secundum naturam, neque totam speciem oonsequens. 62 
It is clear, therefore, that it is not by nature that souls created be-
fore bodies would be united to their bodies since such a union would have to 
be by violence, and so, unnatural and accidental and, consequently, such an 
unnatural state could not precede the natural nor be consequent upon the 
-
62cont. ('! t 
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~hole species, as St. Thomas states in the above text. Furthermore, why 
should souls created from the beginning desire after long intervals to be 
united to bodies since spiritual substances are above time as superior to 
heavenly revolutions? "• •• quia nulla ratio asset quare animae a principia 
mundi creatae, post tot tempera, voluntas accesserit ut nunc corpori uniatur. 
Est enim substantia spiritualis supra tempus, utpote revolutiones coeli ex-
cedens."63 Nature would not have brought about a union after so many years 
because what happens at time intervals is caused by the movement of celestial 
bodies since movement is the measure of the spaces of time. Now souls with-
out bodies would not be subject to the movements of celestial bodies; where-
fore, we cannot say that souls were united to bodies by nature if we hold 
that they first existed bodiless. This is what St. Thomas has expressed as 
follows: 
Nee iterum potest dici, quod post aliquos annorum circuitus 
naturalis ei appetitus supervenerit corpori adhaerendi; et 
quod ex operatione naturae hujusmodi unio sit causata. Nam 
ea quae certo temporis spatia secundum naturam aguntur, ad 
motum caeli reducuntur sicut ad causam, per quam temporum 
spatia mensurantur. Animas autem separatas non est possibile 
caelestium corporum motibus subjacere.64 
If, however, it is said that it is natural to the soul to be at one time 
separated from the body and at another to be united to it, this would seem 
impossible because whatever varies naturally in a subject is accidental to 
it, for example for a man to be young at one time and old at another time. 
If, therefore, it were natural to the soul to be at one time united to the 
63 6~sum. Theol., I, q.ll8, a.3, c. Q. Disp. ~~·· q.3, a.lO, c. 
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body and at another time separated from the body, it would follow that it is 
accidental to the soul to be united to the body at all, the consequence be-
ing that man himself would be an accidental being. This seems to be the 
thought of the following passage: 
Si autem dicatur quod utrumque est animae naturale, scilicet 
uniri corpori et esse a corpore separatam pro diversis tam-
paribus, hoc videtur esse impossibile, quia ea quae naturali-
ter variantur circa subjectum sunt accidentia, sicut juven-
tus et senectus. Si igitur uniri corpori et separari a cor-
pore naturaliter circa animam varietur, erit accidens animae 
corpori uniri; et sic ex hac unione homo constitutus non 
erit ens per se, sed per accidens.65 
Although in this quotation, St. Thomas is speaking of a soul pre-exist-
ing without a body as an unnatural thing, still he holds the same opinion 
with regard to the soul after death has occasioned the separation of soul and 
body. More will be said on that subject when we treat of the final happiness 
of the soul in the last chapter, but we may note in passing this remark of 
the Angelic Doctor's: 
Manifestum est ••• quod anima corpori naturaliter unitur, 
est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. Est igi-
tur contra naturam animae absque corpora esse. Nihil aute.m 
quod est contra naturampotest esse perpetuum. Non igitur 
perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Quum igitur perpetuo 
maneat, oportet earn oorpori iterate conjungi: quod est 
resurgere.66 
The soul is likewise not united to the body by deliberate choice: firs 
because if it were united to the body by its own will, it could leave the 
body at its own will, and it is quite evident that the soul has not this 
power. "Non enim potest dici, quod proprio motu se corporibus adjunxit, cum 
65cont. Gent., II, 83. 
66cont. Gent., IV, 79. 
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videamus quod deserere corpus non subjaceat animae potestati; quod esset, si 
ex voluntate sua corpori asset unita.n67 
Furthermore, it could not be united by its own choice because if it 
could begin to exist apart from the body, it would be in a higher state at 
that time than when joined to the body. Now it is impossible that it should 
desire to exist in a less perfect state unless it were deceived. It could 
not be deceived because if it were in a perfect state it would have perfect 
knowledge and no bodily passions to influence it. 
Si autem dicatur quod neque per violenti~ neque per natu-
rrun corporibus uniuntur, sed spontanea voluntate, hoc esse 
non potest. Nullus enim vult in statum pejorem venire ni-
si deceptus. Anima autem separata est altioris status quam 
oorpori unita, et praeoipue secundum Platonicos, qui dicunt 
quod ex unione corporis patitur oblivionem eorum quae prius 
scivit, et retardatur a contemplations purae veritatis. 
Non igitur volens corpori unitur nisi decepta, Deceptionis 
autem nulla causa in ea potest existere, quum ponatur secun-
dum eos scientiam omnium habere. Nee posset dici quod judi-
cium ex universali causa procedens in particulari eligibili 
subvertatur propter passiones ••• quia passiones hujus-
modi non sunt absque corporali transmutations; unde non pos-
sunt esse in anima separata. Relinquitur igitur quod anima, 
si fuisset ante corpus, non uniretur corpori propria volun-
tate.68 
Likewise it could not be united by its own choice because such a union 
would be a chance union since everything resulting from hvo mutually inde-
pendent wills is a casual effect. This is clear from an example. If a per-
son desiring to meet an acquaintance, but not making an engagement to do so, 
were to meet the desired man by chance at a certain place, we would designate 
such a meeting as a chance one. Now, with regard to soul and body, the will 
6
67Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.lO, c. 
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of the begetter would not depend upon the will of the pre-existing soul. 
since the union of soul and body could not take place in such an instance 
without the concurrence of both wills, it would follow that if there were a 
union, it would be a chance one, and the generation of man a casual, not a 
natural, occurrence. Obviously this cannot be admitted for such a union hap-
pens in the majority of instances. 
Praeterea, omnis effectus procedens ex concursu duarum 
voluntatum ad invicem non ordinatarum est effectus casu-
alis; sicut patet quum aliquis, intendens emere, obviat 
in foro creditori illuc non ex condicto venienti. Volun-
tas autem patris generantis, ex qua dependet generatio 
corporis, non habet ordinem cum voluntate animae separa-
tae uniri volentis. Quum igitur absque utraque voluntate 
unio corporis et animae fieri non possit, sequitur quod 
sit casualis; et ita generatio hominis non est a natura, 
sed a casuA quod patet esse falsum, quum sit ut in 
pluribus. 6~ 
That the soul is not united to the body by deliberate desire and choice 
seems clear then from the three preceding arguments: first, the soul lacks 
the power to leave the body at vrill; secondly, the soul would not choose to 
exist in a less perfect state; and thirdly, a union dependent on the will of 
the soul could only be a casual one. 
Finally, if the soul existed before its union with the body, we cannot 
say that it was united in time by divine ordinance. For if it be said that 
God united the soul to the body for the perfection of the soul, what reason 
could be assigned for His having created the soul without a body? nsimiliter 
non potest dici, quod a Deo sint oorpori alligatae, si eas prius absque cor-
poribus creavisset. Si enim dicatur, quod ad earum perfeotionem hoc fecit, 
-
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non fuisset ratio quare absque corporibus crearentur."70 If God did create 
the soul before its union with the body, that state of the soul would have 
been more perfect since God created each thing according to its nature. Now 
just as it is repugnant to us to think that any soul would deliberately 
choose a worse state, so it is likewise inconceivable that God, in His divine 
goodness, would reduce the soul from a higher state to a lower one. 
Si autem rursus dicatur quod nee ex natura nee ex propria 
voluntate animae corpori unitur, sed ex divina ordinations, 
hoc etiam non videtur conveniens, si animae ante corpora 
fuerunt creatae. Unumquodque enim Deus instituit secundum 
convenientem modum suae naturae; unde et de singulis crea-
tis dicitur: 'Vidit Deus quod esset bonum' (Gen., I, 10), 
et simul de omnibus: 'Viditque cuncta quae fecerat, et 
erant valde bona' (Ibid., 31). Si igitur animas creavit 
a corporibus separatas, oportet dicere quod hie modus es-
sendi sit convenientior naturae earum. Non est autem ad 
ordinationem divinae bonitatis pertinens res ad inferiorem 
statum reducere, sed magis ad meliorem promovere. Non 
igitur ex divina ordinations factum fuisset quod anima cor-
pori uniretur.71 
Further, it is contrary to divine wisdom to ennoble lower things to the 
detriment of higher. Now bodies subject to generation and corruption are 
the least in the order of things. It would, therefore, have been unsuitable 
to divine wisdom to ennoble human bodies by uniting to them pre-existing 
souls because it is evident that union with bodies would be a less perfect 
state for souls and to their detriment if they had pre-existed. 
Praeterea, non pertinet ad ordinem divinae sapientiae, cum 
superiorum detrimento, ea quae sunt infima nobilitare. In-
fima autem in rerum ordine sunt corpora generabilia et cor-
ruptibilia. Non igitur fuisset conveniens ordine sapientiae, 
ad nobilitandum humana corpora, animas prae-existentes eis 
70Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.l6, c. 
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unire, quum hoc sine detrimento earum esse non possit, ut 
ex dictis patet.72 
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Nor can we say that God united souls to bodies as a punishment for some 
sin committed in a pre-existing state. The soul would thus be in the body 
as in a prison, and it would follow that the formation of natures composed 
of spiritual and corporeal substances would have been accidental and not 
originally intended by God. This is again contrary to what we are told of 
creation: that God saw all the things that He had made and found them good. 
we can see from this that God's goodness, and not the creature's sin, was 
the cause of His good works. 
Si vera in earum poenam hoc factum est, ut corporibus quasi 
quibusdam carceribus intruderentur, ••• propter peccata 
commissa, sequeretur quod institutio naturar,um ex spirituali-
bus et corporalibus substantiis compositarum, esset per ac-
cidens, et non ex prima Dei intentione: quod est contra id 
quod legitur Genes., I, 31: 'Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, 
et erant valde bona:' ubi manifeste ostenditur bonitatem 
Dei et non malitiam cujuscumgue creaturae fuisse causam 
bonorum operum condendorum.7~ 
It would certainly be contrary to reason to hold that union of body and 
soul were a punishment of sin for the soul is naturally a part of human 
nature and imperfect without the body, just as is any part separated from 
its whole, and it is repugnant to reason to suppose that God would begin His 
work with imperfect things: 
Unde non est dicendum, quod animae habuerint merita bona 
vel mala, antequam corporibus unirentur. Est etiam contra 
rationem. Nam cum naturaliter anima sit pars humanae 
naturae, imperfecta est sine corpore existens, sicut est 
quaelibet pars separata a toto. Inconveniens autem fuisset 
72Ibid 7~· Q. Disp • .£.::Pot., q.3, a.lO, c. · 
quod Deus ab imperfectis suam operationam inciperet; unde 
non est rationabile quod animam creaverit ante corpus, 
sicut neque quod manum formaverit extra hominem.74 
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Furthermore, punishment is opposed to the good of nature, and because of 
this is said to be something evil. If, therefore, the union of body and soul 
is a penalty, it is not a good of nature. This is an impossible supposition 
since union is intended by nature and is the natural end of human generation. 
If such union were not a natural good, the being of man would not be a 
natural gpod. 
Poena enim bono naturae adversatur, et hoc dicitur mala. 
Si igitur unio animae et corporis est quoddam poenale, 
non est bonum naturae; quod est impossibile; est enim 
intentum per naturam, nam ad hoc naturalis generatio 
terminatur. Et iterum sequeretur quod esse hominum non 
esset bonum secundum naturam, quum tamen dicatur post 
hominis creationem: 'Viditque Deus cuncta quae fecerat 
et erant vald.e bona' (~., I, 31).75 
That union of soul and body is a punishrnent is proved false from the Old 
Testament, from reason, and from Apostolic teaching, for St. Thomas says: 
"Sed hoc repugnat apostolicae doctrinae; dicit enim Apostolus, ~·· IX, 11, 
de Jacob et Esau loquens: 'Cwn nondum nati assent aut aliquid boni vel mali 
egissent; etc.' Eadem autem est ratio de orr~ibus.n76 
We have now shown that it is necessary to hold that souls were not 
created before their bodies because no reason can be fittingly assigned for 
their union with their bodies if they pre-existed. We have seen that tl1ey 
could not be united by force for the union resulting would be an unnatural 
74Q. Disp. De Jllalo, q.5, a.4, c. (Marietti, II) 
75cont. Gent.",""""IY; 83. 
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one; they could not be united by nature since we can see no reason why they 
should experience any desire for bodies if they once lived without them es-
pecially since they are not under the influence of the_ heavenly bodies; they 
could not be united by deliberate choice for they would not wish to enter 
into a less perfect state than that they formerly enjoyed apart from their 
bodies; moreover, such a union by the concurrence of two mutually independent 
wills could only be a casual one and 1nan, consequently, a being ''per acci-
dens"; likevrise we cannot say that God ordained that pre-existing souls 
should in a moment of time seek dwelling in bodies since it is contrary to 
His wisdom and goodness to reduce creatures to a lower from a higher state or 
to elevate lower creatures at the expense of superior beings; it is likewise 
repugnant to divine wisdom and goodness that man should be constituted as he 
is as a result of sin, a state contrary to the good of nature resulting in 
man's nature composed of soul and body being something unnatural. And this 
leads us to the fourth argument given by the great Christian philosopher to 
prove that the rational soul is created at the same time as its body and not 
before. 
Huw~n souls depend upon their bodies for their distinction one from 
another. Diversity of souls, in other words, depends upon diversity of 
bodies. If human souls were not created together ~~th their proper matter, 
they would not differ one from another. Fow, st. Thomas holds that each 
rational soul is substantially distinct from every other rational soul, but 
this distinction does not arise from a difference in the essential principles 
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of the soul, nor from a different kind of soul, but from the aptitude which 
each soul has for its own body, for one soul is adapted to this particular 
body, and another soul to that particular body. In stating that the multi-
plicity of souls separated from their bodies by death follows upon a sub-
5tantial distinction of forms, "• •• ~uia alia est substantia hujus animae 
et illius;" he adds: 
Non tamen ista diversitas procedit ex diversitate prin-
cipiorum essentialium ipsius anime.e, nee est secundum 
diversam rationem ipsius animae, sed est secundum diver-
saw, commensurntionem animarum ad corpora; haec enim 
anima est commensurata huic cor2ori et non illi, illa 
autem alii, et sic de omnibus.77 
Again he states that souls are diversified according to number because 
they are capable of being united to bodies, numerically diversified. 
"• •• unde per hoc quod est unibilis diversis corporibus, diversificatur 
secundum numerum. • n78 • This same thought we find in slightly different 
terminology in the following: 
• • • sicut enim animae humanae secundum suam speciem 
competit quod tali corpori secundum speciem uniatur, ita 
haec anima differt ab illa numero solo, ex hoc quod ad 
aliud numero corpus habitudinem habet; et sic individu-
antur animae humanae ••• secundum corpora, non quasi 
individuatione a corporibus causata.79 
We shall refer a little later, (Infra, footnote, 92), to the last claus 
in the text just cited, but here we desire only to emphasize that matter is 
the principle of individuation of forms. 
77 Cont. Gent., II, 81. 
7~end"ftiiii Theologiae, I, 85, (Opuscula Omnia, R. P. Mandonnet, Lethiel-
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The fact that there are differences in men even from their birth led 
some to suppose that difference must have arisen from merit, as the objection 
states: "Sed secundum justi tiam non dantur di versa et inaequalia nisi in 
illiS in quibus aliqua inaequalitas meriti praeexistit.n80 To this St. 
Thomas replies by asserting again that diversity of souls derives from 
diverse dispositions of their bodies and not from a difference in merit of 
souls. Justice pertains to what is due to a thing, but nothing is due to a 
soul as yet uncreated • 
• • • ad justitian1 pertinere reddere debitum; unde contra 
justitiam fit, si inaequalia aequalibus dantur, quando 
debita redduntur, non autem quando gratis aliqua dantur: 
quod convenit in creatione animarum. Vel potest dici, 
quod ista diversitas non procedit ex diverse merito ani-
r.Arum, sed ex diversa dispositions corporum;Bl 
How just why is it that souls depend upon their bodies for their dis-
tinction one from the other? The answer is that if souls differed as souls, 
each soul would constitute in itself a distinct species, for a distinction 
of forms is a distinction of species, according to St. Thomas, who holds 
that there is a two fold distinction in things: one, a formal distinction 
in those thinls that differ specifically; the other, a material distinction 
in those things which differ numericall~r· "Duplex distinctio invenitur in 
rebus: una formalis in his quae differunt specie: alio vero materialis in 
his quae differunt numero tantum. nS2 
Just why is it that the soul is not a species in itself? Precisely 
80Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.lO, obj. 15. 
81Ibid., adl5um. 
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because it is a form. and a form is not perfected in its species without its 
proper matter. We saw in the first proof of the soul's dependency upon the 
body for the beginning of its existence that st. Thomas insists upon the fact 
that the soul is not the entire essence of human nature. but merely a part of 
human nature. If each soul were a distinct species, men would differ the one 
trom the other specifically, and this cannot be held. Psrhaps we may present 
this in a clearer light if we consider very briefly the reason that St. 
Thomas gives to prove that the soul has not all that it needs for the per-
faction of its nature. The species of a thing. he tells us, is judged ac-
oording to the operation proper to it according to its nature. "• •• speoi-
es rei judicatur secundum operationem competentem ei secundum propriam na-
turamJ"83 Now, the proper operation of the soul is understanding. This 
operation, though distinct from the body, requires material received through 
the senses for the exercise of its operation. In the grade of intellectual 
substances it is. therefore, the last since higher intellectual substances 
do not in any sense require bodies for the exercise of their proper opera-
tions. Speaking of immaterial substances, st. Thomas has this to say: 
••• at hoc quidem gradatim producitur usque ad animam 
humanam. quae in eis tenet ultimum gradum, sicut materia 
prima in genera rerum sensibilium; unde in sui natura non 
habet perfectiones intelligibiles, sed est in potentia 
ad intelligibilia. sicut materia prima ad formas sensi-
biles; unde ad propriam operationem indiget ut fiat in 
actu formarum intelligibilium aoquirendo eas per sensi-
tivas potentias a rebus exterioribus; et cum operatio 
sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditione 
suae naturae campetit ei quod oorpori uniatur. et quod 
83Q. Disp. ~Anima, q.l. a.7 • ~ ~· 
sit pars speciei humanae; non habens in se speciam com-
pletam.84 
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More will be said later on this need of the soul for the senses (Infra, 
footnote, 99, and the following chapter); it is simply mentioned here to in-
sist upon the impossibility of human souls being of different species, and 
just why they are not complete in their species. As forms, rational souls 
are identical. They differ by union with their matter. "Quaecumque sunt 
idem specie, differentia autem numero, habent materiam. Differentia autem 
quae ex forma procedit inducit diversitatem speciei; quae autam est ex ma-
teria inducit diversitatem secundum numerum;n85 Obviously by "habent materi-
am" st. Thomas does not mean that there is matter in the soul. The soul can-
not have matter in it because it can know the natures of all corporeal 
things, a knowledge which it could not have if anything material were in it 
since that material element would constitute an obstacle to the understand-
ing of other beings.86 A clear exposition of this is contained in the text 
which follows: 
Cum enim anima non sit composita ex materia at forma ••• 
distinctio animarum ab invicem esse non posset nisi se-
cundum formalem differentiam, si solum secundum se ipsas 
distinguerentur. Formalis autem differentia diversitatem 
speciei inducit. Diversitas autam secundum numerum in 
eadem specie ex differentia materiali procedit; quae qui-
dam animae competere non potest secundum naturam ex qua 
fit, sed secundum materiam in qua fit.87 
The soul is, therefore, individualized by matter, not matter which is a part 
::Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.7, c. 
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of it, but by the matter in which it is, and for which it has an aptitude. 
"• •• anima non individuatur per materiam ex qua sit, sed secundum habitudi-
nem ad materiam in qua est.•88 The soul finds its perfection through its 
matter, and souls are, therefore, multiplied according to number, not accord-
ing to species ". • • quamvis anima non habeat materiam part em sui ex qua 
sit, habet taman materiam in qua est cujus perfeotio est; ad ejus enim di-
visionam multiplicatur secundum numerum, et non secundum speciam.n89 
Matter is, therefore, the principle of individuation, but not matter 
considered in itself. To be the principle of diversity matter must be under 
certain determinate dimensions, for St. Thomas states: 
Et ex his dimensionibus interminatis efficitur haec ma-
teria signata, et sic individuat formam, et sic ex ma-
teria causatur diversitas secundum numerum in eadem spe-
cie. Unde patet quod materia secundum se considerata 
non est principium diversitatis secundum speciem, nee 
secundum numerum: sed sicut prinoipium diversitatis 
secundum genus prout subest communi formae; ita est 
prinoipium diversitatis secundum numerum prout subest 
dimensionibus interminatis:90 
And again st. Thomas says that if it should be asked why this form dif-
fers from that, there is no other reason than that it is in this determinate 
matter. "• •• sed si quaeratur quare haec forma differt ab illa, non erit 
alia ratio, nisi quia est in alia materia signata.n91 
It should be clear, than, that it is determinate matter, matter propor-
tionate to the rational soul, such as the substance of the human body, that 
88Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.6, ad 13um. 
89In II Sent., <I.xvu, q.2, a.l-;-a~. 
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18 the matter which is the principle of diversity, but lest it should be 
thought that the worth of the individual suffers from this dependency upon 
matter for his distinction from other individuals, it may be well to note 
that st. Thomas does not make of matter, even determinate matter, the cause 
of di varsity. 
Manifestum est autem ••• quod causa diversitatis in rebus 
non est materiae diversitas. Ostensum est enim, quod ma-
teria non praasupponitur actioni divinaa, qua res inesse 
produoit. Causa autem diversitatis rerum non est ex materia 
nisi secundum quod materia ad rerum productionem praeexigi-
tur, ut scilicet secundum diversitatem materiae diversae 
inducantur formae. Non igitur causa diversitatis in rebus 
a Deo produotis est materia.92 
This is simply affirming that the multiplication of bodies is not the cause 
of the multiplication of forms since the matter is for the form, and the 
material distinction for the formal one, as he insists upon: "Cum autem 
materia sit propter formam, distinctio materialis est propter formalem."93 
That the form is not for the matter but the matter for the form is an essen-
tial point in the Thomistic doctrine. We find it again expressed in these 
terms: 
Adhuc, secundum res habent esse, ita habent pluralitatem 
at unitatem, nam unumquodque secundum quod est ens, est 
etiam unum: sed non habent esse formae propter materiam, 
sed magis materiae propter formas, nam actus melior est 
potentia, id autem propter aliquid est, oportet melius 
esse: neque igitur formae ideo aunt diversae ut competant 
materiis diversis, sed materiae ideo aunt diversae, ut 
oompetant diversis formis.94 
St. Thomas reaches the conclusion that souls are multiplied according 
92 9~omp. Theol., I, 71. 9~sum. Theol., I, q. 47, a.2. c • 
._ .22I!l£• Theol., I, 71. 
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to the multiplication of bodies, but also that the multiplication of bodies 
is not the cause of the multiplication of souls by observing that things that 
need to be adapted or that are proportionate the one to the other are to-
gather multiplied or unified each by its own cause. Now, if the being of the 
one depends upon the being of the other, the unity or multiplicity of the one 
depends likewise upon that other; if not, then it depends upon some extrinsic 
cause. Now, matter and form must always be proportionate to each other, and, 
as it were, naturally adapted to each other because the proper act of a thing 
is produced in its proper matter. Matter and form must, therefore, always 
agree in multitude and unity. If the being of the form depends upon the be-
ing of the matter, its multiplicity and also its unity will depend upon the 
matter, but if not, it will, indeed, be necessary that the forrr. should be 
multiplied according to the matter, that is to say together with the matter 
and proportionate to it, but not in such a way that its very unity and multi-
plicity, however, should be dependent upon the matter. He concludes, con-
sequently, that since rational souls are forms independent of matter in their 
being, they are multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies, but the 
multiplication of bodies is not the cause of the multiplication of souls. 
This is, moreover, the reason that he gives for the continuation of the mul-
tiplicity of souls after separation from their bodies: 
••• quaecumque oportet esse invicem coaptata et propor-
tionata, simul recipiunt multitudinem vel unitatem, unum-
quodque ex sua causa. Si igitur esse unius dependeat ab 
altero, unitas vel multiplicatio ejus eti~ ex illo depen-
det; alioquin ex alia causa extrinseca. For.mwm igitur et 
materiam semper oportet esse ad invicem proportionata et 
quasi naturaliter ooaptata, quia proprius actus in propria 
materia fit; unde semper oportet quod materia et forma con-
sequantur se invicem in multitudine et unitate. Si igitur 
esse formae dependet a materia, multiplicatio ipsius a ma-
teria dependet et similiter unitas; si aute.m non, erit qui-
dam necessarium multiplicari formam secundum multiplicatio-
nem materiae, id est simul cum materia et (secundum) pro-
portionem ipsius; non aute.m ita quod dependeat unitas vel 
multitude ipsius formae a materia. Ostensum est autem quod 
anima humana est forma secundum suum esse a materia non de-
pendens. Unde sequitur quod multiplicantur quidem animae 
secundum quod multiplicantur corpora; non taman multipli-
catio corporum erit causa multiplicationis animarum. Et 
ideo non oportet quod~ destructis corporibus, cesset plu-
ralitas animarum. • • 5 
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It should be manifest, then, in what sense st. Thomas means us to take 
matter as a principle of individuation. It is both this matter and this 
form which make a thing an individual. This form, the rational soul, al-
though a self-subsistent being, cannot, precisely as for.m, be a self-subsis-
tent being. It requires its matter to enable it to be distinguished from 
every other soul, and, therefore, it cannot begin to exist apart from its 
determinate matter. 
Unde sicut diversitatem in genera, vel specie facit diversi-
tas materiae, vel formae absolute, ita diversitatem in nu-
mero facit haec forma et haec materia: nulla autem forma, 
in quantum hujusmodi, est hie ex seipsa. Dico autem in 
quantum hujusmodi propter animam rationalem, quae quodam-
modo ex seipsa est hoc aliquid, sed non in quantum for.ma. 
Intellectus vero quamlibet formam quam possibile est re-
cipi in aliquo, sicut in materia, vel sicut in subjecto, 
natus est attribuere pluribus, quod est contra rationem 
ejus quod est hoc aliquid, unde forma fit per hoc quod 
recipitur in materia: sed cum materia in se considerata 
sit indistincta, non potest esse quod formam in se recap-
tam individuet, nisi secundum quod est distinguibilis. 
Non enim forma individuatur per hoc quod reoipitur in ma-
teria, nisi quatenus recipitur in hoc materia, vel illa 
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distincta et determinata ad hoc et nunc.96 
We can say, consequently, that we cannot have many human souls of the 
same species which would at the same time differ one from the other unless 
they were united from the very beginning of their existence to their proper 
bodies. God is, however, the efficient cause of their distinction. But it 
is no less true to say that matter is a principle of individuation because 
without matter human souls would differ in species as do all separate sub-
stances. 
Sic ergo solum ponere possumus plures animas humanas ejus-
dem speciei, numero diversas esse, si a sui principia cor-
paribus uniantur, ut earum distinctio ex unione ad corpus 
quodammodo proveniat, siout materiali principia, quamvis 
ab efficiente principio talis distinctio sit a Deo. Si 
vero extra corpora animae humanae fuissent creatae oportu-
isset eas esse specie differentes, sublato distinctionis 
materialis prinoipio, sicut at omnes substantiae separatae 
a Philosophis ponuntur specie differentes.97 
We find the same argument stated elsewhere: 
Impossibile est enim diversitatam in numero sub eadem 
specie causari nisi ex diversitate materiae: quia ad 
diversitatem formalium principiorum sequitur diversitas 
specierum. Si ergo anima, ut dictum est, non habeat 
materiam ex qua sit, non possunt plures animae unius 
speciei esse diversae numero, nisi per diversitatem ma-
teriae in qua sunt. Unde si ante corpus creatae fuis-
sent, oportuisset eas vel esse diversas in specie, et 
sic omnes homines specie differre ex diversitate forma-
rum; aut quod asset una tantum numero, ••• sa 
The doctrine of st. Thomas as regards the first essential relationship 
of the body to the soul may now be briefl;>• summarized. The rational soul is 
: 6In Boeth. De Trinitate, q.4, a.2, c. 7Q. Disp. D~Potentia, q.3, a.lO, c. 
98 -----In II Sent., d.XVII, q.2, a.2, c. 
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created by God at the very moment when it is infused into the potentially 
human body. That this must be the case is evident when we consider that the 
soul without its body is not in the perfection of its nature since it is an 
incomplete, though subsistent, substance and requires a body for the com-
pletion of its species. The soul is, moreover, a form, and every form re-
quires to be united to its proper matter. It is the act of the human body 
and communicates to the composite its own being which then becomes the being 
of the composite. Now in one and the same being, man, for example, act is 
not prior to potency but simultaneous with it. Furthermore, if the soul 
were created apart from the body, it is clear that only at the price of 
making man an unnatural being can we assign a cause for the union of a pre-
existing soul with its body. For neither force, nor nature, nor deliberate 
choice, nor divine ordinance can sufficiently explain why a nobler creature 
existing in the fulness of its natural perfection should at some time be 
united to a less noble and corporeal substance, a substance which would ne-
cessarily not be essential to the soul if it could begin to exist without it. 
Finally, we have seen that it is matter which is the principle of individua-
tion of rational souls, and without that matter one soul would not be dis-
tinct from another without at the same time constituting a different species, 
a consequence which would make men differ specifically, which conclusion is 
obviously absurd. 
As a further proof that the human soul receives existence only in the 
human body, St. Thomas states that the soul needs the senses, and as nature 
does not fail to supply whatever is necessary to anything for its proper 
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operation. it would not have been fitting for the soul to have been fashioned 
without a body which would have sense organs. 
Si ergo anima humana ad intelligendum sensibus indiget 
(natura autem nulli deficit in necessariis ad propriwm 
operationem explendwm. sicut animalibus habentibus ani-
mwm sensitivam et motivam dat convenientia organa sensus 
et motus). non fuisset anima humana sine necessariis 
adminiculis sensum instituta. Sensus autem non operan-
tur sine organis corporeis •••• Non igitur fuit insti-
tuta anima sine corporeis organis.99 
Raving now shown that the soul needs the body in order to have its substan-
tial perfection. we shall turn our attention to a consideration of the manner 
in which the soul likewise needs the body for its accidental perfection, and 
that brings us to the next chapter. 
99cont. Gent •• II. 83. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE RATIONAL SOUL NEEDS THE BODY IN THE 
EXERCISE OF ITS OPERATIONS 
In the first chapter we considered that the human body was necessary for 
the substantial perfection of the rational soul, which was only a part of 
human nature and an incomplete substance. That was 'V'Jhat may be termed the 
first perfection of the soul. The second is its accidental perfection, that 
is to say the perfection of the soul in the exercise of its operations. The 
distinction St. Thomas gives as follows: 
••• duplex est rei perfectio: prima et secunda. Prima 
quidem perfectio est secundum quod res in sua substantia 
est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius, 
quae ex integritate partium consurgit. Perfectio autem 
secunda est .finis. Finis autem vel est operatic sicut 
finis citharistae est citharizare ••• 1 
Because the human soul has a variety of powers which require a body for 
their exercise, the rational soul can, in a very real sense, be said to need 
that body. Let us first see why the soul should have so many powers. st. 
Thomas assigns two reasons for this. The first is taken from the soul's 
plaoe in the hierarchy of beings. In the order of beings the lowest crea-
tures cannot attain perfect goodness, but they are able to achieve imperfect 
goodness which they gain by means of few activities. There is a higher order 
of beings that can attain perfect goodness but only by means of many activi-
1st. Thomas Aquinas, ~· Theol., I,q.73, a.l, c. 
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ties, and these beings are rational souls. Still higher up on the scale of 
being are those creatures that can achieve perfect goodness and can do so by 
rawer movements. These are angelic spirits. The highest in this order of 
being is God, Who, without any movement at all, is perfect goodness. It may 
serve to make this clearer by an analogy. In health there are various dis-
positions or degrees. He is least disposed to health who can never be per-
fectly healthy but who can, by means of a few remedies, succeed in reaching 
imperfect health. Better disposed to health is he who has it in his power 
to become perfectly healthy but who is obliged to make use of many remedies 
to do so. Still better disposed is he who can become perfectly healthy by 
means of very few remedies. Finally best disposed is the one who is in a 
state of perfect health and needs no remedies at all. The human soul, st. 
Thomas concludes, is in the class of those who can reach their perfection by 
the exercise of many and various powers and operations. 
Dicendum est ergo quod res quae aunt infra hominem, quaedam 
particularia bona consequuntur: et ideo quasdam paucas et 
determinatas operationes habent et virtutes. Homo autem 
potest consequi universalem et perfectam bonitatem: quia 
potest adipisci beatitudinem. Est taman in ultimo gradu, 
secundum naturam, eorum quibus oompetit beatitude: et ideo 
multis et diversis operationibus et virtutibus indiget 
anima humana. Angelis vero minor diversitas potentiarum 
competit. In Deo vero non est aliqua potentia vel actio, 
praeter eius essentiam.2 
The second reason given for the variety of the soul's powers is taken 
from the position of the soul which is midway between the spiritual and oor-
poreal worlds, for in the rational soul, the powers of both these orders meet 
2~~· Theol., I, q.77, a.2, c. 
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together. "Est et alia ratio quare anima humana abundat diversitate poten-
tiarum: videlicet quia est in confinio spiritualium et corporalium creatura-
rum et ideo concurrunt in ipsa virtutes utrarumque creaturarum."3 
The soul has nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual powers, but these 
forces do not all belong to the soul in the same way, for some pertain to 
the soul as to their principle, and others pertain to the soul as to a sub-
jeot. Thus the intellectual powers, as understanding and will, are per-
formed without a corporeal organ, and are, therefore, in the soul as in their 
subject. There are, however, other operations of the soul which are per-
formed by means of physical organs, as sight by the eye and hearing by the 
ear, and so for all the other operations of the sensitive and nutritive 
parts. The powers which are the principles of these operations belong to 
the composite as to their subject and to the soul as to their principle. 
Manifestum est autem • • • quod quaedam operationes sunt 
animae, quae exeroentur sine organo corporali, ut intel-
ligere et vella, Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operatio-
num principia, sunt in anima sicut in subiecto. Quaedam 
vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa 
corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem. 
Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae 
et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium 
operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in sub-
iecto, et non in anima sola.4 
The soul is said to be the principle of these operations of the nutri-
tive and sensitive parts because it is through the soul that the composite 
has the power to perfor.m them. "• •• Omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, 
non sicut subiecti, sed sicut principii: quia per animwm coniunctum habet 
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quod tales operari possit."5 
Although some powers of the soul are thus attributed to it as to their 
subject and others as to their principle, they all, however, flow from the 
essence of the soul as from a principle because although the sensitive and 
nutritive powers have the composite as their subject, the composite itself 
owes its actuality to the substantial form, and hence the actuality of these 
lesser powers, Which are accidental forms, is caused by the actuality of the 
subject, which, as we have just stated, derives fran the soul. 
Manifestum est autem • • • quod potentiarum anima.e sub-
iectum est vel ipsa anima sola quae poteet esse subiectum 
accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis, 
••• vel compositum. Compositum autem est in actu per 
animam. Unde manifestum est quod omnes potentiae anim.ae, 
sive subieotum earum sit anima. sola, sive compositum, 
fluunt ab essentia anim.ae sicut a principio: quia iam 
dictum est quod accidens causatur a subiecto secundum 
quod est in actu, et recipitur in eo in quantum est in 
potentia.6 
The nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual powers are thus rooted in 
one and the same soul, and this must be the case if the unity of man is to 
be preserved. Now, unity follows being. If, therefore, the intellectual 
soul gives being to the composite it will likewise give it unity. This can 
be considered from another point of view. Different powers not rooted in one 
and the same subject do not impede one another's action unless the powers are 
contraries, and the powers of which there is question here are not contrarie& 
Now, in the human soul we can observe that different powers do hinder one 
another, for when one power is intense, another is remiss. We can only con-
5Ibid., ad 1 um. 
~ --Sum. Theol., I, q.77, a.6, c. 
--
47 
elude that these actions and their powers Which are their proximate princi-
ples must be reduced to one ultimate principle. The human body cannot be 
that principle, for in the act of intelligence it has no part, and bodies 
other than the human body have not these same powers we find in the soul 
which they necessarily would have if the body were the principle of them. 
The principle of the various powers we see exercised by man must be one for.m 
through which the body is the kind of body that it is, and that one form is 
the rational soul • 
• • • diversae vires quae non radicantur in uno principio, 
non impediunt se invicem in agendo, nisi forte earum ac-
tiones assent contrariae, quod in proposito non contingit. 
Videmus autem quod diversae actiones animae impediunt se. 
Cum enim una est intensa, altera remittitur. Oportet igi• 
tur quod istae actiones, et vires quae aunt earum proxima 
principia, reducantur in unum principium. Hoc autem prin-
cipium non potest esse corpus; tum quia aliqua actio est 
in qua non communicat corpus, scilicet intelligere; tum 
quia, si principium harum virium et actionum asset corpus, 
in quantum hujumnodi, inveniretur in omnibus corporibus; 
quod patet esse falsum. Et sic relinquitur quod sit 
principium earum forma aliqua una per quam hoc corpus est 
tale corpus, quae est anima. Relinquitur igitur quod om-
nes actiones animae quae sunt in nobis ab ipsa una pro-
cedunt; et sic non sunt in nobis plures animae.7 
As has been said the operation of the rational soul is not performed 
through any corporeal organ, but that of the sensitive soul is performed 
through a corporeal organ, but not through any corporeal quality, for al-
though heat and cold, wetness and drJ~ess are required for the functioning 
of the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the sense oper-
ates by virtue of these qualities; they do serve, however, for the proper 
7~. ~·• II, 58, also, Q. Quodl., XI, q.S, a.S,c. (Marietti, V). 
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disposition of the sense organ. The lowest of the soul's activities, which 
iS that of the vegetative soul, is performed both through a corporeal organ 
and by virtue of corporeal qualities. Yet low as this activity is, it yet 
exceeds the operation of a purely corporeal nature, for it is performed from 
an intrinsic principle, and not from an extrinsic one, as are the movements 
of bodies, for every animated thing in a certain manner, moves itself. 
Est ergo quaedam operatio animae, quae in tantum excedit 
naturam corpoream, quod neque exercetur per organum cor-
porals. Et talis operatio animae rationalis. Est autem 
alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidam fit per 
organum corporale, non taman per aliquam corpoream quali-
tatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilia: quia 
etsi calidum at frigidum, at humidum at siccum, at aliae 
hujusmodi qualitates corporae requirantur ad operationem 
sensus; non taman ita quod mediante virtute talium quali-
tatum operatio animae sensibilia procedat; sed requiruntur 
solum ad debitam dispositionem organi. Infima autem ope-
rationem animae est, quae fit per organum corporeum, at 
virtute corporeae qualitatis. Supergreditur taman ope-
rationem naturae corporeae: quia motiones corporum sunt 
ab exteriori principio, hujusmodi autem operationes sunt 
a principio intrinseco; non enim commune est omnibus 
operationibus animae; omne enim animatum aliquo modo mo-
vet seipsum. Et talis est operatio animae vegetabili~.s 
It is in virtue of the soul's office as a form that it possesses the 
lower operations as well as the higher ones. "• •• quia aliae operationes 
vitae sunt actus animae in quantum est forma corporis corruptibilis at trans-
mutabilis; cum quaedam anim transmutatione at alterations corporali sunt:"9 
For sensation and nutrition there can be no question of the soul's need 
for the body. These activities the soul could in no way perform without 
physical organs, and we may, therefore, say that for such actions the body is 
~· Theol., I, q.78, a.l.c. 
Q. Disp. ]! Spiritu. Creat., q.l, a.6, o. 
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absolutely necessary. "Invenitur autam corpus necessarium ad aliquam opera-
tionem animae, quae mediante corpore exercetur; siout patet in operibus ani-
mae sensitivae et nutritivae.nlO Without a bodily organ, St. Thomas tells us, 
there is no sensation. "• •• sentire accidit in ipso moveri a sensibilibus 
exterioribus; unde non potest homo sentire absque exterior! sensibili, siout 
non potest aliquid moveri absque movente.nll 
It is only when we come to the higher operations of the rational soul 
that the necessity for a human body admits of questioning. Now, the intel-
lectual operations of the soul, we repeat, are not exercised through the 
medium of the body, but the body, in a way, ndnisters to their production. 
"Est autam aliqua operatio animae, quae non exeroetur corpore mediante, sed 
taman ex corpore aliquod adminiculum tali operationi exhibetur;"l2 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into a discussion of the 
Thomistic theory of knowledge except in so far as will be necessary to show 
What part the body has in the intellectual operation of the soul, for if its 
role is only an accidental one, union of body and soul would seam to be both 
useless and unnatural. Now, St. Thomas would never admit that, for he con-
siders that the sensitive powers are necessary to the soul, not merely as 
accidental stimulants nor as dispositive conditions, but as representatives 
to the intellectual soul of its proper object. "Et ideo aliter dicendum est 
quod potentiae sensitivae sunt necessariae animae ad intelligendum, non per 
accidens tamquam excitantes ••• neque disponentes tantum ••• sed ut 
10 Sum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3, c. u-cont. Gent., II, 57. 
1~-sum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3, o. 
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repraesentantes animae intelleotivae proprium objectum •• nl3 • 
The soul requires something corporeal for its operation in a twofold 
manner: in one way, as an organ through which it operates, as the soul needs 
the eye to see, and in this way the soul could not need a corporeal organ for 
knowing; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. The other way in which the 
soul may need something corporeal is as an object, just as for sight a 
colored body is required. In this second way, the soul depends on a material 
thing, an object, which object consists of phantasms--sense images from which 
the agent intellect can abstract the intelligible species. 
• • • anima indiget aliquo corporal! ad su~ operationam 
dupliciter. Uno modo sicut organo per quod operetur, 
sicut indiget oculo ad videndum: et sic ad intelligendum 
non indiget aliquo organo, • • • Si autem sic indigeret 
organo ad intelligendum, asset corruptibilis, utpote non 
potens per se operari. Alio modo anima ad operandum in-
diget aliquo corporali sicut objecto, sicut ad videndum 
indiget corpore colorato, at sic anima rationalis indiget 
ad intelligendum phantasmata, quia phantasmata sunt ut 
sensibile intellectivae animae, ••• 14 
Over and over again we find st. Thomas insisting that the soul depends 
on nothing corporeal as a co-principle of knowledge or of intellectual opera-
tion. On the other hand, the principle of vision requires both the faculty 
of sight and the eye consisting of the power of vision and the pupil. Thus, 
just as the eye besides all that it has otherwise still requires an object 
on which the color will be, so, too.,- does the intellect need its object, 
though it does not need an organ for an act of knowing • 
• • • intellectus in corpore existens non indiget aliquo 
< 13Q. 
1 Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l5, c. 
· 
43. Quodl.-;-x, q.3, a.6, ~ lum. 
.And again: 
corporal! ad intelligendum, quod simul cum intellectu sit 
principium intellectualis operationis, sicut accidit in 
visu: nam. principium visionis non est visus tantum, sed 
oculus constans ex visu at pupilla. Indiget autem cor-
pore tamquam objecto, sicut visus indiget pariete in quo 
est color: nam phantasma.ta comparantur ad intelleotum ut 
colo~es ad visum, ••• 15 
••• corpus requiritur ad actionem intelleotus, non sicut 
organo quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obieoti: 
phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad 
visum.l6 
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An intellectual substance is united to a body, therefore, not in as much 
as it is intelligent, but in as much as it needs those operations which are 
exercised through the body for the completion of its intellectual operation 
since it knows by abstraction from the phantasma. 
Si ergo aliqua substantia intelligens corpori uniatur, 
hoc non erit in quantum est intelligens, sed secundum 
aliquid aliud; sicut supra dictum est, quod necessarium 
est, animam humanam uniri corpori, in quantum indiget 
operationibus per corpus exeroitis ad completum intel-
lectualis operationis, prout intelligit a phantasmatibus 
abstrahendo;l7 
Furthermore, we cannot say that the phantasms are merely useful, for 
they are so essential that as long as the soul is in the body it cannot 
understand without a phantasm, nor can it remember except through the sensi-
tive powers of cogitation and memory through which the phantasms are pre-
pared. Having said that the intellect finds its object in the phantasm, st. 
Thomas thus continues: " • • • unde, quamdiu est anima in corpore, non potest 
15Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.9, ad 22um. 
16 -- ---- Sum. Theol., I, q.75, a.2, ad 3 • 
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intalligere since phantasmate, nee etiam reminisoi nisi per Virtutam cogita-
tivam at me.morativ.rum per quam phantasmata preparantur, • 
That this must needs be so we have two indications. First, our own ex-
parience of ourselves and others assures us that the act of the intellect is 
hindered when the imagination, or any other sense organ, is impaired. Now, 
this would not happen if the intellect did not depend upon the exercise of 
some power which did make use of a corporeal organ. Hence since the imagi• 
nation, memory, and other sensitive powers do require organs, the lesion of 
any one of these latter will be an impediment to understanding. Wherefore, 
in case of frenzy and lethargy, it happens that one does not understand those 
things of which he had previous knowledge. The second indication is likewise 
attested by experience. We know how dependent we ourselves are upon phan-
tasms, for when we learn something ngw, we form certain images to serve us 
as examples, and also when we essay to impart our ideas to another, we em-
ploy examples and illustrations of various kinds that from these the student 
may grasp our thought. Thus has St. Thomas accounted for our need of phan-
ta~s: 
• • • impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum prae-
sentis vitae statum, quo passibili corpori coniungitur, 
aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi oonvertendo se ad 
phantasmata. Et hoc duobus indioiis apparet. Primo qui-
dam quia, cum intellectus sit vis quaedam non utens cor-
porali organo, nullo modo impediretur in suo actu per 
laesionem alicuius corporalis organi, si non requireretur 
ad eius actum actus aliouius potentiae utentis organo cor-
porali. Utuntur autem organo corporali sensus et imagi-
natio et aliae vires pertinentes ad partam sensitivam. 
Unde manifestum est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu in-
telligat, non solum accipiendo soientiam de novo, sed 
l8cont. Gent., II, 81. 
etiam utendo scientia iam acquisita, requiritur actus imagi• 
nationis et oeterarum. virtutum.. Videmus enim quod, impedito 
aotu virtutis imaginativae per laesionem organi, ut in 
phreneticis; et similiter impedito actu memorativae virtutis, 
ut in lethargiois: impeditur homo ab intelligendo in actu 
etia.m ea quorum soientiam praeaocepit. Secundo, quia hoc 
quilibet in seipso experiri potest, quod quando aliquis 
conatur aliquid intelligere, format aliqua phantasmata sibi 
per modum exemplorum, in quibus quasi inspiciat quod in-
telligere studet. Et unde est etiam quod quando alium 
volumus facere aliquid intelligere, proponimus ei exempla, 
ex quibus sibi phantasmata for.mare possit ad intelligendum..l9 
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Phantasms are, therefore, necessary, according to St. Thomas, both to 
acquire fresh knowledge and to utilize the knowledge that we actually possess, 
and if the imagination is hindered, so, too, is the act of the understanding. 
A concise expression we find elsewhere repeated in the following terms: 
Et ex hoc est quod intellectus impeditur in intelligendo, 
laeso organo phantasiae: quia quamdiu est in corpore in-
diget phantasmatibus non solum quasi accipiens a phantas-
matibus dum aoquirit scientia.m, sed etiam comparans speci-
es intelligibiles phantasmatibus dum utitur scientia ac-
quisita. Et propter hoc exempla in scientiis sunt neces-
saria.20 
We cannot insist too strongly upon the influence which the sensitive 
powers exercise over the act of understanding, for we shall see in the third 
chapter what bearing this has on the disposition of the human body. The fol-
lowing citation, though it merely repeats what has been said, emphasizes it 
clearly and strongly: 
198 
Licet enim intellectus non sit virtus corporea, taman in 
nobis operatic intellectus compleri non potest sine opera-
tiona virtutum corporearum, quae sunt imaginatio, et vis 
memorativa at cogitativa, ••• Et inde est quod impeditis 
harum virtutum operationibus propter aliquam corporis in-
um. Theol., I, q.84, a.7, c. 
2aq:-Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.9, ad 22um. 
-- ------

est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive 
natura in materia corporali existens et per huiusmodi natu-
ras, visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualam 
cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autam huius naturae est, 
quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non absque materia 
corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit 
in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoo 
equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscum.-
que materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, 
nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. 
Particulars autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem; 
et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat 
suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, 
ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.23 
55 
In the passage just cited st. Thomas mentions that it is through such 
natures of visible things that we rise to a knowledge of things invisible. 
This sets forth another important aspect from which to view the need for the 
body which the rational soul experiences. Only through corporeal objects do 
we know the incorporeal, and since incorporeals have no phantasms by which 
we can know them directly, we would be deprived of that knowledge did we not 
arrive at a certain degree of comprehension through a comparison of them with 
corporeal things that have phantasms. In this way we know truth by a con-
sideration of something of Which we possess the truth; we know God, in like 
manner, as the cause of the effects we see around us, as possessing in the 
highest possible perfection the qualities we find in creatures, and by deny-
ing of Him certain attributes we realize He cannot possess. In the present 
state of life we know other immaterial substances only by remotion or in com-
parison with other things. 
• • • incorporea, quorum non sunt phantasmata, cognoscuntur 
a nobis per comparationem ad corpora sensibilia, quorum 
25~um. Theol., I, q.84, a.7, c. 
And also: 
sunt phantasmata: sicut veritatem intelligimus ex considera-
tions rei circa quam veritatem speculamur; Deus autem, ••• 
cognoscimus ut causam, et per excessum, at per remotionem; 
alias etiam incorporeas substantiae, in statu praesentis 
vitae, cognosoere non possumus nisi per remotionem, vel ali-
quam comparationem ad corporalia. Et ideo cum de huiusmodi 
aliquid intelligimus, neoesse habemus converti ad ~hantas­
mata corporum, licet ipsorum non sint phantasmata. 4 
Et ideo necesse est dicere quod intellectus noster intelligit 
materialia abstrahendo a phantasmatibus; et per materialia 
sic considerata in immaterialium aliqualem cognitionem de-
. 25 venJ.mus, ••• 
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It is because of its aspect towards the lower realm of beings that the 
rational soul must thus seek its knowledge of the higher: 
Manifestum est enim quod anima humana corpori unita aspectum 
habet ex unione corporis ad inferiora directum; unde non 
perficitur nisi per ea quae ab inferioribus accipit, sci-
licet per species a phantasmatibus abstractas; unde neque 
in cognitionem sui ipsius neque in cognitionem aliorum po-
test devenire, nisi in quantum ex praedictis speciebus 
d •t 26 manu ucJ. ur. • • 
We cannot, however, arrive at a perfect knowledge of these immaterial 
things because of the insufficient proportion between materials and immateri• 
als. 
• •• ex rebus materialibus ascenders possumus in aliqualem 
cognitionem immaterialium rerum, non taman in perfectam: 
quia non est sufficiens comparatio rerummaterialium ad im-
materiales, sed similitudines si quae a materialibus accipi- 27 
untur ad immaterialia intelligenda, sunt multum dissimiles, •• 
In stating that it is appropriate that Holy Scripture should present 
~4sum. Theol., I, q.84, a.7, ad ,um, also, Cont.~·· IV, 1. 
2
5sum. Theol., I, q.85, a.l, ~ 
SQ:-nisp. De Anima, q.l, a.l7, c. 2? __ .;.._ 
sum. Theol., I, q.ss, a.2, ad 1um. 
- --
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divine and spiritual truths clothed in material forms, St. Thomas gives as 
the reason that it is fitting that God should provide for each thing accord-
ing to that thing's nature, and as the understanding natural to man is by 
way of the senses, it becomes a human being to arrive at divine truths 
through sense presentations. 
Deus enim omnibus providet secundum quod competit eorum na-
turae. Est autem naturale homini ut per sensibilia ad in-
telligibilia veniat: quia omnis nostra cognitio a sensu 
initium habet. Unde convenienter in Sacra Scriptura tra-
duntur nobis spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium ••• 28 
Since it is difficult for man to transcend the sensible, Divine Provi-
dance thus draws him to things divine through the material, and that because 
such a procedure is natural to the human being, as St. Thomas again remarks: 
Quia vero oonnaturale est homini ut per sensus cognitione.m 
accipiat, et difficillimum est sensibilia transcendere, 
provisum est divinitus homini ut etiam in sensibilibus 
rebus divinorum ei commemoratio fieret, ut per hoc haminis 
intentio magis renovaretur ad divina ••• 29 
Not only does the human mind depend upon the senses to reach its know-
ledge of things incorporeal, it likewise depends upon them for direct know-
ledge of the individual. The reason for this is that the intellect can have 
direct knowledge only of the universal by abstracting the intelligible 
species from matter which is the principle of individuation. To know the 
particular Which is in matter only, if we speak of natural things, the in-
tellect must turn to the phantasms. Thus it is only indirectly, and by a 
certain reflex action, that the mind gets at the singular; direct knowledge 
28 Sum. Theol., I, q.l, a.9, c. 
29-Cont. Gent., III, 119. 
--
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comes through the senses.30 
Again in speaking of species received from things, the Angelic Doctor 
states that singulars are not known from these, but from a reflex action to 
imagination and sense • 
• • • et ideo ex eis singularia non oognosountur, quae indi-
viduantur per materiam, nisi per reflexionem quamdam intel-
leotus ad ±maginationem et sens~, dum scilicet intelleotus 
speciem universalem, quam a singularibus abstraxit£ appli-
cat for.mae singulari in imaginatione servatae. • .~1 
Not only does the soul need the senses for its knowledge of things im-
material and things singular, it even needs them for an understanding of 
first principles, for we should not be able to conceive that the whole is 
greater than any of its parts, if we had not first seen some whole thing, 
any more than a man born blind is able to have any idea of color. 
Praeterea, id quod per sensum in nobis acquiritur non fuit 
animae ante corpus. Sed ipsorum principiorum cognitio in 
nobis ex sensibilibus causatur; nisi enim aliquod totum 
sensu percepissemus, non possemus intelligere quod totum 
esset majus parte, siout nee oaecus natus aliquid peroipit 
de coloribus. Ergo nee ipsorum principiorum cognitio 
3°sum. Theol., I, q.86, a.l, c. "• •• singulare in rebus materialibus in-
te!lectus noster direote et pr~o cognoscere non potest. Cuius ratio est, 
quia prinoipium singularitatis in rebus materialibus est materia individu-
alis: intellectus autem noster ••• intelligit abstrahendo speciem intel-
ligibilem ab huiuamodi materia. Quod autem a materia individuali abstra-
hitur, est universale. Unde intellectus noster directe non est cognosciti-
vus nisi universalium. 
Indirecte autam, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere 
singulare: quia, ••• etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, 
non potest eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in 
quibus species intelligibiles intelligit, ••• Sic igitur ipsum universale 
per speciem intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, 
quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc modo format hanc propositionem, 'Socrates 
est homo. ' " 
31~.!,! Sent., D. III, q.3, a.3, ~ ~· 
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affuit e.nima.e ante corpus; multo igi tur minus aliorllm. 32 
This last clause to the effect that if the soul does not know first 
principles without the help which comes from the senses, much less does it 
knOW anything else, reminds us that for St. Thomas the soul knows nothing 
through innate species. In refuting those who held that the soul did have 
such species, and that, consequently, the sense did not "per se" cause know-
ledge, but only "per accidens," in as much as upon the stirring of a certain 
sense the soul was roused to a memory of its former knowledge, st. Thomas 
holds that this is false for two reasons: first, such a doctrine is unreaso 
able because the soul would not forget what it knew naturally and furthermore 
no fitting reason could be assigned for union of the soul with the body if 
the senses were not really needed; and secondly, experience teaches us that 
if a man is lacking in one sense, his knowledge of the object apprehended by 
that sense is wanting, and this would not be the case were he endowed with 
innate species.33 
As St. Thomas visualizes it, the mind is like a blank slate on which 
32cont. Gent., II, 83. 
33sum. T~., I, q.84, a.3, c. "Sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum. 
Primo quidem si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse 
possibile quod huius naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod 
nesciat se huiusmodi scientiam habere; nullus enim homo obliviscitur ea 
quae naturaliter cognoscit, sicut quod omne totum sit maius sua parte, at 
alia huiusmodi. Praecipue autem hoc videtur esse inconveniens, si ponatur 
esse animae naturale corpori uniri • • • Inconveniens enim est quod na.tu-
ralis operatic alicuius rei totaliter impediatur per id quod est sibi 
secundum naturam. Secundo, manifeste apparet huius positionis falsitas ex 
hoc quod, deficiente aliquo sensu, deficit scientia eorum quae apprehen-
duntur secundum illum sensum; sicut caecus na.tus nullam potest habere no-
titiam de coloribus. Quod non esset, si intellectuali animae assent natu-
raliter inditae omnium intelligibilium rationes. Et ideo dicendum est 
quod anima non cognoscit corporalia per species naturaliter inditas." 
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nothing is written, having no intelligible species of its own which belong to 
it naturally for the exercise of its proper operation, understanding. To 
all knowledge it is only in potency and must be reduced to act through in• 
telligible species received from exterior things by way of the senses which 
are required by the sensitive powers. ~by the soul needed to be united to 
the body can thus readily be seen. And this is as it should be for st. 
Thomas never tires of repeating that the soul is the least in the order of 
intellectual substances as prime matter is the least in the order of sensible 
things. 
• • • naturale est animae humanae corpori un~r~, quia cum 
sit infima in ordine intellectualium substantiarum, sicut 
materia prima est infima in ordine sensibilium, non habet 
anima humana intelligibiles species sibi naturaliter in-
ditas, quibus in operationem propriam exire possit, quae 
est intelligere, sicut habent superiores substantiae in-
tellectuales; sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut 
tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum, • • • Unde oportet 
quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat 
mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis or-
ganis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde et 
animam humanrum necesse est corpori uniri.34 
That the human soul should be actualized in knowing by intelligible 
species draw.n from material things is in accord with its position in the 
scale of beings. The order and distinction of intellectual substances is 
similar to that of corporeal substances. From a consideration of the materi-
al order, then, we may arrive at a clearer grasp of the immaterial. The 
highest bodies have a potency in their nature which is wholly actualized by 
their form. In lower bodies the potency of matter is not completely per-
34Q. Disp. ~ Anima, q.l, a.8, c. 
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rected by the form, but receives now one form, now another, from some exter-
nal agent. Likewise, inferior intellectual substances, such as human souls, 
haVe an intellectual potency which is not actualized except successively by 
reception of intelligible species from things. The intellectual potency of 
the higher intellectual substances is, on the other hand, completely actual-
ized by intelligible species connatural to them.35 
A difficulty may here arise. Obviously, understanding by means of sim-
ply intelligible species is superior to understanding by means of species 
abstracted from the phantasm. Now, since nature is always ordered to the 
bast, why was not the human soul so fashioned as to have the first mode of 
knowing natural to it, rather than the second? St. Thomas thus presents the 
difficulty: 
Cum enim natura semper ordinetur ad id quod ~lius est; 
est autem melior modus intelligendi per conversionem ad 
intelligibilia simpliciter, quam per conversionem ad 
phantasmata: debuit sic a Deo institui animae naturae, 
ut modus intelligendi nobilior ei asset naturalis, et 
non indigeret corpori propter hoc uniri.36 
To answer this, st. Thomas offers as a consideration the fact that the 
35sum. Theol., I, q.55, a.2, c. "Sic enim cportet intelligere distinctionem 
er-ordinem spiritualium substantiarum, sicut est distinctio et ordo cor-
poralium. Suprema autem corpora habent potentiam in sui natura totaliter 
perfectam per formam: in corporibus autem inferioribus potentia materiae 
non totaliter perficitur per formam, sed accipit nunc unam, nunc aliam 
formam, ab aliquo agente. Similiter et inferiores substantiae intellecti-
vae, scilicet animae humanae, habent potentiam intellectivam non completam 
naturaliter; sed completur in eis successive, per hoc quod aocipiunt spe-
cies intelligibiles a rebus. Potentia vero intelleotiva in substantiis 
spiritualibus superioribus, idest in angelis, naturaliter completa est per 
species intelligibiles, in quantum habent species intelligibiles connatu-
rales ad omnia intelligenda quae naturaliter cognoscere possunt. 
36 ~· Theol., I, q.89, a.l, c. 
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universe requires that there should be a hierarchy of beings for the per-
reotion of the universe. "Hoc autem perfeotio universi exigebat, ut diversi 
gradus in rebus essent.u37 As a further reply, he considers that, although 
the manner of understanding by means of phantasms is not so elevated as the 
mode proper to higher intellectual substances, still it is the best and most 
perfect as regards What is possible for rational souls. "Considerandum est 
igitur quod, etsi intelligere per oonversionem ad superiora sit simpliciter 
nobilius quam intelligere per oonversionem ad phantasmata; taman ille modus 
intelligendi, prout erat possibilis animae, erat imperfeotior.u38 
The reason that knowledge by means of simply intelligible species is not 
suited to human souls lies in the fact that because of the weakness of its 
intellectual power it could understand such objects only in a confused and 
general way, the consequent of which would be that rational souls would have 
only imperfect knowledge. That this is true is verified by an examination 
of other intelligences. God is Supremest Intelligence and the First Prin-
oiple of all intellectual light. As they recede the farther from this First 
Source, other intelligences participate in it less, and have, consequently, 
weaker intellectual power. Now, of all intellectual substances, the rational 
soul is most distant from the First Principle of light; as a result, its in-
tellectual power is less strong, and its manner of understanding must needs 
be in proportion to its strength. The light in the First Intelligence is 
such that by one intelligible form, the Divine Essence, God knows all other 
37Ibid. 
36Ibid. 
-
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things. Superior intelligences, nearer than the human soul to the fountain 
source, know by fewer and more universal intelligible forms • 
• • • anima, cum sit infima in ordine intellectivarum sub-
stantiarum, infimo et debilissimo modo participat intellec-
tualem naturam. Nam in primo intelligente, scilicet Deo, 
natura intellectualis est adeo patens quod per unam formam 
intelligibilam, scilicet essentiam suam, omnia intelligit; 
inferiores vero substantiae intellectuales per species 
multas; et quanta unaquaeque earum est altior, tanto habet 
pauciores formas, et virtutem ma§is potentem ad intelli-
gendum omnia per formas pauoas.3 
That consideration leads to the conclusion that if inferior intellectu-
al substances had forms so universal as the higher intellectual substances, 
the knowledge of the former would be imperfect since their power of knowing 
is weaker. "Si autem substantia intellectualis inferior, haberet for.mas ita 
universales siout superior; cum non adsit ei tanta virtus in intelligendo, 
ramaneret ejus scientia incompleta; quia tantum in universal! res oognosceret 
et non posset deducere cognitionem suam ex illis paucis et singulis.n40 If 
this mode of knowing were natural to the human soul, it would thus gain only 
confused and general knowledge, as st. Thomas states: 
Anima ergo humana, quae est infima, si acciperet formas in 
abstractione et universalitate conformes substantiis sepa-
ratis; cum habeat minimam virtutem in intelligendo, imper-
fectissimam cognitionem haberet, utpote oognoscens res in 
quadam universalitate et confusione.41 
An example may help to clarity this point. Those men whose intellects 
are weaker do not acquire knowledge by conceptions so universal as those 
whose intellects are more powerful, but they must needs resort to details 
39Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l5, o. 
40Ibid. -
4!Ibid. 
-
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and examples, many of which can be dispensed with by keener minds. "Quod 
&liqualiter apparet in hominibus: nam qui sunt debilioris intellectus per 
universales conceptiones magis intelligentium non accipiunt perfectam cog-
nitionem, nisi eis singula in speciali explicentur. tt42 
Thus, for perfect knowledge human souls must have recourse to material 
objects and by their intellectual light reach out for the intelligible 
species proportionate to their power which will make them from being poten-
tial knowers actual ones. For the perfection of their intellectual opera-
tions, therefore, rational souls needed to be united to bodies. 
Et ideo ad hoc quod ejus cognitio perficiatur, et distin-
guatur per singula, oportet quod a singulis rebus scien-
tiam colligat veritatis; lumina taman intellectus agentis 
ad hoc necessaria existente, ut altiori modo recipiantur 
in anima quam sint in materia. Ad perfectionem igitur 
intellectualis operationis necessarium fuit anima cor-
pori uniri. 43 
This should suffice to portray in what way the body ministers to the 
accidental perfection of the rational soul, that perfection being the com-
pletion of its operations. For nutrition and sensation, we have seen that 
St. Thomas holds that the body is absolutely essential, and for the act of 
intelligence it is also needed if the lowest of the intellectual substances 
is to reach the perfection of its proper operation. The sanses and the sen-
sitive powers may be unnecessary for intellectual substances which have 
their proper object independently of exterior pathways, but for the human 
soul there is no mode natural to it other than that whereby it grows in know-
42 Sum. Theol., I, q.89, a.l, c. 
43~Disp • .£! Anima, q.l, a.l5, c. 
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ledge through abstraction of its proper object from the phantasms received 
rrom sensibles through the mediua of the organs of the human body. The phan-
tasm, as we have seen, is necessary both to the acquisition of new knowledge 
and to the application and use of the knowledge we have. Since, therefore, 
phantasms are acquired through the senses and the sensitive powers work 
through organs, the body which will, consequently, be most suited to the 
rational soul must be one whose disposition will best fit this mode of know-
ledge which is proper to the rational soul. Just what that disposition is 
considered to be by St. Thomas we shall endeavor to determine in the next 
chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DISPOSITION OF THE HUMAN BODY 
IS SUITED TO THE RATIONAL SOUL 
The kind of body which will be suited to the rational soul depends to 
a large extent upon the close and intimate relationship which must, in the 
vieW of St. Thomas, exist between the soul and its body. Thus he explicitly 
states that the soul is the efficient, formal, and final cause of the body, 
for in his commentary on Aristotle, he says: "Et cum principium at causa 
dicatur multipliciter, anima dicitur tribus modis principium et causa viven-
tis corporis. ~ ~~ sicut unde est principium motus. Alio ~· sicut 
cujus causa, idest finis. Tertio, sicut substantia, id est forma animator-
um.."l 
That St. Thomas means by the principle of movement, referred to in this 
passage, the efficient causa is clear from another in which he tells us that 
this was the sense attached to it by Aristotle. To the objection that the 
soul would need to precede the body in point of time if it were the efficient 
cause of the body, st. Thomas gives as the interpretation of Aristotle the 
following: tt • • • Philosophus non dicit animam, efficients.m esse oausrum cor-
poris, sed causa unde est principium motus, in quantum est principium motus 
localis in corpore, at augmenti, at aliorum hujusmodi. 
1st. Thomas Aquinas, In II De Anima, lect. 7, n.318. 
2Q. Disp. De Pot., q.'3,"' a.lO, ad sum. 
---- --
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tt2 
• • It is this 
67 
conception of efficient cause, therefore, which we must give to st. Thomas' 
own statement: "• •• corpus autem disponatur ad hoc quod sit proportionatum 
esse per actionem animae, quae est causa efficiens corporis. • • tt3 
Although in the first chapter we treated of the soul as the form of the 
body with reference to the t~e of the existence of the rational soul, we 
shall here again for the sake of unity consider that st. Thomas holds that 
the rational soul is the substantial or formal cause of the body for two 
reasons: first, it is the formal cause of its body because it is the cause 
of its being in that the human body is actualized by the rational soul, and 
secondly, since the act of anything is the for.m of that thing, and, conse-
quently, its formal cause, the soul is the formal cause of the body because 
it is the aot of the body which was only potentially in act before its ad-
vent. 
Et primo, quod anima sit causa viventis corporis, ut forma: 
et hoc duplici ratione: quarum prima talis est. Illud est 
causa alicujus ut substantia, idest, ut forma, quod est 
causa essendi; nam per formam unumquodque est actu. Sed 
anima viventibus est causa assendi; par animam enim vivunt, 
at ipsum vi vera est esse eorum: ergo anima est causa vi van-
tis corporis, ut for.ma.4 
Id quod est actus alioujus, est ratio et forma ejus quod 
est in potentia: sed anima est actus corporis viventis ••• 
ergo anima est ratio et forma viventis oorporis.s 
The rational soul is not only the efficient and formal cause of the 
3Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.lO, ad 11um., also In IV Sent., D.XLIV, q.l, a.2, 
s.l, c. ts'imon Ocohi, Venica,l71r0'}'" "• •• aniiiia' ha'6at se ad corpus non 
solum in habitudine formae, at finis, sed etiam in habitudine causae ef-
ficientis." 
4rn II De Anima, leot. 7, n.319, also Cont. _Gent., II, 68-70. 5Th--Ibid., n. 320. 
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body, but it is its final cause as well. "• •• anima non solum est corporis 
rorma et motor, sed etiam finis.n6 The reason given is that just as the in-
tellect acts for an end, so, too, does nature. Now the intellect in the 
things that are achieved through art orders matter and disposes it for the 
ror.m; in like manner does nature. Since, therefore, the soul is the form of 
the body, and the matter is disposed for the form, the human body will have 
as its end the rational soul. 
Et quod sit causa, ut finis, viventium corporum, sic ostendit. 
Sicut enim intellectus operatur propter finem, ita et natura. 
• • Sed intellectus in his quae fiunt per artem, materiam 
ordinat at disponit propter for.mam: ergo et natura. Cum 
igitur anima sit forma viventis corporis, sequitur quod 
sit finis ejus.7 
That the soul is the final cause of the body has an important bearing 
on the disposition of the body, for the union of soul and body exists for 
the sake of the soul and not for the sake of the matter since form is not 
for matter but rather matter is for form. "• •• considerandum est quod unio 
animae et corpori non est propter corpus, sed propter animam: nee enim forma 
est propter materiam, sed e converso."8 Now because matter is for the form, 
it is from the form that we seek the reason that the human body is such as 
it is. "• •• cum materia sit propter formam, et none converso; ex parte 
animae oportet accipere rationam, quale debeat esse corpus cui unitur; •• 
The soul, as we explained in the last chapter, requires a body as a 
n9 
• 
necessary instrument for its operations of sensation and nutrition, and for 
6Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.8, c. 
7 -In II De Anima, laot. 7, n.321. 
s---~· Theol., I, q.70, a.3, c. 
Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.8, c., also Sum. Thaol., I, q.91, a.S, c. 
its intellectual operations, as a minister. 
Invenitur autem corpus necessarium ad aliquam operatione.m 
animae, quae mediante corpori exercetur; sicut patet in 
operibus sensitivae et nutritivae ••• Est autem aliqua 
operatio animae, quae non exercetur corpore mediante, 
sed taman ex corpore aliquod adminiculum tali operatione 
exhibetur.lO 
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Now, form gives being and species to matter that matter may be suited 
to the operations of the form, and because the body is to minister to the 
various activities of the rational soul, it must have diversity of parts • 
• • • cum materia sit propter formam; hoc modo forma dat 
esse et speciem materiae, secundum quod congruit suae 
operationi: et quia corpus perfectibile ab anima ad hoc 
quod congruat diversis operationibus animae, requirit 
diversitatem in partibus ••• 11 
Furthermore, just as the whole organized body is so related that it may 
zealously serve the soul's operations which are exercised through it, so, 
too, there is one organ related to, or corresponding to, each determinate 
operation. "• •• sicut tatum corpus organicum se habet ut deserviat opera-
tionibus animae quae per corpus exercentur, ita se habet unum organum ad 
unum determinatam operationem."l2 A great variety of organs is demanded be-
cause the soul, though simple in its essence, is yet manifold in its powers 
and operations. "• •• anima rationalis quamvis sit simplex in essentia, 
tamen est multiplex in potentiis et operationibus; et ideo oportet quod cor-
pus suum multa habeat organa ad diversas operationes apta; ••• "13 
lOsum. Theol., I, q.70, a.3.c. 
llQ. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.lO, ad 2um. 
12Ibid., ad~ --
1~ --In II Sent., D.l, q.2, a.5, ad 3um., also Sum. Theol., 
----- -- -
I, q.76, a.5, ad 
3um., and also, Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.lO, ad 17um. 
- - --
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Diversity of organs is, therefore, in proportion to diversity of opera-
tions, and this in turn to the gradation in perfection of forms, for nobler 
forms have a greater variety of operations. This is because perfection in 
activity corresponds to perfection in being since operation pertains to be-
ing existing in act. Having said that the soul, like any other form, is the 
principle of its operations, st. Thomas continues: 
Sed considerandum est quod secundum gradum formarum in per-
fectione essendi est etiam gradus earum in virtute operandi, 
cum operatic sit existentis in actu; et ideo quanto aliqua 
forma est majoris perfectionis in dando esse, tanto etiam 
majoris virtutis in operando. Unde formae perfectiores 
habent plures operationes et magis diversas quam formae 
minus perfectae.14 
In less perfect beings a diversity of accidents is sufficient for diver-
sity of operations, but for the more perfect, a diversity of parts is needed. 
In fire, for example, various activities pertain to various accidents. Fire 
ascends according to its lightness and heats according to its warmth, but no 
organs are required for such. 
Et inde est quod ad diversitatem operationum in rebus minus 
perfectis sufficit diversitas accidentium. In rebus autem 
magis perfectis requiritur ulterius diversitas partium; et 
tanto magis, quanto forma fuerit perfectior. Vidamus enim 
quod igni conveniunt diversae operationes secundum diversa 
accidentia; sicut ferri sursum secundum levitatem, cale-
facere secundum calorem, et sic de aliis; sed taman quae-
libet harum oEerationum competit igni secundum quamlibet 
partem ejus.l 
Animate bodies have nobler forms than inanimate ones and, consequently, 
more operations, and parts, as well. In plants, for instance, the activities 
14Q. Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.9, c. 
15Q. Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.9, c. 
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of the root, the stem, and the branches are not identical. "In corporibus 
~ero animatis quae habent nobiliores formas, diversis operationibus deputan-
tur diversae partes; sicut in plantis, alia est operatic radicis, alia rami, 
nl6 
• • • et stipi tis; He concludes, then, that animated bodies, as they 
are more perfect, ~11 require more parts to correspond to their greater 
perfection, and that since the rational soul is the most perfect of forms, 
its body, consequently, will need a greater variety of organs or parts. 
• • • et quanta corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto 
propter majorem perfectionem necesse est inveniri majorem 
diversitatem in partibus. Unde cum anima rationalis sit 
perfectissima formarum naturalium, in hamine invenitur 
maxima distinctio partium propter diversas operationes; ••• 17 
It is to the rational soul, therefore, that we must look for the reason 
why the human body is what it is and is not what it is not, and chiefly to 
the proper operation of this noblest of forms, for it is its function of 
understanding which ~11 necessitate a body different from all other bodies. 
"• •• cum materia sit propter formam, forma autem ordinetur ad propriam 
operationem oportet quod talis sit materia uniuscuique formae ut competit 
ttl8 
• • operationi illius formae; • Navf, if the rational soul needs to be 
united to a body to receive that which ~11 actualize it in knowing; namely, 
the intelligible species received from things by way of the senses, it fol-
lows that the body to which the soul is united must be such that it is most 
capable of representing to the intellect the sensible species from which the 
16Ibid 1 • ?fS:rd., also II Cont. Gent., 71, and also, Q. Disp. ~ Spiritu. Creat., 
1 
q:r; a.4, c.-- -
8Q. Disp. E! Anima, q.l, a.lO, ~ 1um. 
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agent intellect can extract its proper object. The human body must, there-
fore, be best disposed for sensation. 
Si ergo propter hoc anima humana unibilis est corpori, 
quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a rebus 
mediante sensu; necessarium est quod corpus, cui anima 
rationablis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum 
ad repraesentandum intellectui species sensibles, ex 
quibus in intellectu intelligibiles species resultant. 
Sic ergo oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, 
esse optime dispositum ad sententiendum.l9 
Since without organs there is no sensation and since nature does not 
fail to furnish what is necessary, there must be sense organs in the human 
body. Now, although there are several senses, there is one which is the 
foundation of all the others; namely, touch, in which man's whole sensitive 
nature chiefly consists. "Sed cum plures sint sensus, unus tamen est qui 
est fundamentum aliorum, scilicet tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura 
sensitiva consistit; •• n20 • 
Why is it that touch should be considered by st. Thomas to be the 
foundation of all other senses, rather than sight, or some one of the other 
senses? One reason is that the sense of touch is absolutely essential to 
make a body an animal body. For no other sense can this be said because 
there are some animals which, although they have no other sense but touch, 
are truly called animals because they have this sense of touch. Concerning 
this, the following comment of st. Thomas will be interesting to note: 
••• sicut vegetativum potest separari a tactu et ab 
omni sensu, sic tactus potest separari ab aliis sensi-
bus. Multa enim sunt animalia, quae solum sensus 
19op. cit., a.8, c., also Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, c. 
20Ibid:;-also In III De Anima, lect., 3, n.602. 
taotus habent, sicut animalia imperfecta. Omnia autem 
animalia habent sensum tactus. Vegetativum autem prin-
cipium dicimus illam partem animae~ qua etiam vegeta-
bilia, idest plantae, participant. l 
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Likewise of interest is his gradation of living things with regard to touch. 
Sic igitur ex praedictis patent tres gradus viventium. 
Primus est plantarum. Secundus animalium imperfec-
torum immobilium, quae habent solum sensum tactus. 
Tertius est animalium perfectorum quae moventur motu 
profressivo, quae etiam habent alios sensus. Mani-
festum est autem, quod quartus gradus est eorum quae 
habent cum his etiam intellectum.Z2 
We see, therefore, that because of this sense a thing is first entitled 
to be called an animal. "• •• propter hunc sensum primo animal dicitur; •• "zs 
Without this sense of touch, moreover, the animal would die, and nothing can 
have this sense unless it be an animal, nor be an animal unless it have the 
sense of touch, as St. Thomas expresses it: "• •• cum necesse sit omne 
animal habere tactum, ••• manifestum est quod solum per privationem hujus 
sensus, scilicet tactus, necesse est animalia mori. Hie enim sensus convert~ 
tur cum animali, nee aliquid potest ipsum habere nisi sit animal, nee aliquid 
potest esse animal nisi habeat hunc sensum.n24 
Touch is so necessary because it is through it that discernment between 
the suitable and the non-suitable is made whereby the safety of the animal 
is secured, and the good sought and the evil avoided. "Et ideo nisi animal 
haberet sensum tactus, per quem discerneret convenientia a corruptivis, non 
posset haec fugere et illa accipere, et ita non posset salvari animal. Ne-
21In II De Anima, lect.3, n.260. 
22Ibid:"-
~!Q· Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.a, c. 
In III De Anima, lect., 18, n.869, also Cont. ~., II, 90. 
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oessarium est igitur ad salutem animalis, quod habeat sensum tactus.n25 
Now, how does St. Thomas account for this power of discrimination which 
he attributes to the sense of touch and which is one more reason why it is 
the foundation of all the other senses? He tells us that it is the organ of 
the common sense which discerns the sensible of one sense from the sensible 
of another sense, for to distinguish the essence of white and sweet belongs 
to the intellect, but to distinguish the way in which the sense is modified 
belongs to sense. "Cognosoimus autem differentiae albi et dulcis, non solum 
quantum ad quod quid est utriusque, quod pertinet ad intellectum, sed etiam 
quantum ad diversam immutationem sensus. Et hoc non potest fieri nisi per 
sensum."26 
The sense which thus discriminates is touch whose ultimate organ is not 
flesh since it has the ability to discern the tangible from other sensibles 
and for this reason is the root of all the other senses because it is so 
closely related to the fountain source of all the senses, to wit, the common 
sense. 
Et si, per aliquem sensum fit, hoc maxima videtur, quod fiat 
per taotum, qui est primus sensuum, et quodammodo radix et 
fundamentum omnium sensuum; et ab hoc, animal habet, quod 
dicatur sensitivum. Unde manifestum est, quod caro non est 
ultimum organum sensus taotus: quia cum per sensum tactus 
fiat disoretio, necesse asset quod ipso contactu carnis a 
tangibili fieret discretio tangibilis ab aliis sensibili-
bus. Attribuitur autem ista discretio tactui non secundum 
quod tactus est sensus proprius, sed secundum quod tactus 
est fundamentum omnium sensuum, et propinquius se habens 
ad fontalem radioem omnium sensuum, qui est sensus communis.27 
25
rn III De Anima, lect.l7, n. 860. 
2Elr\::' - - ----Op. Cit., lect., 3, n.601. 
2'1n::: -nn. Cit., n.602 • 
.... ..;;&:. -
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The reason that touch can thus discriminate is, therefore, because the 
organ of the sense of touch is also the organ of the common sense, and the 
reason that flesh cannot be the ultimate organ of the sense of touch is that 
since discernment is effected through touch it is necessary that by the very 
contact of the flesh with the tangible, discernment of the actual tangible 
from other sensibles should occur. Consequently, this discrimination is at-
tributed to touch not in so far as touch is a proper sense, but rather in so 
far as it is related to the common sense and is the root of all the other 
senses. Furthermore, it is because the organ of touch is diffused through-
out the whole body that it can be the organ of the common sense. 
Oportet autem illud principium sensitivum commune habere 
aliud organum, quia pars sensitiva non habet aliquam 
operationem sine organo. Cum enim organum taotus dif-
fundatur per totum corpus necessarium videtur, ut ibi 
sit organum hujus principii sensitivi communis, ubi est 
prima radix organi tactus.28 
And this is the reason why touch can be the foundation of all the other 
senses; namely, because the organ of touch is diffused throughout the whole 
body, and the instrument of any sense is also the instrument of the sense of 
touch, as st. Thomas states: "• •• tactus est fundamentum omnium aliorum 
sensuum: manifestum est enim, quod organum tactus diffunditur per totum cor-
pus, et quodlibet instrumentum cujusque sensus est etiam instrumentum tao-
tus; • • .u29 
Two more indications given by st. Thomas that the sense of touch is the 
principal sense are: First, when this sense is inoperative, all the other 
28op. cit., n.6ll. 
29"fu I IDe Anima, lect., 2, n.484. 
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senses are also. For no other sense is this true. Our sense of vision, for 
example, or our sense of hearing may not be functioning, but that does not 
prevent our tasting, smelling, and the like. "• •• et inde est quod immo-
bilitato hoc sensu, ut in somno acoidit, amnes alii sensus i.nmobilitantur; 
, • ,tt30 Secondly, all the other senses are impeded not only by the excess 
of their own proper sensibles, as vision is hindered when the light is too 
brilliant, and hearing when sound is too intense, but also they are hindered 
by an excess of the proper sensible of touch, that is to say, by too much 
heat or cold and the like. "• •• et iterum omnes alii sensus non solum 
solvuntur ab excellentia proprium sensibilium, sicut visus a rebus multum 
fulgidis at auditus a maximis sonis; sed etiam ab exoellentia sensibilium 
secundum tactum, ut a forti calore vel frigore.n31 
The body which can have the sense of touch cannot be a simple body be-
oause it must be so constituted that it can perceive its object without any 
medium. We might, perhaps, suppose that a body which needed to be properly 
equipped for hearing could be composed of air, for the auditory sense con-
tacts its proper object through the medium of air, or again that a body 
which was to be suited to the sense of sight only could be composed of light, 
for light is the medium between sight and its object, but the body which must 
have the sense of touch, and every animal body must have, needs to be so 
formed that it will require no medium between itself and its object for 
touch is not exercised through a medium but simply through direct contact 
~01Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.a, o. Ibid. ---
-----... 
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since it perceives through itself. Now, an airy body, or a body of light, 
or of fire, for instance, could not contact sensible objects, and, therefore, 
could not be an instrument of touch. The animal body must be such, as a 
consequence, that through it the sense of touch can be constituted.32 Ob-
viously, then, this body cannot be of any one element. "Et, quia corpus ani 
malis oportet esse tale ut per ipsum fiat sensus tactus, impossibile est 
quod ullum elementorum sit corpus animalis: neque terra, per quam non sunt 
alii sensus: neque alia elementa, per quae fiunt sensus.n33 
Perhaps the strongest reason which St. Thomas gives to prove that the 
animal body cannot be of any one element is that it must be a medium between 
contraries, and so must not have any element in excess, as it would have if 
it were made of fire only, or air, or water only.34 
Now, the human body,although it is an animal body, is united to a 
32rn III De Anima, lect.l8, n.865. "• •• oportet quod omne corpus animatum, 
sciliCe~anima sensibili, sit tale, ut per ipsum possit fieri sensus tac-
tus. Omnia autem elementa praeter terram, possunt esse organa, vel media 
aliorum sensuum, scilicet aer et aqua faoiunt sentire per alterum, idest 
per medium. Sed tactus non fit per medium, sed in tangendo ipsa sensi-
bilia; et ideo sic nominatur, quamvis et alii sensus sentiant quodammodo 
in tangendo, non quidem immediate, sed per medium immutat ipsum. Solus 
autem sensus tactus in tangendo sensibile sentiti per ipsum, et non per 
aliquod medium." 33rbid., n.866, also, Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.S, ad 1um, and ad 12um. 
34rbid., n.867. "Cujus ratio eat, quia illud, per quod:rit tactus, oportet 
esse medium inter qualitates tangibiles, ad hoc quod sit susceptivum 
earum, utpote in potentia existens ad eas, ••• Et hoc est verum non 
solum respeotu qualitatum terrae, sed etiam omnium tangibilium qualitatum. 
In corporibus autem simplicibus non invenitur medium inter qualitates 
tangibiles, sed inveniuntur ipsae qualitates, secundum extremitatem con-
trarietatis. Et inde manifestum est, quod per nullum corpus simplex, nee 
per aliquid corporibus simplicibus vicinum, potest fieri sensus tactus. 
Et ideo ossibus, capillis et talibus partibus non sentimus, quia super• 
abundat in eis quod terrae est, et non reducuntur ad medium prout tactus 
requirit. Also, Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, ad 1um. 
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rational soul, and therefore, must be constituted some~hat differently from 
other animal bodies. The first difference will consist of its being so 
:fashioned as to be the best possible ins.trument for touch. The reason that 
this must be is that the intellectual powers of man are dependent, as we 
have seen in the second chapter, upon the sensitive powers, and these sensi-
tive powers are in turn dependent upon the sense of touch. "Cum igitur cor-
pus cui anima rationalis unitur, debeat esse optima dispositum ad naturam 
sensitivam necessarium est ut habeat convenientissimum organum sensus tac-
tt35 
• • • tus: 
As every animal body, the human body must be composed of contraries be-
cause the organ of touch must be a medium among the contraries. "• •• or-
ganum autem taatus oportet esse medium inter contraria; • • • Unde corpus 
congruens tali animae fuit corpus ex contrariis compositum.n36 Now it is 
necessary for the organ of touch to be a medium precisely because it must 
have contraries, not actually, but potentially. "• •• oportet organum tac-
tus non habere actu contrarietates, sed potentia; • • n37 • 
st. Thomas proves that the sense of touch is only in potency in the 
following manner. The sense organ suffers from a sensible object, for sen-
sation is, in a way, suffering. This sensible object which contacts the 
organ is What really actualizes the sense of touch. Now, the organ of touch 
does not perceive the quality of the object Which affects it when the organ 
itself already possesses that quality in act, for we do not perceive that 
35Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.8, c. 
36 -Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c. 
37 --Cont. Gent., II, 90. 
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~ch is hard or soft, hot or cold, according to the mode in which any of 
these is in the organ itself, but we feel the degrees of tangibles by the 
sense of touch when the organ of this sense is in a middle state between two 
contraries, e.g., hot and cold. And thus it is that we are able to dis-
tinguish between hot and cold, and the like, for if heat were in act in the 
body, the degree of heat in the sensible could not be ascertained, and so 
tor cold, and all the others. 
Manifestum est autem, quod organum tactus, ••• est quae-
dam pars, quae est in potentia ad hujusmodi qualitates. 
Organum enim sensus patitur a sensibili, quia sentire est 
pati quoddam: unde sensibile, quod est agens facit ipsum 
tale in actu, quale est sansibile, cum sit in potentia ad 
hoc. Et propter hoc, organum tactus non sentit illam 
qualitatem secundum quam est in actu. Non enim sentimus 
id quod est calidum aut frigidum, durum aut molle, secun-
dum illum modum quo haec insunt organa tactus; sed senti-
mus excellentias tangibilium, quasi organa tactu consti-
tute in ali§ua mediante inter contrarias tangibiles 
qualitates. 8 
Moreover, to discern what is vary hot the sense of touch must know what 
is very cold, for heat and coldness are relative qualities. One and the 
same object, for example, may be both hot and cold depending upon that to 
which it is compared. If lukewarm water is compared to boiling water it is 
cold; if, on the other hand, it is compared to ice water, it is hot. The 
sense of touch must be susceptible of both extremes in order to determine 
accurately the quality of the sensible that affects it, and for this reason 
it may be said to be both extremes in potency. Just as the organ which is 
to detect white or black must be actually neutral to both, and so for each 
38In II De Anima, lect., 23, n.547. 
------· 
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sense organ with regard to its proper object, so, too, the sense of touch 
must be neither hot nor cold actually, but both potentially. 
Et propter hoc organum tactus discernit extrema tangi-
bilum: medium enim est discretivum extremorum: potest 
enim pati ab utroque extremorum, eo quod dum comparatur 
ad unum habet in se rationem alterius; sicut tepidum in 
comparatione ad calidum, est frigidum; in comparatione 
ad frigidum, est calidum: unde medium patitur ab utro-
que extremorum, cum sit quodammodo utrique contrarium. 
Et oportet quod, sicut organum, quod debet sentire 
album et nigrum, neutrum ipsorum habet actu, sed utrum-
que in potentia, et eodem modo in aliis sensibus; sic 
etiam se habeat in sensu tactus; scilicet organum neque 
sit calidum, neque frigidum actu, sed potentia utrumque.39 
However, there is this difference between touch and the other senses. 
They are not only in potency to their sensibles, but they must be absolutely 
without them in their organs. There must be no color in the eye, to make 
one application, because the receiver of a thing must be without the thing 
received. The organ of touch is not under this necessity, for touch must be 
capable of being acted on by all those qualities of which the animal body is 
necessarily composed; to wit, heat, cold, dryness, wetness, and the rest. 
It is not possible, therefore, for the organ of touch to be entirely free 
from its proper sensibles, but it must be reduced to a medium in order to be 
in potency to contraries~O It is obvious, then, that perfection of touch 
39Ibid. 
40Q::Disp. ~ Anima, q.l, a.a, c. "cum autem organum cujuslibet sensus non 
debeat habere in actu contraria, quorum sensus est perceptivus; sed esse 
in potentia ad illa, ut possit ea recipere, quia recipiens debet esse de-
nudatum a recepto; aliter neoesse est hoc esse in organo tactus, et in 
organis aliorum sensuum. Organum enim visus, scilicet pupilla, caret 
omnino albo et ni~ro, et universaliter omni genera coloris; et similiter 
est in auditu et 1n olfactu; hoc autem in taotu accidere non potest. Nam 
tactus est cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus necesse est componi corpus ani-
malis, scilicet caloris et frigoris, humidi et sioci; unde impossibile 
est quod organum tactus omnino sit denudatum a genera sui sensibilia; sed 
oportet quod sit reductum ad medium sic enim est in potentia ad contraria." 
Also um heol. 91 a 1 a um 
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will correspond to a medium disposition. "Et propter hoc, quanta animal 
habet complexionem magis reductam ad medium, tanto habet meliorem tactum. tt41 
Now, because mixed bodies have nobler forms the closer they approach to 
evenness of complexion, that body to which the rational soul is united must, 
consequently, have the most equable disposition, according to st. Thomas: 
"• •• quum videamus corpora mixta tanto nobiliores formas habere quanta 
magis ad temperamentum commixtionis perveniunt; et sic quod habet for-mam no-
bilissimam, utpote substantiam intellectualem, si sit corpus mixtum, oportet 
esse temperatissimum; • n42 • • Man has, therefore, the noblest form and the 
most equable of bodies. "Et ideo, quanto talia corpora ad majorem aequali-
tatem mixtionis accedunt, tanto nobiliorem formam sorliuntur a Deo: quale est 
corpus humanum, quod est temperatissimae mixtionis, ut probat bonitas tactus 
in hominibus, et nobilissimam formam habet, scilicet animam rationalem.n43 
St. Thomas tells us further that in this evenness of temperament we can 
see terminated in man, as in the most perfect, all the operations of the in-
ferior natures: 
Corpus ergo cui anima rationalis unitur, cum debeat esse 
convenientissimum ad sensum tactus, oportet quod sit 
maxima reductum ad medium per aequalitatem oomplexionis. 
In quo apparet quod tota operatio inferioris naturae 
terminatur ad hominem sicut ad perfectissimum. Videmus 
enim operationem naturae procedere gradatim a simplicibus 
elementis commiscendo ea, quousque perveniatur ad per-
fectissimum commdxtionis modum, qui est in corpore humano. 
Hanc igitur oportet esse dispositionem corporis cui anima 
rationalis unitur, ut scilicet sit temperatissimae com-
plexionis.44 
4lrn II De Anima, lect., 23, n.548. 2 __ _ 
Cont. Gent., II, 90. 
43ne Occ~s Operationibus, (Mandonnet, Opuscula Omnia, I, 5). 44- -Q. Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.a, c. 
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Thera is for st. Thomas a very decided relationship between intellectual 
ability and the sense of touch and evenness of disposition, for we find such 
expressions of the great Saint as the following: 
And again: 
Also: 
Finally: 
••• quanto est melioris tactus, tanto est melioris intel-
lectus, quia subtilitas tactus sequitur aequalitatem com-
plexionis.45 
• • • unde etiam videmus quod molities carnis et bonitas 
tactus, quae aequalitatem complexionis demonstrant, sunt 
signa boni intellectus.46 
• • .et quod propter bonitatem hujus sensus etiam unus 
homo alio est habilior ad intellectuales operationes. 
Molles enim carne (qui sunt boni tactus) aptos mente 
videmus.47 
Et propter hoc homo inter animalia melioris est tactus. 
Et inter ipsos homines~ qui sunt melioris tactus, sunt 
melioris intellectus.4 
We can scarcely say that an idea that appears so frequently in the works 
of the Angelic Doctor was an inconsiderable one for their author. Indeed, 
St. Thomas insists that it is this very sense of touch which makes men, of 
all other animals, the most prudent, and makes man differ from man in mental 
cleverness. No other sense can lay claim to such importance. "Unde, quia 
homo habet optimum tactum, sequitur quod sit prudentissimum omnium aliorum 
animalium. Et in genera hominum ex sensu tactus accipimus, quod aliqui in-
4Sr n II Sent., D.l, q.2, a.5, c. 46 __ _ 
Cont. Gent., II, 90. 47Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.s, c. 
48 -Sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.5, c. 
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geniosi sunt, vel non ingeniosi: et non secundum aliquam alium sensum.n49 
The necessary corollary to this is that men whose flesh is hard are weak 
in intellectual power, and those whose flesh is soft are well-endowed in 
~nd. This st. Thomas does not hesitate to affirm, for he continues his 
thought thus: "Qui enim habent duram carnem, et per consequens habent malum 
taotum, sunt inepti secundum mentem: qui vero sunt molles carne, et per con-
sequens boni tactus, sunt bene apti mente. Unde etiam alia animalia habent 
duriores carnes quam homo.n50 
st. Thomas accounts for this correspondence between aptitude of mind 
and the sense of touch in the following manner. Since touch is the founda-
tion of all the other senses, and since the instrument of any other sense is 
also the instrument of the sense of touch, as we have before remarked, (Supra, 
footnote, 29), it is on this sense that a sensitive nature depends. He who 
has a better sense of touch will have, consequently, a more sensitive nature, 
and, therefore, in the mind of St. Thomas, a keener intellect. The reason 
for this is that excellence of touch is a disposition to excellence of intel-
lect. This will not hold true for any other sense. One may, for example, 
have a more delicate sense of hearing without at the same time having a more 
sensitive nature, and so for all the other senses save only touch. 
Sed dicendum est, quod duplici ex causa, bonitas mentis 
respondet bonitati tactus. Prima ratio est, quod tactus 
est fundamentum onmium aliorum sensuum: manifestum est 
enim, ••• illud, ex quo aliquid dicitur esse sensiti-
vum, est sensus tactus. Unde ex hoc quod aliquis habet 
meliorem tactum, sequitur quod simpliciter habet maliorem 
49In II De Anima, lect., 19, n.483. 
50ibid."-
-
sensitivam naturam, et per consequens, quod sit melioris 
intellectus. Nam bonitas sensus est dispositio ad boni-
tatem intellectus. Ex hoc autem, quod aliquis habet 
meliorem auditum vel meliorem visum, non sequitur quod 
sit melius sensitivus vel melioris sensitivae simpliciter, 
sed solum secundum quid.Sl 
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Furthermore, goodness of touch is consequent upon goodness of complexion 
and upon goodness of complexion nobility of soul follows because every form 
is proportionate to its matter. Wherefore we may conclude with St. Thomas 
that those whose touch is more perfect are nobler in soul and clearer in 
:mind. 
Alia ratio est, quia bonitas tactus consequitur bonitatem 
complexionis sive temperantiae ••• Ad bonam autem cam-
plexionem corporis sequitur nobilitas animae: quia omnis 
forma est proportionata suae materiae. Unde sequitur, 
quod qui sunt boni tactus, sunt nobilioris animae, et 
perspicacioris mentis.52 
A better sense of touch, then, denotes better intellect, and perfection 
of touch is consequent uponlcomplexion and softness of the flesh, and also 
upon greater or less susceptibility to heat and cold, for st. Thomas gives 
this latter condition in the following passage. 
Et ideo oportet quod sensus tactus tanto sit certior quanto 
complexio corporis est magis temperata, quasi ad medium 
zeducta. Hoc autem maxima oportet in homine, ad hoc quod 
corpus ejus sit proportionatum nobilissimae formae. Et 
ideo homo inter alia animalia habet certissimum tactum, 
et per consequens gustum, qui est tactus quidam. Et huius 
signum est; quod homo minus potest sustinere vehementiam 
frigoris et caloris qurum alia animalia; et etiam inter 
homines, tanto est aliquis magis aptus mente; quanto est 
melioris tactus; quod apparet in his qui habent molles 
carne, ••• 53 
5lrn II De Anima, lect., 19, n.484. 
52Tl:' - - ~!'"-Ibid., n.485. 5~De Sensu et Sensato, I, 9, (Ioannem Keerbergium,Antwerp,l612,Tomus Tertius) 
- -
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These qualities in the human body, to which we have just referred, are 
indications of a good intellect, but they are not all that is required. The 
act of understanding depends upon the interior sense faculties and so upon 
their organs, as well as upon the exterior senses and their organs, and the 
disposition of these interior organs will be a determinant factor in estima-
ting the strength of mental power. Thus, after speaking of the impediment to 
understanding caused by the indisposition of the organs of the imagination, 
memory, and "vis cogitativa," to which we have previously called attention in 
chapter two, st. Thomas continues: "Et propter hoc etiam bonitas dispositio-
nis corporis humani facit aptum ad bene intelligendum, in quantum ex hoc 
praedictae vires fortiores existunt."54 
Now, the disposition of these organs mentioned above depends upon the 
brain, and as man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, 
"Praecedit etiam homo amnia animalia, quantum ad vires sensitivas interi-
ores; ••• "55 , he has the largest brain of all other animals in proportion 
to the size of his body. 
Unde, quia ad bonam habitudinam potentiarum sensitivarum 
interiorum, puta imaginationis, et memoriae, et cogitati-
vae virtutis, necessaria est bona dispositio cerebri; 
ideo factus est homo habens majus cerebrum inter omnia 
animalia, secundum proportionem suae quantitatis.56 
The two reasons that account for one man's being able to understand 
better than another are taken from these two dispositions; namely, the dis-
position of the body, and the disposition of the interior organs. The con-
54cont. Gent., III, 84. 
s~-sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, ~~··also I, q.78. a.4, c. 
S~Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.s, c. 
-ditions are thus presented by St. Thomas: 
••• unus alio potest eande.m ram melius intelligere, quia 
est melioris virtutis in intelligendo; ••• Hoc autem 
circa intellectum contingit dupliciter. Uno quidem modo 
ex parte intellectus, qui est perfectior. Manifestum est 
enim quod quanta corpus est melius dispositum, tanto 
melior em sorti tur animam: quod manifest a apparet in his 
quae sunt secundum speoiem diversa. Cujus ratio est, quia 
actus et forma recipitur in materia secundum materiae 
capaoitatem: unde cum etiam in hominibus quidam habeant 
corpus melius dispositum, sortiuntur animam maioris vir-
tutis in intelligendo. • • Alio modo oontingit hoc ex 
parte inferiorum virtutum quibus intellectus indiget ad 
sui operationem: illi anim in quibus virtus imaginativa 
et cogitativa at memorativa est melius disposita, sunt 
melius dispositi ad intelligendum.57 
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In the passage just cited, st. Thomas once again states that diversity 
and dignity of souls is derived from a diversity of bodies. As we noted in 
treating of the distinction of souls in the first chapter, if diversity of 
souls depended on diversity of the for.ms, that would entail a specific dif-
ferenoe. Now this is untenable in the Thomistic system. ". • • differentia 
formae quae non provenit nisi ex diversa dispositions materiae, non facit 
diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum numerum; sunt enim diversorum in-
di viduorum di versae formae, secundum materiam di versificatam. tt58 The dis-
position of the rational soul follows the disposition of the body, then, 
partly because the rational soul receives something from the body, and partly 
because forms are diversified according to the diversity of the matter. 
"• •• ipsam dispositionem corporis sequitur dispositio animae rationalis; 
tum quia anima rationalis aliquid accipit a corpore; tum quia secundum 
57 Sum. Theol., I, q.85, a.7, c. 
58 Ibid., ad 3um. 
---
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diversitatam matariae diversificantur at for.mae.n59 
The brain is an important part of the human body, and it is because of 
it that man, alone of all other animals, has an upright stature. In order 
that the brain may be freer in its operations, the head must be erect. This 
requires a high degree of heat in the heart, and this necessity, as we shall 
see later, (Infra, 66), affects the other senses • 
• • • st ut liberior sit ajus operatio, habet caput sursum 
positum; quia solus homo est animal rectum, alia vero ani-
malia ourva incedunt; at ad hanc rectitudinem habendam at 
conservandam necessaria fuit abundantia caloris in corde, 
••• ; cujus signum est quod in senio incurvatur homo, 
cum calor naturalis debilitatur.60 
That an upright stature is becoming to man, as wall as necessary, St. 
Thomas gives four reasons. First, man was given his senses not merely to 
procure the necessaries of life, for which purpose they were given to other 
animals, but also to acquire knowledge. That accounts for their position 
chiefly in the face, for in this way, man oan contact things above and below, 
and from all drink in knowledge and enjoyment, 
••• habere staturam rectam conveniens fuit homini propter 
quatuor. Primo quidam, quia sensus sunt dati homini, non 
solum ad vitae necessaria procuranda, siout aliis animali-
bus; sed etiam ad oognosoendum ••• solus homo deleotatur 
in ipsa pulchritudine sensibilium secundum seipsam. Et 
ideo, quia sensus praeoipue vigent in facie, alia animalia 
habent faciem pronam ad terram, • • • homo vero habet 
faciem erect am, ut per sensus, at praeoipue per vi sum, • • • 
libere possit ex omni parte sensibilia oognosoere, at 
oaelestia at terrena, ut ex omnibus intelligibilem ool-
ligat veritatem.61 
59Q. Disp. De Pot., q.3, a.9, ad tum. 
60 -- --Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.a, o. 
61 -Sum. Theol., I, q.9l, a.3, ad 3um. 
- --
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The second reason has been already given; namely, that the greater free-
dom of the brain requires an upright stature, (Supra, 60). The third is 
that if man were not of an erect posture, he would need to use his hands for 
feet, and thus would not have the free use of them for other purposes. "Tar-
tio quia oporteret quod, si homo haberet pronum staturam, uteretur manibus 
loco anteriorum pedum. Et sio utilitas manuum ad diversa opera perficienda 
oessaret."62 
st. Thomas gives as the fourth cause that the tongue of the human ani-
mal would become hard and protruding if it were employed as the instrument 
for acquiring food. This, moreover, would prove an impediment to speech, 
which is the natural vehicle of the reason. 
Quarto quia, si haberet pronam staturam, et uteretur mani-
bus loco anteriorum pedum, oporteret quod cibum caperet 
ore. Et ita haberet os oblongum, et labia dura et grossa, 
et linguam etiam duram, ne ab exterioribus laederetur, 
siout patet in aliis animalibus. Et talis dispositio 
omnino impediret locutionem, quae est proprium rationis.63 
Delicate touch, soft flesh, evenness of complexion, large brain, and up-
right stature, are, therefore, dispositions which are proper to bodies united 
to rational souls, and, consequently the human body is fittingly disposed for 
its form. Having noted these five elements, St. Thomas considers that he has 
sufficiently accounted for the construction of the human body, for he con-
eludes: "Et per istum modum ratio dispositionis humani corporis est assig-
nanda ad singula quae sunt homini propria; •• •"64 
62rbid. 
63rbid. 
64-Q. Disp. ~ Anima, q.l, a.8, c. 
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But has he sufficiently accounted for the disposition of the human body? 
The human body is certainly not the most perfect possible of bodies, nor is 
it even so perfect as the bodies of many other animals in many respects. 
Now, surely, the most perfect of fo~, such as is the rational soul, should 
have been united to the most excellent of bodies. This objection st. Thomas 
meets by conceding first of all that it is indeed true that other animals 
have a better sight, a more sensitive smell, a more acute hearing, greater 
agility in movement and the like, even natural clothing and arms of defense 
which men have not, but that also we must observe that the human body excels 
other bodies in touch, equability of temperament, brain, and that these are 
more desirable assets than those by which other animals surpass the human 
animal. Furthermore, we must remark that the human body had to be endowed 
just as it is in order to minister to the intellectual operation of the 
rational soul. For this, man's temperament must be of an even disposition, 
and to this evenness can be traced the explanation that human sight is not 
so keen and human audition not so delicate as the animal sight and hearing. 
This too prevents greater swiftness in movement, for excess in speed is 
repugnant to an equable temperament. 
Et similiter potest assignari ratio quare quaedam animalia 
sunt acutioris visus et subtilioris auditus quam homo, 
propter impedimentum horum sensuum quod necesse est con-
sequi in homine ex perfecta complexionis aequalitate. Et 
eadem etiam ratio est assignanda de hoc quod quaedam ani-
malia sunt homine velociora, cui excellentiae velooitatis 
repugnat aequalitas humanae complexionis.65 
That human beings have poorer scent than other animals can likewise be 
65sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, ad 1um. 
--
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accounted for in the following manner. For erect posture, as we have re-
marked elsewhere, (Supra, 60), there is required great heat in the heart. 
Now this heat must be moderated by a low temperature in the brain. For this 
low temperatura, the brain must have great humidity, since the brain is large 
Now, for the perfection of smell, much dryness is required, which dryness is 
tmpaded by the humidity of the brain. Wherefore, the olfactory sense is lass 
powerful in man than in some other animals, whose brain, though large, does 
not have to be very damp as there is not so much heat in the heart to be 
counteracted. 
Sicut homo, inter omnia animalia, habet pessimum olfactum. 
Necessarium enim fuit quod homo, inter omnia animalia, 
respectu sui corporis haberet maximum cerebrum: • • • tam 
etiam ut frigiditas cerebri temperaret calorem cordis, 
quem necesse est in homine abundare, ad hoc quod homo sit 
rectae staturae. Magnitude aute.m cerebri, propter eius 
humiditatem, est impedimentum olfactus, qui requirit 
siccitatam.66 
In place of natural weapons and clothing, men have been endowed with 
reason which can conceive a great variety of instruments and can choose the 
proper one for the proper circumstance, and with hands which are, as it were, 
the organ of organs. Other animals are guided by instinct and thus deter-
mined to this thing or that, but such necessity would not have been suited 
to the rational animal • 
• • • alia animalia habent aestimativam naturalem determi-
natam ad aliqua certa; et ideo suffioienter potuit eis 
prpvideri a natura aliqualibus certis auxiliis; non autem 
homini, qui propter rationem est infinitarum conceptionum; 
at ideo loco omnium auxiliorum quae alia animalia naturali-
ter habent, habet homo intelleotum, qui est species speci-
arum; at manus, quae sunt organum organorum, per quas potest 
sibi praeparare omnia necessaria.67 
Furthermore, horns and claws, feathers, thickness of skin, and such 
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things are unsuited to the softness of flesh and equability of temperament 
~ich are essential to the human animal because these qualities indicate an 
abundance of the earthly element which cannot predominate in an even com-
plexion such as is that of the human body • 
• • • cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium arma, 
at spissitudo corii, at multitude pilorum aut plumarum, quae 
aunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiaa tarrestris 
elementi; quae repugnat aequalitati et tenaritudini complexi• 
onis humanae. Et ideo haec homini non competebant. Sed 
loco horum habet rationem et manus, quibus potest parare 
sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitae necessaria, infinitis 
modis. Et hoc etiam magis competebat rationali naturae, 
quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem 
infinita instrumenta sibi paranda.68 
Another objection to the explanation of st. Thomas of the suitability of 
the human body is based upon the soul's distinction of being the most subtle 
of forms. Since it is that, why then should it not have been united to the 
most subtle of bodies? We have partially answered this in showing what must 
be the temperament of a body which was to excel in the sense of touch. 
(Supra, 33 at 34). We shall content ourselves with adding here only the 
words of st. Thomas which directly an~er the question; namely, those wherein 
he states explicitly that the rational soul could not have been united to the 
most subtle of bodies, fire, for example, since then the matter could not 
have been reduced to an evan disposition. 
67Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.s, ad 2oum. 
68 - -um:--Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, ad 2 • 
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••• lioet anima sit subtillissima formarum, "in quantum 
est intelligens; quia taman, cum sit infima in genera 
formarum intelligibilium, indiget oorpori uniri, quod fit 
mediante complexiane, ••• necessarium fuit quod corpus 
cui unitur, haberet plus in quantitate de gravibus ale-
mentis, scilicet terra et aqua. Cum enim ignis sit ef-
fioacissimae virtutis in agendo; nisi secundum quanti-
tatam inferiora elementa excederent, non possent fieri 
commixtio, et maxima reducta ad medium; ignis enim alia 
elementa consumeret.69 
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Furthermore, to no simple body could the rational soul be united, for in 
simple bodies contraries are in act and could not be reduced to a medium. We 
repeat this text: 
In oorporibus autem simplioibus non invenitur medium 
inter qualitates tangibiles, sed inveniuntur ipsae quali-
tates, secundum extremitatem oontrarietatis. Et inde 
manifestum est, quod per nullum corpus simplex, nee per 
aliquid corporibus simplicibus Vicinum, potest fieri 
sensus taotus.70 
And, although it was not fitting for the rational soul to be united to a 
heavenly body because such a body has no contraries and would not be a suit-
able instrument for touch, still the human body is most like this body in 
that it is most distant from contraries because of the evenness of its dis-
position. 
De nobilitate autem corporis caelestis est, quod non habet 
contrarium; unde quanto plus corpus separatur a contrarie-
tate, similius caelo effioitur ••• at ideo illus corpus 
quod venit ad maximam aequalitatem mixtionis, est simil-
limum caelo, et tale corpus debet esse corpus humanum; •• 71 • 
That the human body has defects, and that these defects are, in a cer-
tain sense, natural to it, st. Thomas will not deny, nor will he seek to 
69Q. Disp. De Ani~, q.l, a.s, ad 1um. 
70In III De~ma, lect., 18, n.S6~cited also (Supra, 34) n---rn II Sent., D.l, q.2, a.5, c. 
---
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evade the issue by falling back upon sin as the cause of the corruption, 
fatigue, subjection to disease, and the like disadvantages of the body, for 
he considers that sin did not detract from human nature, considered in its 
principles and the properties that flow from them. "• •• bonum naturae hu-
~~ae potest tripliciter dici: primo ipsa principia naturae, ex quibus ipsa 
natura constituitur, et proprietates ex his causatae, sicut potentiae animae, 
et alia hujusmodi ••• Primum bonum naturae nee tollitur, nee diminuitur per 
peccatum."72 
To ascertain in what respect these defects can be said to be natural, we 
may note first of all the twofold meaning of the word •natural.' A thing 
that has a nature is called natural. That is the first distinction. The 
second is that a property flowing from that nature is said to be natural, 
for example, to be lifted up is natural to fire. "• •• naturale dicitur 
dupliciter; vel id quod habet naturam, sicut dicimus corpora naturalia; vel 
illud quod consequitur naturam secundum naturam existens, sicut dicimus quod 
ferri sursum, est naturale igni: • nn • • It is in this latter sense of 
properties flowing from the nature of things that we shall consider whether 
death and such like defects are natural to man. II • • • et sic loquimur nunc 
de naturali, quod est secundum naturam."74 Now, nature consists of matter 
and form. Something, therefore, ~~y be natural to a thing according to the 
form or according to the matter. The act of heating is natural to fire ac-
cording to form, for action follows form. On the other hand, the ability to 
72sum. Theol., I-II, q.85, a.l, c. 
7~Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c. For a further discussion of this point con-
74!~1~!ng narl;u~consult Aristotle, Physics, II, 1, 192bl. 
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be heated by fire, as in water, is natural to water, not as to its form, but 
as to its matter. And since form is more truly nature, so to speak, than is 
matter, what is natural to anything according to its form is more natural to 
it than What is merely natural according to its matter. 
Unde cum natura dicatur dupliciter, scilicet forma et ma-
teria, dupliciter dicitur aliquid naturale: vel secundum 
formam, vel secundum materiam.. Secundum formam quidem, 
sicut naturale est igni quod calefaciat nam actio conse-
quitur formam; secundum materiam, autem, sicut aquae est 
naturale quod ab igne calefieri possit. Cumque forma sit 
magis natura quam materia, naturalius est quod est natu-
rale secundum formam quam quod est naturale secundum ma.-
teriam..75 
The natural condition of matter can likewise be viewed from two differ-
ent aspects. There is one condition of matter that makes it suitable for 
such and such a form. This is matter considered in relation to its end, and 
this is what is looked to by the agent when he selects matter for some defi-
nita purpose, for he needs must choose those qualities which will be useful 
to the thing he proposes to fashion. The second condition of matter is that 
which follows of necessity from the very nature of the matter itself. This 
consequent is not according to matter's suitability to its form, for it may 
even be repugnant to the form, and, therefore, this is not chosen in the mat-
ter nor intended by the maker when he seeks the best matter for the form he 
has in mind. 
Sed id quod consequitur materiam, dupliciter accipi potest: 
uno modo secundum congruit formae; et hoc est quod agens 
eligit in materia: alio modo non secundum quod congruit 
formae, immo forte repugnat etiam formae et fini, sed ex 
necessitate materiae; et talis conditio non est electa 
75Q. Disp • .£!_ Iv~alo, q.S, a.5, c. 
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vel intanta ab aganta; ••• 76 
There are, therefore, certain conditions in matter which make a certain 
matter proper for a certain form and certain conditions which have no rala-
tion to the form but which follow of necessity from the matter. The former 
are what the agent seeks in making something, and not the latter, as we find 
st. Thomas again affir.ming: "• •• sed taman considerandum est, quod in his 
quae sunt ex materia, sunt quaedam dispositiones in ipsa materia, propter 
quas talis materia eligitur ad hanc formam; at sunt aliquae quae consaquuntur 
ex necessitate materiae, at non ex electione agentis; •• • n77 
Now, whatever is destined for an end will be so constituted as to serve 
to the attainment of that end, as is clear in artificial things especially. 
"• •• ea quae sunt ad finem, instituuntur secundum rationem finis, ut patet 
praecipue in artificialibus.n78 Since God created all natural things, each 
thing can, consequently, be called a work of art, and God, a Divine Artist. 
The Divine Artist, as any human artist, desires to give to each of His pro-
ductions the bast disposition in view of the purpose for which the object is 
intended. This best disposition may not, however, be the very best absolute-
ly, but only relatively, and it may even be compatible with many defects. 
An example may illustrate this more clearly. A man wants to fashion a saw. 
This saw must cut, and must, therefore, be made of matter Which may not in-
deed be the most beautiful, or entirely free from undesirable accidents such 
as subjection to rust, dullness, and the like, but which will be capable of 
76Ibid. 
77Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.a, c. 
7Brn II Sen~, D.l9, q.l, a.2, c. 
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serving or fulfilling the end of the saw; namely, to cut. Iron, as a con-
sequence, and not glass, will be selected by the fabricator of this instru-
ment. 
And also: 
• •• omnes res naturales productae sunt ab arte divina: 
unde sunt quodammodo artificiata ipsius Dei. Quilibet 
aute.m artifex intendit suo operi dispositionem optimam 
inducere, non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad fine.m. 
Et si talis dispositio habet secum adiunctum aliquem de-
fectum, artifex non curat. Sicut artifex qui facit serram 
ad secandam, facit eam ex ferro, ut sit idonea ad seoandam; 
nee curat eam facere ex vitro, quae est pulchrior materia, 
quia talis pulchritude esset impedimentum finis. Sic igi-
tur Deus unicuique rei naturali dedit optimam dispositio-
ne.m, non quidem simpliciter, sed secundum ordinem ad pro-
prium finem.79 
••• sicut ad faciendam serram artifex eligit duritiem in 
ferro, ut sic serra utilis ad secandam; sed quod acies fer-
ri hebetari possit et fieri rubiginosa, hoc accidit ex 
necessitate materiae.SO 
Furthermore, these undesirable qualities which are not suited to a form 
or to its end, would willingly be excluded from the matter proper to the con-
ceived end, if this were possible, but since it is not, they must be accept-
ed and accounted for, not by their final cause, but rather by their material 
cause. It is for this reason that the agent who acts in view of an end and 
who looks to the final cause of the thing should not be called to task for 
conditions which flow from the matter itself. 
79 
Invenitur tamen in ferro aliqua conditio secundum quam fer-
rum non habet aptitudinem nee ad formam nee ad finem, siout 
quod est frangibile vel contrahens rubiginem vel aliquid 
hujusmodi, quae sunt impeditiva finis; unde non sunt electa 
Sum. Theol., I, q.91, a.3, c • 
._80Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.a, c. 
ab agente, sed magis ab agente repudiarentur, si asset pos-
sibile. Unde ••• in accidentibus individui non est quae-
renda causa finalis sed solum causa materialis: proveniunt 
enim ex dispositione materiae, non ex intentione agentis.81 
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These principles, than, namely, that something may be natural to a for.m 
and not natural to the matter, and vice versa, and that matter itself has 
certain conditions which give it an aptitude for a certain for.m and other 
conditions which are necessitated by the very qualities of the matter and 
which may even be repugnant to the form, will make clear, perhaps, in what 
sense, we may affirm that the defects of the human body are natural to man 
and also in what respect the human body has the best possible disposition. 
According to the form of man, understanding, willing, and such operations, 
are natural to him. "Sic ergo homini est aliquid naturale secundum suam 
formam, ut intelligere, vella, et alia hujusmodi; ••• n82 Also, according 
to his form, incorruptibility is natural to man because, as st. Thomas holds, 
every form intends perpetual being in so far as it can, but only the rational 
soul whose being does not wholly depend upon matter, since it has· immaterial 
operations, can achieve it. 
Et quamvis omnis forma intendat perpetuum esse, quantum po-
test, nulla tamen forma rei corruptibilis potest assequi 
perpetuitatem sui, praeter an~am rationalam, eo quod ipsa 
non est subiecta omnino materiae corporali, sicut aliae 
formae; quinimo habet propriam operationem immaterialem, 
• • • Unde ex parte suae formae naturalior est homini in-
corruptio quam aliis rebus corruptibilibus.83 
81Q. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c. 
82Ibid. ------
8~sum. Theol., I-II, q.85, a.6, c. also, Cont.~·· II, 79. 
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Naw, the rational soul is destined to eternal beatitude and, consequent-
ly, is adapted to its end by reason of its immortality. But the human body 
which has the rational soul for its proximate end is adapted to that end in 
one way, but in another way it is not. "• •• forma hominis, quae est anima 
rationalis, secundum suam incorruptibilitatenl, proportionata est suo fini, 
qui est beatitude perpetua; sed corpus humanum, quod est corruptibile, secun-
dum suam naturam consideratum, quodammodo proportionatum est suae formae, et 
quodammodo non. n84 It is adapted to the soul in that it is so constructed 
that it may serve the soul in its acquisition of knowledge. For this reason 
the human body had to be composed of contraries, as has been previously 
stated, (Supra, 36, et sqq.), and in this sense it is matter proportionate 
to its form. 
Corporis autem humani conditio dupliciter considerari 
potest: uno modo secundum aptitudinem ad formam; ••• 
Secundum aptitudinem quidem ad formam, necessarium est 
corpus humanum esse ex elementis compositum, et medie 
complexionatum. • • Unde corpus congruens tali animae 
fuit corpus contrariis compositum.86 
Now, anything composed of contraries is subject to corruption, for con-
traries are the "• •• causa corruptionis in rebus, •• n86 . This corruption 
is an absolute necessity since it is inseparable from the matter itself. 
"• •• cum necessitas corruptionis sit necessitas absoluta, utpote proveniens 
ex ipsa materia, ••• "87 It is according to this condition following upon 
matter that the human body is not adapted to its form. "Quod autem sequitur 
84Ibid. 
8~isp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c. 
86 --In II Sent., D.l9,q.l, a.2, c. 
87In D~ima, lect., 7, n.317. 
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ex necessitate materiae quod sit corruptibile. secundum hanc conditionem non 
habet aptitudinem ad formam, sed magis repugnantiam ad formam.''88 
If, however, there could be found in nature any body composed of ele-
ments which would, at the same time, be incorruptible, that body would cer-
tainly be adapted to the rational soul, that is to say, proportionate accord-
ing to the nature of the soul, and not merely according to the end intended. 
As far as that goes, we may say the same for any other thing. If iron could 
be found which would be unbreakable and not subject to rust, that would be 
the iron most suited to a saw, but since there exists no such iron, the hard 
and breakable kind must suffice. So, too, with regard to the human body. 
Since only corruptible matter can be found which will, at the same time, be 
organic and composed of contraries, such matter must be taken for union with 
' 
the rational soul. 
Unde si in natura inveniri potuisset aliquod corpus ex ale-
mentis compositum quod esset incorruptibile, proculdubio 
tale corpus asset conveniens animae secundum naturam; sicut 
si posset inveniri ferrum infrangibile et rubiginem non 
oontrahens, asset convenientissima materia ad serram, at 
talem artifex quaereret; sed quia talis inveniri non potest 
accipit qualem potest, scilicet duram vel frangibilem. 
Et similiter quia natura non potest invenire corpus ex 
elementis compositum quod secundum naturam materiae sit 
incorruptibile, aptatur naturaliter animae incorruptibili 
corpus organicum licet corruptibile.89 
88Q.. Disp • .ll§. Malo, q.S, a.5, c. 
89Q.. Disp. De Malo, q.S, a.S, c., also Q.. Disp. De .Ap,ima, q.l, a.8.o. "Magis 
enim artifex eligeret materiam ad quam non consequeretur, si posset inveni-
ri; sed quia inveniri non potest, propter hujusmodi defectus conse~uentes 
non praetermittit ex hujusmodi materia convenienti facere opus. s~o igitur 
et in corpore humano oontingit; quod enim taliter sit cammixtum et secundum 
partes dispositum, ut sit oonvenientissimum ad operationes sensitivas, est 
electum in hac materia a factore hominis; sed quod hoc corpus sit corrupti-
bile, fatigabile et hujusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessitate 
materiae. Necesse est enim corpus sic mixtum ex contrariis subjacere tali-
bus defeotibus." 
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Neither· can it be said that God could have done otherwise, for in the 
formation of natural things, we do not inquire what God could effect, but 
what the nature of things permits to be done. "Nee potest obviari per hoc 
quod Deus potuit aliter facere: quia in institutions naturae non quaeritur 
quid Deus facere potuit, sed quid rerum natura patitur ut fiat, • n90 • • 
However, God provided man with a remedy for these defects by the gift of im-
mortality of which man rendered himself unworthy by sin. 
Likewise: 
Sed quia Deus, qui est haminis institutor, hanc necessitatem 
materiae sua omnipotentia potuit prohibere ne in actum pro-
diret, ejus virtute collatum est homini ante peccatum ut a 
morte praeservaretur quousque tali beneficia se reddidit 
peccando indignum: sicut et faber praestaret ferro ex quo 
operatur, si posset, quod numquam frangeretur.9l 
Sciendum tamen est, quod in remedium horum defectuum Deus 
homini in sua institutione contulit auxilium justitiae 
originalis, per quam corpus esset omnino subditum animae, 
quamdiu anima Deo subderetur; ita quod nee mors nee ali-
qua passio vel defectus homini accideret, nisi prius ani-
ma separaretur a Deo. Sed per peccatum anima recedente 
a Deo, homo privatus est hoc beneficia~ et subjacet defeo-
tibus secundum quod materiam requirit. 2 
st. Thomas concludes, then, that death and corruption are natural to 
man according to the necessity of matter, but according to his form, immor-
tality is proper to him. "Sic ergo mora et corruptio naturalis est homini 
secundum necessitatem materiae; sed secundum rationem formae asset ei con-
veniens immortalitas ••• Et in quantum immortalitas est nobis naturalis, 
mors et corruptio est nobis contra naturam. n93 
90Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.a, c. 
9lQ. Disp. De Malo, q.5, a.5, c. 
92Q. Disp. 1Je' Aiiiiiia, q.l, a.a, c. 
93Q. Disp. De Malo, q.S, a.S, c. 
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This will suffice to show that the human body has a disposition suited 
to the rational soul because this very disposition was determined by the nee 
themselves of that soul. The proximate end of the human body is the human 
soul, and since matter is always for the form and not the form for the matte~ 
it was fitting that the body should have been so disposed as to be an instru-
ment suited to minister to the operations of the for.m to which it was united. 
Because the intellectual operation of the rational soul depends in some sense 
upon the sensitive nature of the body, that body had to be an apt subject for 
sensation with many sense organs required by the diverse activities of the 
soul. Furthermore, it had to be composed of contraries and constituted of a 
medium complexion that it might have a delicate touch, Which is the founda-
tion of all the senses and which is more perfect in man than in any other 
animal. Soft flesh, large brain in proportion to his body, erect posture 
were also necessary to man, and, therefore, the human body was given these. 
In many things it may be surpassed by other animals, and we may also add, is 
not free from defects proper to itself, but these defects considering the 
nature of the rational soul, could not have been avoided, and thus we come 
to a further problem concerning the body; namely, Can the body be considered 
to be a burden to the soul? In the light of Thomistic principles we shall 
discuss this subject in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE BODY IS NOT A HINDRANCE TO THE SOUL 
If we consider man in his nature, apart from original sin, we may say 
that st. Thomas will, in no sense, consider the body a burden to the soul. 
If, on the other hand, we approach this subject from the view-point of fallen 
and sinful man, then there is a sense in which the Angelic Doctor will con-
cede that the body is a hindrance to the soul. 
First of all, let us look at man as God made him. He is a composite 
substance, a unity resulting from the union of two incomplete substances, one 
of which, the soul, though capable of an independent existence, yet requires, 
in a very real sense, the other part, the body, for its full perfection. 
Now, if the rational soul attains the perfection of its nature through its 
union with the body, it surely cannot be said that through this self-same 
union it suffers an impediment. ". • • non est in detrimentum animae quod 
corpori uniatur, sed hoc est ad perfectionem naturae."l 
Furthermore, if the body occupies such an important place in the exer-
cise of the soul's operations, as we have seen it does, it certainly cannot 
be said to hinder these operations, for nature would not unite one thing to 
another if that other impeded the operations of the higher substance since 
nature seeks in such a combination rather to facilitate these activities than 
to obstruct them in any way. "Nulli autem rei natura adjunxit per quod sua 
lQ. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.2, ad 14um. 
- --
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operatic impediatur, sed magis ea per quae fiat convenientior."2 Union of 
the soul with the body is, therefore, for the perfection of the soul in its 
nature and in the exercise of its operations, for, as st. Thomas expresses 
it: "Anima unitur corpori ut perfioiatur non solum quantum ad intelligere 
phantasmaticum, sed etiam quantum ad naturam speciei, et quantum ad alias 
operationes quas exercet per corpus."3 
To hold that man's proper operation, understanding, is impeded by the 
body, (as those maintained who were of the opinion that souls existed in 
another world before they came to bodies and forgot through this very contact 
the knowledge they had had previously), is to affirm that man is an unnatural 
being, a consequential position which is, for st. Thomas, unthinkable. 
Videtur etiam sequi ex hac opinione quod unio animae ad 
corpus non sit naturalis: nam quod est naturae alicui 
non impedit ejus propriam operationem. Si igitur unio 
corporis impedit intelligentiam animae, non erit naturale 
animae corpori uniri, sed contra naturam; et ita homo 
qui oonstituitur ex unione animae ad corpus, non erit 
aliquid naturale: quod videtur absurdum.4 
Such a doctrine that the body is a check upon the intellectual opera-
tion of the soul suggests, moreover, that the union of soul and body is not 
for the sake of the toul but rather of the body. But it is unfitting that 
the soul, which is the nobler of the two, should, for the purpose of the 
body's ennoblement, suffer an Lnpediment to its proper operation because of 
this very contact with and ennoblement of the body. 
Sed secundum hanc opinionem non videtur quod possit 
2cont. Gent., II, 83. 
~isp. De Spiritu. Great., q.l, 
4 -Q. Disp. R! Anima, q.l, a.l5, c. a.3, ~~· 
assignari rationabilis causa propter quam anima corpori 
uniatur. Non enim est hoc propter animam; cum anima 
corpori non unita perfeote propriam operationem habere 
possit, et ex unione ad corpus ejus operatio propria 
impeditur. Similiter etiam non potest dari quod propter 
corpus; non enim anima est propter corpus, sed corpus 
magis propter animam, cum anima sit nobilior corpore. 
Unde et inconveniens videtur quod anima ad nobilitandum 
corpus sustineat in sua operatione detrime~tum.5 
If the soul, through union with a body, did not reach by this very 
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means, its ultimate perfection, it would be of a different nature, and, con-
sequently, we must admit, if we agree with st. Thomas, that according to the 
nature which it has, the soul cannot better attain its end than through its 
union with the body. "Si anima non esset oorpori unibilis, tunc asset al-
terius naturae; unde secundum hano naturam quam habet, non potest melius ad 
divinam bonitatem accedere quam per hoc quod unitur corpori."6 Through the 
exercises it performs through its body or with that body's help, it arrives 
at its terminus, beatitude. "Et etiam secundum operationes quas in corpore 
exercet, ad divinam beatitudinem accedit merendo ••• "7 
The end of man, for st. Thomas, is to arrive at the contamplation of 
truth, for, as he affir.u1s, the last end of anything is that which it reaches 
through the exercise of its proper operations. Now, all the proper activi-
ties of man lead him to a contemplation of truth, and it was for this reason 
that his soul was given a body; namely, that through it he might acquire 
knowledge, not that he might forget or lose it • 
• • • ultimus finis rei cujuslibet est id ad quod res per-
5Ibid. 
Sin II Sent., D.l, q.2, a.4, _ad 1um.. 
rr;::--Op. cit., o. 
--
venire nititur per suas operationas. Sed per omnes pro-
prias ordinatas operationes et rectas homo pervenire 
nititur in veritatis contemplationem; nam operationes 
virtutum activarum sunt quaedam preparationes et dispo-
sitiones ad virtutes contemplativas. Finis igitur homi-
nis est pervenire ad veritatis contemplationem. Propter 
hoc igitur anima est unita oorpori; quod est esse homi-
nem. Non igitur, per hoc quod unitur corpori, scientiam 
habitam perdit; sed magis ei unitur ut scientiam acquirat.S 
Elsewhere, we find the same thought expressed as follows: 
Ultima perfectio animae humanae consistit in cognitions 
veritatis, quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc quod per-
fioiatur anima in cognitions veritatis, indiget uniri 
corpori, quia intelligit per phantasmata, quae non sunt 
sine corpore.9 
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However, it is just here that the difficulty begins. The ultimate per-
faction of the natural intelligence of rational substances consists in the 
knowledge of separated substances, but in this life, because of its union 
with the body, the soul cannot have a direct knowledge of these, and in that 
sense at least, the body would seem to be an impediment. Not for st. 
Thomas, who holds that it was not in vain that the soul was united to the 
body; rather it was precisely that it might more perfectly attain that know-
ledge which is proper to it that the soul was given a body. 
• • • ultima perfectio cognitionis naturalis anfmae humanae, 
haec est ut intelligat substantias separatas; sed perfectius 
ad hanc cognitionem habendam pervenire potest per hoc quod in 
corpore est,~quia ad hoc disponitur per studium, et maxima 
per meritam; unde non frustra corpori unitur.lO 
Certainly, St. Thomas will admit that this knowledge of separated sub-
stances is only the kind that is acquired through intelligible species ab-
8cont. Gent., II, 83. 
9Q:15isp. De Anima, q.l, a.l, c. 
10 - -=-::.----
.2.1: • ..£!.!., a .17, !:.,<,! 3um. 
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stracted fram the phantasms, but this mode is the one proper to the human 
intellect, and for it union with the body is an absolute necessity, rather 
than an obstacle • 
• • • finis ad quem se extendit naturalis possibilitas ani-
mae humanae, est ut cognoscat substantias separatas secundum 
modum praedictum; et ab hoc non impeditur per hoc quod cor-
pori unitur; et similiter etiam in tali cognitione substan-
tiae separatae ultima est felicitas hominis ad quam per 
naturalia pervenire potest.ll 
As for admitting that the body hinders the soul from seeing God in His 
essence, that would be impossible for st. Thomas, since it is, according to 
his thought, impossible for any created intellect with or without a body to 
attain to a knowledge or vision of God in His essence unless that intellect 
receive some special help from God. "Non est autem possibile quod ad istum 
visionis divinae modum aliqua creata substantia ex virtute propria possit 
attingere.nl2 Furthermore, to see God in His essence belongs properly to 
the Divine Nature, and since that Essence transcends the limit of any created 
nature, it belongs properly to no other nature. The action of God, therefor~ 
is needed to enable anyone to have a direct sight of God. 
Videre autem Deum per ipsam essentiam divinam est proprium 
naturae divinae ••• quidquid excedit limites alicujus na-
turae, non potest sibi advenire nisi per actionem ulterius; 
sicut aqua non tendit sursum nisi ab aliquo alio mota. 
Videre autem Dei substantiam transcendit limites omnis na-
turae creatae. Nam cujuslibet naturae intellectualis 
creatae proprium est, ut intelligat secundum modum suae 
substantiae. Substantia autem divina non potest sic in_ 
telligi, • • • Impossibile est ergo perveniri ab aliquo 
intelleotu oreato ad visionem divinae substantiae, nisi 
per actionem Dei, qui omnem creaturam transoendit.l3 
llOp. cit., a.l6, ad 1um. 
12-- --Cont.Gent., III, 52. ~. -:-al"so 0. Dian. De Veri tate a.lO. a.ll e. 
-
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It is not our intention to penetrate further into this problem which 
more properly finds place in the Thomistic theory of knowledge, but we call 
attention to it here just in so far as it is necessary to show in what sense 
the body is not an impediment to the soul. It is obvious that the rational 
soul, though made for the vision of God, "• •• quamvis intellectus noster 
sit factus ad hoc quod videat Deum ••• nl4, could not attain that vision even 
without the body were it not given a special light by God to do so. Con-
sequently, in this point at least, the body is not a burden to the soul. It 
is because of the finite nature of the soul, and for no other reason, that 
this must be the case. 
Cum autem ad visionem divinae substantiae intellectus crea-
tus quodam supernatural! lumina sublimetur, ••• non est 
aliquis intellectus creatus ita secundum suam naturam in-
fimus, qui non ad hanc visionem possit, elevari ••• lumen 
illud non potest esse alicui creaturae connaturale, sed 
omnem creatam naturam excedit secundum virtutem.l5 
From the standpoint, then, of nature, it is to the soul's advantage to 
be in a body since only there can it acquire perfection, but, considered 
practically and not theoretically, the body can be a burden to the soul and 
that fact st. Thomas does not hesitate to face and trace to original sin. 
When treating of the disposition of the body, we saw that it was neces-
sary for the body to be corruptible because composed of contraries. Now, it 
is this very corruptibility which st. Thomas considers to be an obstacle to 
the soul. We find in his works many expressions which suggest this burden of 
14Q. Disp. De Veritate, q.lO, a.ll, ad 7um. (Marietti, III) 
15cont. Gent., III, 57, Cf. John F. MCCormick, "The Burden of the Body," 
"[The New Scholasticism, October, 1938, XII, no. iv, 398). 
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the body as deriving from its corruption. In answering the objection that 
the body is an impediment to the soul in its knowledge of truth, he explicit-
ly states that the soul's mode of understanding, though natural to the human 
soul, is yet below that of spiritual superior substances, and that even in 
its own characteristic mode it suffers an impediment from the corruption of 
the body. "• •• iste modus cognosoendi est naturalis animae, ut percipiat 
intelligibilem veritatem infra modum quo percipiunt spirituales superiores, 
accipiendo scilicet eam ex sensibilibus; sed in hoc etiam patitur impedi-
mentum ex corruptions corporis, • • 
And again he tells us that the intellectual light in man is shadowed 
through union with the body, and is impeded so that it cannot freely perceive 
even naturally knowable truths--, but here again he assigns the cause to the 
corruptibility of the body. 
Lumen intellectuale ubi est purum sicut in angelis, sine 
difficultate omnia cognita naturaliter damonstrat, ita 
quod in eis est omnia naturalia cognoscere: in nobis 
autem lumen hujusmodi est obumbratum per conjunctionem ad 
corpus et ad vires corporeas, et ex hoc impeditur, ut non 
possit libere veritatem etiam naturaliter cognoscibilem 
inspicere secundum illud Sapient., IX, 15. 'Corpus quod 
corrumpitur, aggravat animam, at terrena inhabitatio de-
primit sensum multa cogitantem.' Et ex hoc est, quod non 
est in nobis omnino veritatem oognoscere, scilicet prop-
ter impedimenta sed unusquisque hoc magis vel minus habet 
in potestate secundum quod lumen intelleetuale est in 
ipso purius.l7 
Likewise, we find st. Thomas affirming that it is difficult for man to 
turn to his beatitude for two reasons. One is that it is beyond his nature, 
lSQ. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.2, ad 1sum. 
17rn Boeth. de Trinitate, q.l, &::"1, ad~· 
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and the other that he is impeded by the corruption of the body and the in-
feotion of sin. "Converti autem ad beatitudinem ultimam, homini quidam est 
difficile et quia est supra naturam, et quia habere impedimentum ex corrup-
tione corporis et infectione peccati."lS 
Furthermore, St. Thomas assigns three reasons why the mind is prevented 
from being wholly absorbed in God, two of which, sin and temporal affairs, 
he can eliminate, but the third which results from the burden of a corruptible 
body, he must retain.l9 
It is thus evident that the body does weigh upon the soul, and that that 
depression in this life cannot be lifted. M~~ would fain find rest in God, 
but he is prevented from so doing by that which the Apostle can call the body 
of this death. That contemplation of truth which would give him the coveted 
rest in God man can only desire, not fully attain, because the body inclines 
18sum. Theol., I, q.62, a.2, ad 2um. 
l~Disp. ~ Caritate, q.l, &:lo;-o. (Marietti, II) "Impeditur autem homo in 
hac vita, ne totaliter mens ejus in Deum feratur, ex tribus. Primo quidem 
ex contraria inclinatione mentis; quando scilicet mens per peccatum con-
versa ad commutabile bonum sicut ad finem, avertitur ab incommutabile bono. 
Secunda per occupationem secularium rerum, ••• Tertia vera ex infirmitate 
praesentis vitae, cujus necessitatibus oportet aliquatenus hominem occu-
pari, et retrahi, ne actualiter mens feratur in Deum; dormiendo, comedendo, 
et alia hujusmodi faciendo, sine quibus praesens vita duci non potest; et 
ulterius ex ipsa corporis gravitate anima deprimitur, ne divinam lucem in 
sui essentia videre possit, ut ex tali visione caritas perficiatur; secun-
dum illud Apostoli, II ad Cor., v, 6; 'Quamdiu sumus in corpore, peregrina-
mur a Domino; per fidem-enrm-ambulamus, et non per speciem.' Homo autem 
in hac vita potest esse sine peccato mortali avertante ipsum a Deo; et 
iterum potest esse sine occupatione temporalium rerum, ••• Sed ab onere 
corruptibilis carnis in hac vita liber esse non potest. Unde quantum ad 
remotionem primorum duorum impedimentorum, caritas potest esse perfecte in 
hac vita; non autam quantum ad remotionem tertii impedimenti, et ideo illam 
perfectionem caritatis quae erit post hanc vitam, nullus in hac vita habere 
potest, nisi sit viator et comprehensor simul; quod est proprium Christi." 
the soul to earthly truths. 
Non est autem in contemplatione contentio et certamen ex con-
trarietate veritatis quam contemplamur; sed ex defectu nostri 
intellectus, et ex corruptibili corpore, quod nos ad inferi-
ora retrahit, secundum illud (Sapient., ix, 15): 'Corpus 
quod corrumpitur aggravat animam, et deprimit terrena inhabi-
tatio sensum multa cogitantem.' Et inde est quod quando homo 
pertingit ad contemplationem veritatis, ardentius earn amat: 
sed magis odit proprium defectum et gravitatem corruptibilis 
corporis, ut dicat eum Apostolo (Rom., vii, 24): 'Infelix 
ego homoJ quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?r20 
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The human body because of its corruptibility is then a decided burden to 
the rational soul in that highest intellectual act; namely, contemplation. 
But is this susceptibility to corruption the only sense in ~ch the 
Angelic Doctor considers that the body weighs upon the soul? st. Thomas 
tells us that when the soul is separated from the body, it will understand 
more freely than when in it because the weight and care of the body dims the 
intellectual clarity of the soul in this life. "• •• anima separata est 
quidem imperfectior, si consideretur natura qua oommunicat cum natura cor-
poris: sed tamen quodaDllnodo est liberior ad intelligendum, in quantum per 
gravedinem et occupationem corporis a puritate intelligentiae impeditur."21 
And he further reminds us that there is no doubt that through corporeal 
movement and sense occupation the soul is hindered from receiving the impres-
sions of separated substances, and that, therefore, it is only during sleep 
or upon withdrawal from sense activity that men can receive revelations. 
Nee taman dubium est quin per motus corporeos et oocupationem 
sensuum anima impediatur a receptione influxus substantiarum 
separatarum: unde dormientibus et alienatis a sensibus quae-
20sum. Theol., II-II, q.l80, a.7, ad 2um. 
2Isum. Theol., I, q.89, a.2, ~ 1um. --
dam revelationes fiunt quae non accidunt sensibus utenti-
bus.22 
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Withdrawal from the senses, then, is a necessary condition for higher 
understanding, for the reception of impressions from separated substances, 
and for knowledge of the future. 
And again: 
Nam anima, quando impeditur ab occupatione circa corpus pro-
prium, redditur debilior ad intelligendum aliqua altiora; 
unde et virtus temperantiae, quae a corporeis delectationi-
bus retrahit animam, praecipue facit homines ad intelligen-
dum aptos; homines etiam dormientes, quando corporeis sensi-
bus non utuntur nee est aliqua perturbatio humorum aut fumo-
sitatum impediens, percipiunt de futuris, ex superiorum im-
pressions, aliqua quae modum ratiocinationis humanae ex-
cedunt; et hoc multo magis accidit in syncopizantibus et 
extasim passis, quanta magis fit retractio a corporeis 
sensibus.23 
••• anima quando abstrahitur a corporalibus, aptior reddi-
tur ad percipiendum influxum spiritualium substantiarum; et 
etiam ad percipiendum subtiles motus qui ex impressionibus 
causarum naturalium in imaginatione humana relinquuntur, a 
quibus percipiendis anima impeditur cum fuerit circa sensi-
bilia occupata.24 
Now, although dependence upon the senses does prove an impediment to the 
receptfon of knowledge from a higher source than phantasms, this should be no 
argument to prove that the body is a burden because knowledge that does not 
come to the intellect through the senses is not natural to it even when the 
" • • • 
modus intelli-soul is separated from the body, for st. Thomas says: 
gendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori 
uniri: sed esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae, et 
22Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.l5, c. 
23cont. Gent., II, 81. 
24sum. T~., II-II, q.l72, a.l, ad 1um. 
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similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter natu-
ra.m."25 
If that were the extent to which St. Thomas concedes that the body is a 
burden, we might well give his answer to the difficulty of the body's corrup-
tibility and dismiss the subject, but the problem is not so easily solved, 
and before we attempt an explanation of the first real obstacle, we must con-
sider that st. Thomas maintains that the senses not only impede higher know-
ledge, but also that kncwrledge which is in very truth proportionate to the 
rational intellect, and that the passions, too, have their share in the de-
pression of the soul by the body. 
St. Thomas insists that in this life we can know higher things through 
lower ones, causes through their effects, and, so too, the First Cause thro~ 
His effects. That mode is quite within the nature of the human mind. "Unde 
nee per hanc viam cognosci Deus altiori modo potest quam sicut causa cog-
noscitur per effactum. 11 26 But even for this knowledge of effects we must ad-
mit, st. Thomas says, that sense occupation is an impediment to a full and 
lucid comprehension of them. "A consideratione autem plena at lucida intelli 
gibilium effectuum impeditur homo in statu praesenti, per hoc quod distrahi-
tur a sensibilibus, at circa se occupatur."27 
Corruptibility and sense distraction are thus two weights upon the soul 
caused by its union with the body which st. Thomas recognizes as impediments 
to understanding. The third is found in the human passions. 
25op. cit., I, q.89, a.l, c. 
26cont:-Gent., III, 48. 
2'lsum. Theol., I, q.94, a.l, c., Cf. McCormick,~· cit., 396. 
• • • homini sunt impedimenta plurima perveniendi ad finem. 
Impeditur enim debilitate rationis, ••• Impeditur etiam 
ex passionibus partis sensitivae et ex affectionibus quibus 
ad sensibilia at inferiora trahitur; quibus quanto magis 
inhaeret, longius ab ultimo fine distat; haec ~nim infra 
hominem sunt, finis autem superior eo existit. 8 
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The act of contemplation is hindered through the vehemence of the pas-
sions ~.ich incline the soul's attention to sensibles, he states in the fol-
lowing: "Impeditur actus contemplationis, in quo essentialiter consistit 
vita contemplativa, et per vehementiam passionum, per quam abstrahitur in-
tentio animae ab intelligibilibus ad sensibilia, et per tumultos exteri-
ores.n29 It is, however, because the soul does not rule the body that such 
a hindrance must be recognized, as St. Thomas says: "• •• nunc autem im-
peditur ex corporis unione, propter hoc quod anima non perfectae dominatur 
in corpus.n30 
Now, how can St. Thomas insist so strongly upon this naturalness of the 
union existing between the soul and its body, as we have seen he does, and 
still grant that this body, ld1ich is such a burden, is yet for the soul's 
good? All these defects that we have noted, St. Thomas will an~er us, 
flow from man's nature considered from the aspect of his matter. A body 
composed of elements must needs be corruptible. Desires in man are necessar 
if the senses are, and the struggle consequent upon desires flows from the 
necessity of the matter itself. "Pugna quae est in homina ex contrariis 
concupiscantiis etiam ex necessitate matariae provenit; necesse enim fuit si 
28cont. Gent., III, 147. 
29sum. T~., II-II, q.lBO, a.2, c. 
30--Q. Disp. ~Pot., q.5, a.lO, ad sum. 
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homo haberet sensum, quod sentiret delectabilia et quod eum sequeretur con-
cupiscentia delectabilium quae plerumque repugnat rationi.n31 
All this St. Thomas admits. ~~ is subject to corporeal and spiritual 
defects, and these can, in a certain sense, be attributed to matter. 
Posset tamen aliquis dicere hujusmodi defectus, tam cor-
porales quam spirituales, non esse poenales, sed natu-
rales defectus ex necessitate materiae consequentes. 
Necesse est enim corpus humanum, quum sit ex contrariis 
compositum, oorruptibile esse, et sensibilem appetitum 
in ea quae sunt secundum deleotabilia moveri, quae in-
terdum sunt contraria rationi, et intelleotum possibilem, 
quum sit in potentia ad omnia intelligibilia, nullum 
eorum habens in actu, sed ex sensibus natum ea acquirere, 
difficulter ad scientiam veritatis pertin~ere et de fa-
cili propter phantasmata a vero deviare.3 
However, he continues, and we must consider this as his answer in so far 
as an answer can be given, if we think rightly on the matter, we must con-
elude that God would not have united the soul to a body which would natural-
ly impede it unless at the same time He gave to the soul some special help 
whereby these aforesaid consequences necessarily following upon matter would 
in no wise be a check upon the rational nature. 
Sed taman, si quis recta consideret, satis probabiliter 
poterit aestimare, divina providentia supposita, quae 
singulis perfectionibus congrua perfectibilia coaptavit, 
quod Deus superiorem naturam inferiori ad hoc conjunxit 
ut ei dominaretur, et, si quod hujus dominii impedimentum 
ex defectu naturae contingeret, ejus speciali et super-
naturali beneficia tolleretur; ut scilicet, quum anima 
rationalis sit altioris naturae quam corpus, tali con-
ditione credatur corpori esse conjuncta quod in corpore 
aliquid esse non possit contrarium animae, per quam cor-
pus vivit; et similiter, si ratio in homine appetitui 
sensuali conjungitur et aliis sensitivis potentiis, quod 
31Q. Disp. De Anima, q.l, a.8, ad 7um. 
32cont. Gent:', IV, 52. --
ratio a sensitivis potentiis non impediatur, sed magis 
eis dominetur.33 
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St. Thomas can only conclude, therefore, that from the standpoint of 
faith, and that indeed is the only reasonable standpoint, man, in the begin-
ning, was free from those defects which are consequent upon matter, and that 
it was only after the advent of sin that he became subject to the full pos-
sibilities of his lower nature. 
Sic igitur, secundum doctrinam fidei, ponimus hominem a 
principia taliter esse institutum quod, quamdiu ratio 
hominis Deo asset subjecta, et inferiores vires ei sine 
impedimenta deservirent et corpus ab ejus subjections 
impediri non posset per aliquid impedimentum corporale, 
Deo et sua gratia supplente quod ad hoc perficiendum 
natura minus habebat; ratione aversa a Deo, at inferi-
ores vires a ratione repugnarent et corpus vitae, quae 
est per animam, contrarias passiones susciperet. Sic 
igitur, hujusmodi defectus, quamvis naturales homini 
videantur, absolute considerando humanam naturam ex 
parte ejus quod est in ea inferius, taman, considerando 
divinam providentiam et dignitatem superioris partis 
humanae naturae, satis probabiliter probari potest 
hujusmodi defectus esse poenales.34 
The body of the first man, then, in the light of the above citation, 
was proportioned to the human soul according to that which was required of it 
by nature; namely, that it should be a fitting instrument through which the 
human intellect could be perfected, but it was also proportionate to the 
soul according to grace since the defects belonging to the very nature of the 
body were to prove in no way burdensome to the soul. "• •• corpus Adam fuit 
proportionatum humanae animae, ••• non solum secundum quod requirit natura, 
sed secundum quod contulit gratia: qui quidem privamur, natura manente ea-
33Ibid. 
34cont. ~·· IV, 52. 
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dem."35 Because of its noble form, the body was destined to live forever, 
and although incorruptibility was not natural to it according to the active 
principles of nature, nevertheless it was natural to it in view of its end, 
to wit, that it should be matter suited to its rational and incorruptible 
form, as is said by St. Thomas: 
Deus, ••• in institutione humanae naturae aliquid cor-
pori humano attribuit supra id quod ei ex naturalibus 
principiis debebatur, scilicet incorruptibilitatem quam-
dam, per quam convenienter suae formae coaptaretur; ut, 
sicut animae vita perpetua est, ita corpus per animam 
posset perpetuo vivere: at talis quidem incorruptibili-
tas, etiam si non asset naturalis quantum ad activum 
principium, erat taman quodammodo naturalis ex ordine 
ad finem, ut scilicet materia proportionaretur suae 
naturali formae, quae est finis materiae.36 
It is thus evident that the soul of man was to suffer no impediment 
from the corruptibility of his body, and this conclusion is in full accord 
with reason, for it was fitting that the rational soul which exceeds the 
capacity of corporeal matter should have been granted a power whereby it 
could preserve the body in a way that would surpass the capacity of cor-
poreal matter. 
Non enim corpus eius erat indissolubile per aliquem immor-
talitatis vigorem in eo existens; sed inerat animae vis 
quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus data, per quam poterat 
corpus ab omni corruptione praeservare, quamdiu ipsa Deo 
subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia 
enim anima rationalis excedit proportionem corporalis 
materiae, ••• conveniens fuit ut in principio ei virtus 
daretur, per quam corpus conservare posset supra naturam 
corporalis materiaa.37 
35Q. Disp. rye Anima, q.l, a.8, ad sum. 
36cont. (}ant:", IV, 81. ---
37sum. T~., I, q.97, a.l, c. 
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As for the need of phantasms and corporeal organs which seem to be an 
impediment to knowledge, that was always natural to man even before sin. 
~he human intellect, then as now, was obliged to revert to the phantasms for 
understanding;. 
Manifestum est aute.m ex praemissis quod ex hoc quod anima 
est accomodata ad corporis gubernationem et perfectionem 
secundum animalem vitam, competit animae nostrae talis 
modus intelligendi, qui est per conversionem ad phantas-
mata. Unde et hie modus intelligendi etiam animae primi 
hominis competebat.38 
The knowledge of separated substances which the first man had was not 
perfect, but this imperfection came, not from the fact that the body was an 
obstacle to the soul, but because the connatural object of the human intel-
lect fell short of the excellence of separated substances. In the present 
state of man, his knowledge is imperfect for both the above reasons • 
• • • hoc quod anima primi hominis deficiebat ab intellectu 
substantiarum separatarum, non erat ex aggravations cor-
poris; sed ex hoc quod obiectum ei connaturale erat defi-
ciens ab excellentia substantiarum separatarum. Nos autem 
deficimus propter utrumque.39 
Adam, consequently, in the view of St. Thomas, did not have direct know-
ledge of God in His essence. Nevertheless, he knew God more perfectly than 
we can know Him because he suffered no impediment to a clear and strong 
understanding of intelligible effects. 
Haec autem fuit rectitude hominis divinitus instituti, ut 
inferiora superioribus subderentur et superiora, ab inferi-
oribus non impedirentur. Unde homo primus non impediebatur 
per res exteriores a clara et firma contemplations intelli-
gibilium effectuum, quos ex irradiations primae veritatis 
38op. cit., q.94, a.2, c. 
39Ibid., ad ~· 
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percipiebat, sive naturali cognitione sive gratuita.40 
With regard to the hindrance which comes to man in his present state 
through the passions and through the rebellion of the body, St. Thomas re-
plies that the soul had complete mastery over the body in the primitive state 
. 
of innocence. "Anima enim hominis in statu innocentiae erat corpori per-
ficiendo et guberna.ndo accommodata, sicut et nunc: ••• Sed huius vitae in-
tegritatem habebat, in quantum corpus erat totaliter animae subditum, in nul-
lo impediens, • • ."41 
There have always been passions in man, but in the first human being 
there were none with evil as their object • 
• • • omnes illae passiones quae respiciunt malum, in 
Adam non erant, ••• similiter nee illae passiones 
quae respiciunt bonum non habitum et nunc habendum, ut 
cupiditas aestuans. Illae vero passiones quae possunt 
esse praesentis, ut gaudium et amor; vel quae sunt 
futuri ut suo tempore habendi, et desiderium et spes 
non affligens; fuerunt in statu innocentiae.42 
But the lower powers could not act against the reason then. 
Sed contra hoc etiam homini fuit datum remedium in statu 
innocentiae, ut scilicet inferiores vires in nullo con-
tra rationem moverentur.43 
As for the passions constituting a check upon man, even in his fallen 
state, we need only say that, for st. Thomas, these passions, considered in 
themselves, are neither morally good nor morally evil. When they are sub-
jected to reason, then they deserve to be termed morally good, when not, 
40sum. Theol., I, q.94, a.l, c. 
4lrbid., a.2, c. 
42sum. Theol., I, q.95, a.2, c. 
4~Q.. Disp. ~Anima, q.l, a.s, ~ 7um. 
morally evil • 
• • • passiones animae duplioiter possunt considerari: uno 
modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent im-
perio rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se con-
siderentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis 
appetitus; sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod 
dependet a ratione, ••• si autem considerentur secundum 
quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in 
eis bonum vel malum morale.44 
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The passions can be mighty forces for good in the perfecting of human 
bein6s or mighty forces for evil. They incline to virtue when controlled by 
reason and to sin, vmen not. "• •• passiones animae, in quantum aunt prae-
tar ordinem rationis, inclinant ad peccatum: in quantum autem sunt ordina-
tae a ratione, pertinent ad virtutam."45 Furthermore, we are neither praised 
nor blamed for our passions. 
Sed secundum passiones absolute consideratas neque laudamur 
neque vituperamur. Non enim aliquis laudatur neque vitu-
peratur ex hoc quod absolute timet vel irascitur sed solum 
ex hoc quod aliqualiter timet vel irascitur, idest secundum 
rationem vel praeter rationem.46 
By no means, therefore, are passions diseases of the soul unless they 
are unchecked by reason. "Non enim passiones dicuntur morbi, vel purbationes 
animae, nisi cum carent moderations rationis. 1147 Rather are they important 
factors in man's moral good because that good, since it is based on reason, 
1vill be all the mora perfect as it has reference to more things pertaining 
to man. 
44sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.l, a. 
45op. cit., a.2, ad 3um. 
46rn II Eth. lect:7s;-n.300, (P. Fr. A• Pirotta, ~Arietti, Tarini, Ialy, 
1934),-also sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.l, ad 3um. 
47sum. Theol.,~II, q.24, a.2, c. -----
Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omne motus appetitus 
sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod 
etiam ipsae passiones moderatae per rationem. Cum enim 
bonum hominis consistat in ratione sicut in radice, tanto 
istud bonum erit perfectius, quanto ad plura quae homini 
conveniunt, derivari potest. Unde nullus dubitat quin ad 
perfectionem moralis boni pertineat quod actus exteriorum 
membrorum per rationis regulam dirigantur. Unde, cum ap-
petitus sensitivus possit obedire ratione, ••• ad per-
fectionem moralis siva humani boni pertinet quod etiam 
ipsae passiones animae sint regulatae per rationem.48 
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It is only in man, however, that good"depends upon the proper ordering 
of the passions and the bodily activities, for in God and the Angelic Spirits 
there is neither sensitive appetite nor bodily members. "• •• in Deo et in 
angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, neque etiam membra corporea; et ideo 
bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeum 
actuum, sicut in nobis.tt49 
It might be useful to pause at this point in order to ascertain that 
part which st. Thomas assigns to the passions in the life of the will. That 
they have a share must be evident from the very fact that the rational soul 
is decidedly a human soul and reaches its perfection in a human way, and this 
way does not exclude the passions. 
We must first remark that just as this great Christian philosopher in-
sists that the intellect is not exercised through a corporeal organ, so does 
he assert that the will, which, in his thought, is in the reason, is an en-
tirely immaterial and incorporeal power, not dependent on any material organ. 
"Voluntas enim, • • • 
48op. cit., a.3, c. 
49rbid., ad 2um. 
est in ratione. Ratio autem est potentia non alligata 
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organo corporali. Unde relinquitur quod voluntas sit potentia omnino imma-
terialis et incorporea.n50 
However, the intellectual appetite, or will, can be moved by the sensi-
tive appetite. "• •• ex parte obiecti appetitus sensitivus movet volunta-
tem.n51 And the sensitive appetite, furthermore, is the act of a bodily or-
gan, "• •• appetitus sensitivus est actus organi corporali."52 
Naw, if the will is moved by the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive 
appetite depends upon a corporeal organ, it seems clear that the disposition 
of that organ will affect the sensitive appetite, and, in a certain sense, 
the will. 
Est autam sciendum quod appetitus sensitivus in hoc differt 
ab appetitu intellective, qui dicitur voluntas, quod appa-
titus sensitivus est virtus organi corporalis non autem 
voluntas. Omnis autem actus utentis organo dependet non 
solum ex potentia animae, sed etiam ex corporalis organi 
dispositions; sicut visio ex potentia visiva at qualitate 
oculi per quam iuvatur vel impeditur. ~nde et actus ap-
petitus sensitivi non solum dependet ex vi appetitiva, 
sed etiam ex dispositions corporis.53 
Before we consider just what influence the passions exercise over the 
sensitive appetite and, therefore, over the will, we must first note that 
the movements of the sensitive appetite Which use corporeal organs are what 
we mean here by passions, and that these passions are, consequently, always 
accompanied by some bodily alteration. "• •• passiones sunt motus appetitus 
sensitivi qui utitur organo corporali. Unde omnes cum aliqua corporali 
50sum. Theol., I-II, q.9, a.5, c. 
5lop. cit., I-II, q.9, a.2, c., also, Op. cit., I-II, q.lO, a.2, c. 
52op. Cit., I-II, q.9, a.5, ad 3um. 
53sum.'Theol., I-II, q.l7, a::r,-o; 
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transmutations fiunt.n54 
Now, as to the influence exerted upon the free will of man by these pas-
sions, we can say that in the exercise of its act, the will can be moved 
necessarily by no finite object, for regardless what object is presented to 
man, he has it in his power not to will it actually. However, the will can 
be moved as to the specification of its act, which it derives from the ob-
ject. "• •• voluntas movetur dupliciter: uno modo, quantum ad exercitum 
actus; alio modo, quantum ad specificationem actus, quae est ex obiecto.n55 
This is where the passions of the sensitive part enter. They can move the 
will just in so far as the will is moved by its object. The reason for this 
is that the will is moved by what man apprehends to be good. Now, the pas-
sions can make an object appear to man good and fitting at one time which he 
would not judge to be so at another time. "• •• passio appetitus sensitivi 
movet voluntatem ex ea parte qua voluntas movetur ab obiecto, inquantum scili 
cet homo aliqualiter dispositus per passionem iudicat aliquid esse conveniens 
et bonum, quod extra passionem existens non iudicaret."56 
The object which influences the will must be a suitable good which is 
apprehended. That is evident. Furthermore, the good apprehended as good 
and desirable must be apprehended as such in particular and not just in 
general. Moreover, unless the object appears to be desirable from every 
possible angle, the will oan be inclined to it under one particular aspect 
rather than under another, and one of the three elements that can color man's 
54In IV Eth., lect., 17, n.867, also Q. Disp. ~ Verit., q.26, a.l, c. 
55sum:-The01., I-II, q.lO, a.2, c. 
56op. 2.!.!. , a. 3, 0. 
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perception of the good, is, according to st. Thomas, the disposition of the 
body, for as a man is, so will the good seem to him.57 
As an example of this, we know that the will of the man who is angry is 
moved to something quite different from that to which the calm man's will is 
directed in much the same way as food is looked upon as desirable by the 
healthy man, and undesirable by the man who is ill. "Unde aliter movetur ad 
aliquid voluntas irati et voluntas quieti, quia non idem est conveniens utri-
que; siout etiam aliter aooeptatur cibus a sano et aegro."58 It is because 
the sensitive appetite changes man's disposition, therefore, that he judges 
a certain thing to be appropriate or not appropriate, and it is in this fash-
ion that the will can be moved by the sensitive appetite on the part of the 
object. 
Quod autam aliquid videatur bonum et conveniens, ex duobus 
contingit, scilicet ex conditione eius quod proponitur, et 
eius cui proponitur; conveniens enim secundum relationem 
dicitur, unde ex utroque extremorum dependat. Et inde est 
quod gustus diversimode dispositus non eodem modo accipit 
aliquid, ut conveniens, et ut non conveniens ••• Mani-
festum est autem quod secundum appetitus sensitivi immu-
tatur homo ad aliquam dispotitionem: unde secundum quod 
homo est in passions aliqua, videtur ipsi aliquid conveni-
ens, quod non videtur ei extra passionem existens; sicut 
57Q. Disp. De Malo, q.6, a.l, c. "fatet ergo quod si oonsideretur motus 
voluntatise~rte exeroitii act.us, non movetur ex necessitate; si autem 
consideretur motus voluntatis ex parte objecti determinantis actum volunta-
tis ad hoc vel illud volendum, considerandum est, quod objeotum movens vo-
luntatem est bonum conveniens apprehensum; ••• requiritur ut id quod ap-
prehenditur ut bonum at conveniens apprehendatur ut bonum et conveniens in 
particulari, et non in universali tantum ••• Et quod voluntas feratur in 
quod sibi offertur magis secundum hanc particularem conditionem quam secun-
dum aliam, potest contingere triplicitar ••• Tertio vero modo contingit ex 
dispositions hominis; quia, ••• qualis unusquisque est, talis finis vide-
tur ei." 
58 Ibid. 
irato videtur bonum quod non videtur quieto; at per hunc 
modum ex parte obiecti appetitus sensitivus movet volun-
tatem.59 
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Is this bodily disposition subject to reason? In so far as it precedes 
the act of the sensitive appetite, that is to say, in so far as a man may be 
disposed to one passion rather than another in respect of his physical con-
stitution, it is not. But in so far as his condition is consequent upon the 
act of the sensitive appetite, for example, in so far as man becomes heated 
by anger, this condition can be subject to reason • 
• • • qualitas corporalis dupliciter sa habet ad actum ap-
petitus sensitivi: uno modo, ut praecedens, prout aliquis 
est aliqualiter dispositus secundum corpus ad hano vel il• 
lam passionem; alio modo, ut consequens, sicut eum ex ira 
aliquis incalescit. Qualitas igitur praeoedens non subia-
oet imperio rationis; quia vel est ex natura, vel ex ali-
qua praecedenti motione,· quae non statim quiescere potest. 
Sed qualitas consequens sequitur imperium rationis, ••• so 
Now, what bearing has all this, which looks like a digression, upon the 
question of the burden of the body? Just this, that we must think of man as 
a composite of body and soul, destined to be that, not so made by chance or 
an accident or sin or by any other such unnatural cause. Man was so fash-
ioned that from the very beginning he was to reach his intellectual and moral 
perfection through his human body working with his rational soul. Senses and 
sensitive appetite are natural to the human being, and what belongs to that 
creature by nature was neither given him nor taken away from him when he fell 
from his Creator's friendship. "Ea quae sunt naturalia homini neque substra-
59sum. Theol., I-II, q.9, a.2, c. 
60sum. Theol., I-II, q.l7, a.7, ad 2um. 
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hantur, neque dantur per peccatum."61 It is not, then, a matter of surprise 
to us to find that st. Thomas teaches that man will attain a greater perfec-
tion of moral good if his sense appetite as well as his rational appetite 
moves him to it. 
Sicut igitur melius est quod homo et velit bonun1, et faciat 
exteriori actu; ita etiam ad perfectionem boni moralis per-
tinet quod homo ad bonum moveatur non solum secundum volun-
tatem, sed etiam secundum appetitum sensitivum, secundum 
quod Psal., LXXXIII, 3, dicitur: 'Cor meum et caro mea 
exultaverunt in Deum vivum,' ut 'cor' accipirumus pro appe-
titu intellective, 1 carnem1 autem pro appetitu sensitivo.62 
The power to love and hate, to desire and hope, dare and fear, and all 
the rest are certainly necessary for complete human perfection, and all these 
passions belong not to the soul alone, nor to the body alone, but to the com-
posite. "Passiones autem sunt communes totius compositi ex anima et corpore, 
cum pertineant ad partem sensitivam."63 
Nor does virtue consist in the complete cessation of the passions, for 
st. Thomas affirms that they have spoken ill who were of such convictions and 
for this reason: 
••• quod totaliter a virtuoso volunt excludere animae 
passiones. Pertinent enim ad bonum rationis ut regule-
tur per eam appetitus sensitivus, cujus motus sunt pas-
siones. Unde ad virtutem non pertinent quod excludat 
omnes passiones, sed solum inordinatas, quae sunt ut 
non oportet et quando non oportet et quaecumque alia 
adduntur pertinentia ad alias ciroumstantias.64 
Thus spoke the human saint, and because this common-sense philosopher 
6lsum. Theol., I, q.98, a.2, c. 
62op. cit., I-II, q.24, a.3, c. 
63In x Eth., lect.l2, n.2114. 
64~ II Eth., lect.3, n.272, also sum. Theol., I-II, q.24, a.l and 2. 
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and profound Christian never forgets that man is a unity of body and soul, 
he will never permit that his intellectual or moral perfection be accomplish 
without the body having its full share of contribution. "• •• aninta enim 
indiget corpore ad consecutionem sui finis, in quantum per corpus perfectio-
nem acquirit, et in scientia, et in virtute, ••• n65 
A body so essential as an instrument to an intellectual soul cannot con-
stitute a real burden to it, but since the soul is situated midway between 
two worlds, it must incline toward the higher to have its full perfection, 
and that can only be had by a corresponding withdrawal from the lower. 
"• •• quia, quum anima humana sit in confinio corporum et incorporearum sub-
stantiarum, quasi in horizonte existens aeternitatis et temporis, recedens ab 
infima appropinquat ad summum; • • • tt66 
If the body can be said to shadow the intellectual light of the soul, 
it is precisely because the soul's nature is the lowest in the order of in-
tellectual substances and can only receive its light veiled and, as it were, 
through the instrumentality of matter, which necessarily obscures the bril-
liant rays of the purely intelligible. But, viewed in itself, the body is 
no weight upon the soul, but an absolute necessity for the soul's development 
in this life. 
Substantiae enim spirituales inferiores, scilicet animae, 
habent esse affine corpori, inquantum sunt corporum for.mae: 
et ideo ex ipso modo essendi competit eis ut a corporibus, 
et per corpora suam perfectionem intelligibilem consequan-
tur: alioquin frustra corporibus unirentur.67 
65cont. Gent., III, 144. 
6~-0p. cit., II, 81. 
67sum.~eol., I, q.55, a.2, c., e.lso, McCormick, ~· ~., 400. 
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That the body is, in a certain sense, necessary even in the next life 
for tl1e perfection of the happiness of the rational soul, we shall now en-
deavor to establish in our final chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
THE RATIONAL SOUL NEEDS THE BODY FOR THE 
FULL PERFECTION OF ITS FINAL HAPPINESS 
The important place that the human body occupies in the life of the 
rational soul has now been sketched, and from the standpoint of reason pre-
sents no difficulty as to the naturalness and necessity of the soul's union 
with the body.--But the soul when separatedl-•That is another aspect to the 
question and offers a little more of a problem. The soul has its being in-
dependent of matter. It needed matter for its perfection in this life, but 
it always felt somewhat burdened by a corruptible body so that when the time 
came for corruption of that body according to the laws of nature, one might 
expect this noble and rational substance to heave a sigh of relief, wing its 
flight to higher, purer regions, rejoicing in its liberation from the ties 
that bound it to anything corporeal, forever free to soar amid eternal, tm-
changing, spiritual realities. 
For those, indeed, who looked upon the union of soul and body as some-
thing accidental, an unnatural, burdensome relationship, such a conception 
might well prove satisfactory, but for st. Thomas, what was natural once is 
natural always, and, consequently, the human soul will never be all that it 
should be until it again meets its body. To be forever separated from its 
proper matter would be contrary to the nature of the rational soul, end what 
is against nature cannot continue forever. The soul ~~11 last forever; it 
cannot last forever without its body. Reason assures us that the immortality 
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of the soul requires the future resurrection of the body. 
Ostensum est enim (Liber II, 79) animas hominum immortales 
esse. Remanent igitur post corpora a corporibus absolutae. 
Manifestum est etiam ••• quod anima corpori naturaliter 
unitur, est enim secundum suam essentiam corporis forma. 
Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. 
Nihil autem quod est contra naturam potest esse perpetuum. 
Non igitur perpetuo erit anima absque corpore. Quum igi-
tur perpetuo maneat, oportet eam corpori iterato conjungi: 
quod est resurgere. Immortalitas igitur animarum exigere 
videtur resurrectionem corporum futuram.l 
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There is, however, one sense in which separation from the body can be 
said to be natural to man, and another in which it cannot. If we consider 
the subject from the point of view of the body, as we have remarked previous-
ly, (Chapter III, P• 98), we must admit that corruption is natural to it, and 
that without the special preservation which it was destined to receive from 
the soul, the body is subject to death, and thus separation of soul and body, 
considered with reference to the body, is natural to man. On the other hand, 
if we have regard to the nature of the soul and the disposition which was 
given to the body in the beginning, severance of the rational form from its 
human matter is accidental and contrary to nature. "Si igitur ad naturam 
corporis respiciatur, mors naturalis est. Si vero ad naturam animae et ad 
dispositionem, quae propter animam supernaturaliter humano corpori a prin-
cipio indita fuit, est per accidens, et contra naturam, cum naturale sit ani-
I!'.am corpori esse uni tam. tt2 
Further, we are told that union with the body belongs to the soul by 
reason of its nature, and that when it is separated from the body, it will 
lcont. Gent., IV, 79. 
2comp. The'Ol., I, 152. 
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retain its aptitude and natural inclination for the body. An illustration of 
this St. Thomas takes from a consideration of a light body. According to 
that body's nature, it is proper to it to be lifted up, but the light body 
remains light when taken from its proper place; yet it keeps an aptitude and 
an inclination towards that place. So, too, the soul, when separated from 
the body keeps its own baing, but it does not lose its aptitude and natural 
inclination for union with its body • 
• • • secundum sa convanit corpori levi esse sursum. Et 
sicut corpus lave manet quidem lave cum a loco proprio 
fuarit separatum, cum aptitudine taman at inclinations 
ad proprium locum; ita anima humana manet in suo esse 
cum fuerit a corpore separata, habens aptitudinem et in• 
clinationem naturalem ad corporis unionem.3 
Desire for reunion with the body will remain in the separated soul, and 
there will not be perfect rest of will until the soul rejoins its body, 
since the will cannot attain perfect peace as long as it is the subject of a 
natural desire left unfulfilled. 
Considerandum est autem, quod non potest esse omnimode 
immobilitas voluntatis, nisi naturale desiderium totali-
ter impleatur. Quaecumque autem nata stmt uniri secundum 
naturam, naturaliter sibi uniri appetunt: unumquodque 
appetit id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam. 
Cum igitur anima humana naturaliter corpori uniatur, ••• 
naturale ei desiderium inest ad corporis unionem. Non 
poterit igitur esse perfecta quietatio voluntatis, nisi 
iterato anima corpori conjungatur, quod est hominem a 
morte resurgere.4 
In the preceding chapters, we devoted some attention to the fact that 
the body is necessary for the soul's substantial and accidental perfection. 
3sum. Theol., I, q.76, a.l, ad~· 
4comp. Theol., I, 151. 
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Here, we shall investigate what St. Thomas has to say concerning the body's 
relation to the soul's final perfection. 
Man's final perfection, which is perfect beatitude or happiness, con-
sists in the divine vision. "Consummatio autem hominis est in adeptione ul-
timi finis, qui est perfecta beatitude, sive felicitas quae consistit in 
divina visione, •• "5 • Now, St. Thomas holds that the final perfection of 
anything requires the first perfection of that thing, the first perfection 
of anything being that it should be perfected in its nature, and the final 
that it should attain its end. For _the human soul to be fully perfected as 
regards its end, it must, therefore, be perfected in its nature, and that 
nature requires to be united to a human body. The nature of the soul is that 
it should be part of man as his form, and as no part has its perfection out-
side the whole, the rational soul must be united to its body to have the 
full perfection of its nature, not only at the beginning of its existence, 
but always. 
Item, final is perfectio requiri t perfectionem primam: 
prima aut~m perfectio uniuscujusque rei est ut sit per-
factum in sua natura, finalis vero perfectio consistit 
in consecutione ultimi finis. Ad hoc igitur quod anima 
humana omnimode perficiatur in fine, necesse est quod 
sit perfecta in sua natura, quod non potest esse nisi 
sit corpori unita. Natura enim animae est ut sit pars 
hominis ut forma: nulla a.utem pars perfecta est in 
sua. natura, nisi sit in suo toto. Requiritur igitur 
ad ultimam hominis beatitudinem, ut anima rursum cor-
pori uniatur.6 
The rational soul, therefore, in the ultimate perfection of the human 
5op. cit., 149. 
6comp. Theo1., I, 151. 
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species, cannot forever be without the human body. "• •• anima in perfec-
tione ultima speciei humanae esse non potest a corpore separata: unde nulla 
anima in perpetuum remanebit a corpore separata: "7 • • • 
The soul without the body is imperfect, and as everything naturally 
desires perfection, final happiness for man cannot be attained unless the 
full perfection of his nature is assured • 
• • • naturale hominis desiderium ad felicitatem tendere. 
Felicitas autem ultima est felicis perfectio. Cuicumque 
igitur deest aliquid ad perfectionem nondum habet felici-
tatem perfectar1, quia nondum ejus desiderium totaliter 
quietatur; omne enim imperfectum perfectionem oonsequi 
naturaliter cupit. Anima autem a corpore separata est 
aliquo modo imperfecta, sicut omnis pars extra suum to-
tum existens: anima enim naturaliter est pars humanae 
naturae. Non igitur homo potest ultimrum felicitatem 
consequi, nisi anima iterate corpori conjungatur; prae-
sertim quum ostensum sit quod homo in hac vita non 
potest ad felicitatem ultimam pervenire.a 
Absolutely speaking, however, for man's perfect happiness which consists 
in the vision of the Divine Essence, the body is not necessary because that 
vision does not depend upon the body, since the intellect will not require 
the phantasms for the understanding of the Divine Essence. 
Nam intellectus ad suam operationem non indiget corpore 
nisi propter phantasmata, in quibus veritatem intelli-
gibilem oontuetur, ••• Manifestum est autem quod di-
vina essentia per phantasmata videri non potest, ••• 
Unde cum in visione divinae essentiae perfecta hominis 
beatitude consistat, non dependet beatitude perfecta 
hominis a corpore. Unde sine corpore potest anima esse 
beata.9 
7rn IV Sent., D.43, q.l, a.l, s.2, c., (Venice, Simon Occhi, 1780, Tomus, 
nrl)-
8cont. Gent., IV, 79. 
9sum. T~., I-II, q.4, a.5, c. 
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St. Thomas does not, however, leave that statement as it stands, for he 
qualifies it by distinguishing the two ways in which something may pertain to 
another's perfection.: in one way so as to constitute the essence of the 
thing, and in that sense the body does not belong to the perfection of human 
happiness, because the essence of man's happiness is not in his body; in a 
second way as being necessary for the well being of that thing, and in this 
latter sense the perfection of human happiness does require that the soul be 
reunited to the body. The reason that this is so is that since operation 
follows the nature of a thing, the more perfect the soul is in its nature, 
the more perfectly will it exercise its proper operation, in which its beati-
tude consists. 
Sed soiendum quod ad perfectionem alicuius rei dupliciter 
aliquid pertinet. Uno modo ad constituendam essentiam 
rei, sicut anima requiritur ad perfectionem hominis. Alia 
modo requiritur ad perfeotionem rei quod pertinet ad bene 
esse eius: sicut pulchritude corporis, et velocitas in-
genii pertinet ad perfectionem hominis. Quamvis ergo 
corpus prima modo ad perfeotionem beatitudinis humanae 
non pertineat pertinet taman secunda modo. Cum enim 
operatio dependeat ex natura rei, quanta anima perfec-
tior erit in sua natura, tanto perfectius habebit suam 
propriam operationam, in qua felicitas consistit.lO 
As long, therefore, as the soul is separated from the body it is pre-
vented from enjoying the entire perfection of its happiness. This hindrance, 
however, is not one of opposition, but rather one of defect. It simply 
means that the soul has not all that it needs to make it perfect in every 
way. It is happy, but it cannot tend with all its strength to its last end 
because it desires that its enjoyment in beholding God should overflow into 
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the body in so far as that can be. And, consequently, so long as the soul is 
not united to the body, it rests in its delight in God in such a way that it 
still desires to have its body participate in its own happiness • 
• • • dupliciter aliquid impeditur ab alio. Uno modo, 
per modum contrarietatis, sicut frigus impedit actionem 
caloris: at tale impedimentum operationis repugnat 
felicitati. Alio modo, per modum cuiusdam defectus, quia 
scilicet res impedita non habet quidquid ad omnimodam 
eius perfectionem requiritur; at tale impedimentum opera-
tionis non repugnat felicitati, sed omnimodae perfectio-
nis ipsius. Et sic separatio animae a corpore dicitur 
animam retardare, ne tota intentione tendit in visionem 
divinae essentiae. Appetit enim anima sic frui Deo, 
quod etiam ipsa fruitio derivetur ad corpus per radun-
dantiam, sicut est possibile; at ideo quamdiu ipsa 
fruitur Deo sine corpore, appetitus eius sic quiescit 
in eo, quod habet, quod tamen adhuc ad participationem 
eius vellet suum corpus pertingere.ll 
Besides being contrary to faith and well-established authority, the po-
sition of those who deny the reunion of the soul with the body is, there-
fore, likewise untenable from the standpoint of reason. St. Thomas is so 
convinced, both by his faith and by his reason, that bodies will one day find 
again their noble forms that he can say that the souls of the saints do not 
enjoy the Divine vision so perfectly before the resurrection as afterwards. 
Sed haec positio praeter hoc quod est fidei contraria, 
ut ex auctoritatibus inductis et pluribus aliis patere 
potest, etiam a ratione discordat. Non enim perfectio 
beatitudinis esse poterit ubi deest naturae perfectio. 
Cum autem animas et corporis naturalis sit unio, at 
substantialia, non accidentalis, non potest esse quod 
natura animae sit perfecta, nisi sit corpori conjuncta; 
at ideo anima separata a corpore non potest ultilruam 
perfectionem beatitudinis obtinere. Propter quod ••• 
animae sanctorum ante resurrectionem non ita perfects 
fruuntur divina visione sicut postea; unde in ultima 
llsum. Theol., I-II, q.4, a.5, ~~· 
perfections beatitudinis oportebit corpora humana esse 
animabus unita ••• 12 
135 
Indeed, this must be the case, for the human body has been ordained to 
the soul, not according to man's anllnal life, but rather according to the 
perfection of his nature, and, this very body with such a destiny, though 
camposed of contraries, will not forever be subject to corruption. 
Corpus etiam hominis ordinatur ad hominem, non secundum 
animalem vitam, sed ad perfectionem naturae ipsius. Et 
quamvis corpus hominis sit ex contrariis compositum, 
inerit principium incorruptibile, quod poterii praeser-
vare a corruptions absque violentia, cum sit intrinsecum.l3 
It should be clear, then, that St. Thomas affirms that reason demands 
the resurrection of the body, but what kind of body? Will a body composed 
of contraries, equipped with sense organs, and the like, be a fitting partner 
to the separated soul? 
As st. Thomas sees it, the body must be of the same nature after the 
resurrection as before, and this for the following reasons: First, the soul 
is united to the body as form to matter. Now, every form must have its de-
terminate matter, and since the soul will be of the same specific nature, 
the body must also be of the same specific nature. The risen body will, 
consequently, be composed of flesh and bones and other such parts • 
• • • anima unitur corpori sicut forma materiae. Omnis 
autem forma habet determinatam materiam: oportet enim 
esse proportionem actus et potentiae. Cum igitur ani-
ma sit eadem secundum speciem, videtur quod habeat earn-
dam materiam secundum speciem. Erat ergo idem corpus 
secundum speciem post resurrectionem et ante; at sic 
oportet quod sit consistens ex carnibus et ossibus, et 
12Q. Disp. ~~·· q.5, a.lO, c. 
l3rbid. 
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aliis hujusmodi partibus.14 
Since the body is to be the same in the essentials after its reunion 
with the soul as it was while united to it while on earth, all its members 
will likewise rise. This st. Thomas explains in the following manner. The 
soul is related to the body not only as for.m and end but also as efficient 
cause, for it is related to the body as art is related to the art effect. 
Now, whatever is explicitly revealed in the product of the art is wholly and 
originally contained in the art itself, and likewise whatever appears in the 
parts of the body is originally contained in a certain manner in the soul. 
Furthermore, just as the art is not perfected if its exterior expression 
lacks something which is contained within the art itself, so neither can man 
be perfected unless all that is contained implicitly in the soul is exteri-
orly manifested in the body, for in the contrary case the body would not be 
completely proportionate to the soul. Therefore since in the resurrection 
the body is to be completely proportionate to the soul because it will only 
rise according to the relation it has to the rational soul, we must conclude 
14cont. ~., IV, 84. 
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that a perfect man will rise with all the members which are now in his body.15 
To explain this a little more clearly, we may say that st. Thomas con-
siders the members of the body as related to the soul in a two-fold manner, 
~ither according to the relation of matter to its form, or according to the 
relation of an instrument to the agent, for one and the same is the propor-
tion of the whole body to the whole soul and of parts to parts. If, there-
fore, we take the members of the body as under the first relationship, their 
end is not their operation, but rather their end is the perfection of the 
species, and this use of the members of the body; namely, to complete the 
body in its species, will be required even after the resurrection. If, on 
the other hand, we take the members of the body in view of their second re-
lationship in which their end is their operation, even though they will not 
all be used after the resurrection to enable the soul to exercise its activi-
ties, they will still have a decided utility in showing forth the powers of 
the soul. According to 6t. Thomas, then, we must conclude that although all 
15In IV Sent., D.44, a.l, a.2, s.l, c. "• •• anima habet se ad corpus non 
s;lum in habitudine formae, et finis, sed etiam in habitudine causae ef-
ficientis: est enim comparatio animae ad corpus, sicut est comparatio ar-
tis ad artificiatum, • • • Quidquid aute.m explicite in artifioiato ostendi-
tur, hoc totum implicite, et originaliter in ipsa arte continetur: et sun-
liter etiam quidquid in partibus corporis apparet, totum originaliter, et 
quodammodo implicite in anima continetur. Sicut ergo artis corpus non 
esset perfectum, si artificiato aliquid deesset eorum quae ars continet; 
ita nee homo posset esse perfectus, nisi totum quod in anima implicite 
continetur, exterius in corpore explicetur; nee etiam corpus ad plenum pro-
portionaliter responderet animae. Cum ergo oportet in resurrections corpus 
hominis esse animae totaliter correspondens, quia non resurgit nisi secun-
dum ordinem quem habet ad animam rationalem; oportet etiam hominem perfeo• 
tum resurgere; utpote quod ad ultimam perfeotionem oonsequendam reparatur: 
oportet quod omnia membra quae nunc sunt in corpore, in resurrections 
hominis reparentur." 
I 
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the members of the human body will not retain the same functions they par-
formed while the body was united to the soul on earth, they will be in the 
risen body to reveal the potencies of the rational soul and to enable the 
body to be a perfect human body • 
• • • membra dupliciter possunt considerari in comparatione 
ad animrun: vel secundum habi tudinem materiae ad formam, 
vel secundum habitudinem instrumenti ad agentem. Eadem est 
enim comparatio totius corporis ad totam animam, at partium 
ad partes, ••• Si ergo membrum accipiatur secundum primam 
comparationem, finis eius non est operatic, sed magis per• 
rectum esse speciei; quod atiam post resurrectionem require-
tur. Si autem membrum accipiatur secundum secundam com-
parationem, sic finis eius est operatio, nee taman sequitur 
quod quando deficit operatio, frustra sit instrumentum: 
quia instrumentum non solum servit ad exequendam operatio-
n~ agentis, sed ad ostendendum virtutem ipsius: unde 
oportebit ut virtus potentiarum animae instrumentis cor-
poris demonstretur, etsi numquam in actum prodeant, ut 
ex hoc commendetur Dei sapientia.l6 
It is likewise necessary that the same body should rise again for yet 
another reason. In the definition of natural things, st. Thomas tells us, 
the essence of a species is signified, and in that definition matter finds 
its place. Now, if the matter should vary specifically the species of the 
natural thing would have to vary. Since man is a natural thing, if he does 
not resume the same specific body, he will not be of the same species and 
can be called a man only equivocally • 
• • • cum in definitione rerum naturalium, quae significat 
essentiam speciei, ponatur materia, necessarium est quod 
variata materia secundum speciem, varietur species rei 
naturalis. Homo autem res naturalis est. Si igitur post 
resurrectionem non habebit corpus consistens ex carnibus 
at ossibus, at hujusmodi partibus, sicut nunc habet, non 
16rn IV Sent., D.44, q.l, a.2, s.l, ~ 1um. 
erit qui resurgat, ejusdem speciei, sed dicitur homo tan-
tum aequivoce.l7 
Thirdly, the human body must be the same because man must rise the 
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same in number. In the thought of st. Thomas, man would seem to have been 
made in vain if he does not arrive, the same in number, at the end for which 
he was fashioned. He must have the same soul and the same body when he 
rises as that which he had while on earth; otherwise, there would not be a 
resurrection, properly so called • 
• • • necessitas ponendi resurrectionem est ex hoc ut homo 
finem ultimum propter quem homo factus est, consequatur; 
quod in hac vita fieri non potest, nee in vita animae 
separatae, ••• alias vane asset homo constitutus, si ad 
finem ad quem factus est, pervenire non posset. Et quia 
oportet quod illud idem numero ad finem perveniat quod 
propter finem factus est, ne in vanum factum esse videa-
tur, oportet quod idem numero homo resurgat; et hoc qui-
dam sit cum eadem anima eidam numero corpori coniungitur, 
••• alias enim non asset resurrectio propria loquendo, 
nisi idem homo repararetur.l8 
Again, in refuting those who denied the resurrection, St. Thomas affirms 
once more that for any resurrection the same thing that falls must rise again 
otherwise there is no resurrection. This applies especially to the body. 
Et praedicti errores haereticorum destrui possunt ex hoc 
quod veritati resurrectionis praeiudicant, quam sacra 
Scriptura profitetur. Non enim resurrectio dici potest, 
nisi anima ad idem corpus redeat: quia resurrectio est 
iterata surrectio; eiusdem autem est surgere, et cadere: 
unde resurreotio magis respicit corpus quod post mortem 
vivit: at ita si non est idem corpus quod anima resumit, 
non dicetur resurrectio, sed magis novi corporis assump-
tio.l9 
17cont. Gent., IV, 84. 
l8In IV Sen£., D.44, q.l, a.l, s.2, c. 
19op. cit., D.44, q.l, a.l, s.l, c. 
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Also: 
••• differentia quae est inter animam resurgentis: at 
animam in hoc mundo viventis, non est secundum aliquid 
essentiale, sed secundum glori~ at miseri~; quae dif• 
ferentiam accidentalem faciunt: unde non oportet quod 
aliud corpus numero resurgat, sed alio modo sa habens, 
ut respondeat proportionabilitar differentia corporum 
differentiae animarum.20 
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Now, in order that man should rise the s~e in number, the essential 
parts of man must be the same in number. "• •• ad hoc quod homo idem nu-
mero resurgat, necessarium est quod partes ejus essentiales sint eodem nu-
mero. Si igitur corpus hominis resurgentis non erit ex his ossibus ex quibus 
nunc componitur, non erit homo resurgens idem numero."21 
Identity of essential principles is necessary that a thing should be the 
s~e in number. The principles of a human being are matter and form, and, 
therefore, the matter that rejoins the human soul must be essentially the 
same as that to which it was first united. St. Thomas again expresses this 
as follows: 
••• ad hoc quod aliquid sit idem numero, requiritur 
identitas principiorum essentialium. Unde quodcumque 
principiorum essentialium, etiam in ipso individuo, 
varietur, necesse est etiam identitatem variari. Il-
lud autem est essentiale cujuslibet individui quod est 
de ratione ipsius; sicut cuilibet rei materiali sunt 
essentialia materia et forma: unde si accidentia 
varientur at mutentur, remanentibus principiis, essen-
tialibus individui, ipsum individuum remanet idem. 
Cum ergo principia essentialia hominis sint anima et 
corpus, et haec remaneant, quia resurget eadem anima 
at idem corpus; dicendum, quod corpus hominis resurget 
idem numero.22 
20op. cit., D.44, q.l, a.l, s.l, ad 2um. 
2Icont:-G'ent., IV, 84. --
22Q. Quo~XI, q.6, a.6, c. (Marietti, V). 
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However, since there has been a substantial corruption, the resurrection 
cannot take place through the action of nature, but only by the divine power. 
Ea vero quae secundum substantiam corrumpuntur, non re-
iterantur eadem numero secundum operationem naturae, sed 
solum secundum speciem ••• Cum igitur corpus humanum 
per mortem substantialiter corrumpatur, non potest opera-
tiona naturae idem numero reparari. Cum igitur hoc 
exigat resurrectionis ratio, ••• consequens est quod 
resurrectio hominum non fiat per actionem naturae, ••• 
sed resurgentium reparatio sola virtute divina fiet.23 
The human body, therefore, ~11 be of the same specific nature. It can-
not become a spirit, for in order that one thing may be transformed into 
another, each must have matter, but a spiritual substance cannot have matter 
in it. "Ponere enim corpus transire in spiritum est omnino impossibile. Non 
enim transeunt invicem, nisi quae in materia communicant. Spiritua1ium autam 
et corporalium non potest esse communicatio in materia, cum substantiae 
spirituales sint omnino immateriales, ••• "24 Furthermore, if the human 
body were converted into a spiritual substance, it would be transformed 
either into the spiritual substance of the soul, or into some other spiritual 
substance. If into that of the soul, then after the resurrection man would 
be nothing but soul, as he is before the resurrection when the soul is in a 
state of separation from the body. The resurrection, then, would have no ef-
feet upon the condition of man. If, on the other hand, the body were changed 
into some other spiritual substance, it would follow that from the union of 
two spiritual substances some one thing in nature would result. That would 
be impossible because every spiritual substance is 'per se' subsistent. 
23comp. Theol., I, 154. 
24cont. ~·· IV, 84. 
••• si transeat in substantiam spiritualam corpus humanum, 
aut transibit in ipsam spiritualem substantiam quae est ani-
ma, aut in aliquam aliam. Si in ipsam, tunc post resurrec-
tionem non asset in homine nisi anima; sicut et ante resur-
reotionem. Non igitur immutaretur conditio hominis per 
resurrectionem. Si autem transibit in aliam substantiam 
spiritualem, sequetur quod ex duobus aliquid unum in natura; 
quod est omnino impossibile, quia quaelibet substantia 
spiritualis est per se subsistens.Z5 
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Nor will the human body become like to air or wind or any such thing, 
for man's body, like the body of any animal, must have a determinate figure 
both in the whole and in the parts. How, a body with a determined figure 
must be in itself terminable because a figure is something which is compre-
hended in its term or terms, and air is terminable not in itself, but in 
something else. 
Similiter etiam impossibile est quod corpus hominis resur-
gentis sit quasi aereum, et ventis simile. Oportet enim 
corpus ho~~nis et cujuslibet animalis habere determinatam 
figuram in toto et in partibus. Corpus autem habens de-
terminatam figuram, oportet quod sit in se terminabile, 
quia figura est quae termino, vel terminis comprehenditur; 
aer autem non est in se terminabilis, sed solum termino 
alieno terminatur. Non est ergo possibile quod corpus 
hominis resurgentis sit aereum vel ventis simile.26 
This is again proved by considering that the body that is to rise must 
have the sense of touch because without it the body would not be animal, and, 
if not animal, then not the human body. Now, neither air nor any other sim-
ple body could be susceptible to touch because such a body would not be a 
medium of contraries. 
25Ibid. 
• • • corpus hominis resurgentis oportet esse tactivum, 
quia sine tactu nullum est animal: oportet autem ut 
26cont. ~·· IV, 84. 
resurgens sit animal, si sit homo. Corpus autem aereum non 
potest esse tactivum sicut nee aliquod corpus simplex, quum 
oporteat corpus, per quod fit tactus, esse medium inter 
qualitates tangibiles, ut sit quodammodo in potentia ad 
eas, ••• Impossibile est igitur quod corpus hominis re-
surgentis sit aereum et simile ventis. 27 
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For the same reason, the risen body cannot be a celestial body since 
such a heavenly body could not be an organ of touch as it has no contraries 
either in act or in potency. 
Ex quo etiam apparet quod non poterit esse corpus coeleste. 
Oportet enim corpus hominis et cujuslibet animalis esse 
susceptivum tangibilium qualitatum ut jam dictum est. Eoc 
autem corpori coelesti non poteet convenire, quia non est 
neque calidum, neque frigidum, neque humidum neque siccum, 
neque aliquid hujusmodi vel actu, vel potentia ••• Corpus 
igitur hominis resurgentis non erit corpus coeleste.28 
We must, therefore, conclude that the body which the rational soul will 
resume after the resurrection will be neither a heavenly body, nor an airy 
one, nor that of any other animal, but it will be a human body composed of 
flesh and bones and the same members which it had while body and soul were 
united in this earthly life. "Non enim resumet anima in resurrectione cor-
pus coeleste, vel aereum, vel corpus alicujus alterius animalis, ••• sed 
corpus humanum ex carnibus et ossibus compositum organicum eisdem organis, 
ex quibus nunc consistit. 11 29 
The disposition of risen bodies, however, will not be the same as is 
that of bodies still united to their souls before dissolution sets in, for 
the corruptibility which weighed upon the soul will no longer be present in 
27rbid. 
2Brbid. 
29comp. Theol., I, 153. 
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the risen body, and the rebellion of man's lower nature will no longer drag 
his higher nature down. The reason that this must be is again taken from 
the principle that the body is for the soul and the condition of the risen 
body must be proportionate to that of the separated soul. 
Quia vero corpus est propter animam, sicut materia propter 
formam, et organum propter artificem, animae vitam prae-
dictam consecutae tale corpus in resurrectione adjungetur 
divinitus, quale competat beatitudini animae ••• Quae 
enim propter finem sunt disponi oportet secundum exigen-
tiam finis. Animae autem ad summum operationis intellec-
tualis pertingenti non convenit corpus habere, per quod 
aliqualiter impediatur, aut retardetur. Corpus autem 
humanum ratione suae corruptibilitatis impedit animam et 
retardat, ••• Corpora igitur resurgentium beatorum non 
erunt corruptibilia, et anima retardantia ut nunc, sed 
magis inoorruptibilia, et totaliter obedientia ipsi ani-
mae, in nullo ei resistent.30 
All risen bodies will, therefore, be incorruptible. 
Disponetur igitur corpus communiter omnium secundum con-
decentiam animae, ut scilicet forma incorruptibilis esse 
incorruptibile corpori tribuat, contrariorum compositione 
non obstante, eo quod materia corporis humani, divina 
virtute, animae humanae quantum ad hoc subjicietur omnino.31 
Just what the disposition of the glorified body will be may be ascer-
tained from a consideration that the soul is both the form and the motor of 
the human body. In as much as it is form, it is not only the principle of 
the body's substantial being but even of its proper accidents which are 
caused in the subject by the union of the matter with its form. Now, in pro-
portion as the form is stronger, its impression upon its matter is so much 
the less impeded by any exterior agent. We can see this in fire whose form, 
30op. cit., I, 167. 
3lcont. Gent., IV, 86. 
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which is said to be the noblest among the elementary forms, confers this upon 
fire that it is not easily changed by any exterior agent from its own natural 
disposition. Likewise, the beatified soul in its supreme nobility and power 
bestows something of this nobility and power upon the body reunited to it; 
namely, that it should be subtle and spiritual.32 
The glorified body will thus be a subtle and a spiritual body, and this 
subtlety will derive front the dominion of the glorified soul over its body, 
and from its spirituality its subtlety will arise, as St. Thomas confirms 
when stating the opinions of others as his own in the following citation: 
Et ideo alii dicunt, quod dicta complexio, ex quo corpora 
humana subtilia dicentur, erit ex dominic animae glorifi-
catae, quae est forma corporis, super ipsum; ratione cuius 
corpus gloriosum spirituale dicitur, quasi omnino spiritui 
subiectum. Prima autem subiectio animae subiicitur, est 
ad participandum esse specificum, prout subiicitur sibi 
ut materiae formae, et deinde subiicitur ei ad alia opera 
animae, prout animae est motor; et ideo prima ratio spiri-
tualitatis in corpore est ex subtilitate, et deinde ex 
agilitate, et aliis proprietatibus corporis gloriosi: ••• 33 
In the resurrection, then, the body will be entirely subject to the sou 
First, as we have just seen, by the gift of subtlety, the body will be sub-
32comp. Theol., I, 168. "Anima enim est corporis forma et motor. Inquantum 
autam est forma, non solum est principium corporis quantum ad esse substan-
tials, sed etiam quantum ad propria accidentia, quae causantur in subjecto 
ex unione formae ad materiam. Quanta autem forma fuerit fortior, tanto im-
pressio formae in materia minus potest impediri a quocumque exteriori agen-
te, sicut patet in igne, cujus forma quae dicitur esse nobilissima inter 
elamentares formas hoc confert igni, ut non de facili transmutetur a sua 
naturali dispositione patiendo ab aliquo agente. Quia igitur anima beata 
in summa nobilitatis et virtutis erit, utpote rerum primo principia con-
juncta, confert corpori sibi divinitus unito, prima quidem esse substan-
tiale nobilissimo modo totaliter ipsum sub se continendo, unde subtile et 
spirituale erit." 
33In IV Sent., D.44, q.2, a.2, s.l, c. 
• 
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ject to the soul in as much as the soul is the form of the body, giving it 
specific being. Secondly, by the gift of agility, the body will be complete-
ly dominated by the soul in all its movements and actions in as much as the 
soul is the motor of the human body. Thus the glorified body will be wholly 
subject to the glorified soul, not only in such a way that there will be 
found in it nothing that will resist the will of the spirit, for such sub-
jection was found in the body of the first man, but even that there will be 
some perfection in the body by an overflow, as it were, from the glorified 
soul by which this subjection will be more proportionate to the soul. That, 
at least, seems to be the thought in this passage; 
••• corpus gloriosum erit omnino subiectum animae glori-
fioatae, non solum ut nihil in eo sit quod resistat volun-
tati spiritus, quia hoc fuit etiam in corpore Adae, sed 
etiam ut sit in eo aliqua perfeotio effluens ab anima 
glorifioata in corpus, per quam habile reddatur ad prae-
diotam subiectum: quia quidem perfectio dos glorificati 
corporis dicitur. Anima autem coniungitur corpori non 
solum ut forma, sed ut motor; et utroque modo oportet 
quod corpus gloriosum animae glorificatae sit summa sub-
iectum. Unde sicut per dotem subtilitatis subiicitur ei 
totaliter, inquantum est forma corporis, dans esse 
specificum; ita per dotem agilitatis subiicitur ei in-
quantum est motor, ut scilicet sit expeditum, et habile 
ad obediendum spiritui in omnibus motibus, et actionibus 
animae.34 
Impassibility is another quality which will belong to the risen body, 
as St. Thomas states: 
Corpus humanum, et quidquid in eo est, perfecte erit sub-
iectum animae rationali, sicut etiam ipsa perfecte sub-
iecta erit Deo: et ideo in corpore glorioso non poterit 
esse aliqua mutatio contra dispositionem illam qua per-
34In l! Sent., D.44, q.2, a.3, s.l, c • 
J 
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ficitur ab anima; et ideo corpora illa erunt impassibilia.35 
The cause of this quality of impassibility is again the dominion which 
the soul will exercise over the body. "Causa autem eius dominium animae 
super corpus; quod quidem dominium causatur ex hoc quod servitur Deo immobili 
ter: unde in illo qui perfectius fruitur, est maior impassibilitatis causa1 
Another prerogative of glorified bodies will be the quality of clarity, 
and this will be an overflow from the glory of the soul into the human body • 
• • • ideo melius est ut dicatur quod claritas illa causabi-
tur ex redundantia gloriae animae in corpus. Quod enim re-
cipitur in aliquo, non recipitur per modum influentis, sed 
per modum recipientis; et ita claritas quae est in anima ut 
spiritualis, recipitur in corpore ut corporalis: et ideo 
secundum quod anima erit maioris claritatis secundum maius 
meri tum; ita enim differenti.a clari tati s in corpore, ut 
patet per Apostolum I Corinth., xv, et ita in corpore 
glorioso cognoscitur-gloria animae sicut in vitro cognos-
citur color corporis quod continetur in vase vitreo, ••• 37 
What the glorified soul has, therefore, the glorified body will share, 
and as the soul is elevated to the glory of heavenly spirits, the body, too, 
will receive the properties of heavenly bodies, such as clarity, impassibili-
ty, mobility without difficulty and labor, in a word, it will be entirely 
perfected by its form • 
• • • sicut anima hominis elevabitur ad gloriam spirituum 
coelestium, ut Deum per essentiarrt videat, ••• ita ejus 
corpus sublimabitur ad proprietates coelestium corporum, 
inquantum erit alarum, impassibile, absque difficultate, 
et labore mobile, et perfectissime sua forma perfectum.38 
But human bodies will be celestial, not in nature, but in glory, for 
35op. cit., D.44, q.2, a.l, s.l, c. 
36rn Ivrsent., D.44, q.2, a.l, s.2, c. 
3~.-ci~D.44, q.2, a.4, s.l, c. 
3 Cont. Gent., IV, 86. 
r 
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there are heavenly bodies, and there are earthly bodies, and the glory of the 
one is not the glory of the other. Vfuerefore, just as the glory to which the 
human soul is elevated exceeds the natural power of celestial spirits, so, 
too, the glory of the risen body exceeds the natural perfection of the celes-
tial bodies, and human bodies ~~11 be clothed with greater brightness, 
stronger impassibility, and they will enjoy more perfect agility and dignity 
of nature • 
• • • et sic propter hoc Apostolus dicit (I Cor.,xv,40) 
resurgentium corpora esse coelestia, non quantum ad na-
turam, sed quantum ad gloriam. Unde cum dixisset quod 
sunt corpora coelestia et sunt terrestra corpora, sub-
junxit, quod alia est coelestium gloria, alia terrestri-
um. Sicut autem gloria, in quam humana anima subleva-
tur, excedit naturalem virtutem coelestium spirituum, 
••• ita gloria resurgentium corporum excedit naturalem 
perfectionem coelestium corporum, ut sit major claritas, 
impassibilitas, firmior agilitas, et dignitas perfectior.39 
The human body, consequently, will have its full share in the happiness 
of its noble partner, for the perfect beatitude of man consists both in soul 
and body, and we may well bring this final chapter to a close on the strong, 
true note, struck by the Angelic Doctor when he utters his profound and sati& 
fying conviction that while the soul contemplates God and enjoys the eternal 
beatitude for which it was formed, the body, too, is there, radiant in the 
overflow of the superabundant glory of her noblest of forms, the immortal 
soul. 
Hominis autem beatitude perfecta consistit in anima et 
corpore, ••• in anima quide.m, quantum ad id quod est 
ei proprium, secundum quod mens videt et fruitur Deo: 
in corpore vero, secundum quod corpus 'resurget spiri-
tuale~ et in virtute et in §loria et in incorruptione,' 
ut dicitur l~·· xv, 40.4 
40sum. Theel., III, q.l5, a.lO, c. 
149 
r 
CONCLUSION 
As we have endeavored throughout this essay to gather together at the 
end of each chapter the most salient features of the matter treated therein, 
a very brief statement should suffice to bring this topic to a close. In 
our study of St. Thomas concerning the place that the body occupies in the 
life of the soul, we have essayed to portray the very intimate and necessary 
relationship existing between the soul and its body. We have seen that this 
great Scholastic holds that the rational soul really needs the human body to 
begin its existence in the full perfection of its nature. Without its proper 
matter, the rational soul, as a form, is incomplete. Alone it does not con-
stitute human nature, for it is only a part of human nature, and requires the 
other part, the body, for the completion in its species. Without the body, 
moreover, human souls would differ specifically because matter, in the 
Thomistic system, is the principle of individuation. Furthermore, if the 
rational soul could begin to exist apart from the body, no reasonable cause 
could be assigned for its union with the body, and we should be eventually 
led by such a supposition to the conclusion that union of body and soul is 
unnatural, and man, an unnatural being, a consequence which is manifestly 
absurd. 
Not only is the body necessary for the perfection of the nature of the 
soul, it is like~~se necessary, as we have seen, for the perfec~ion of its 
operations, from the lowest activities to the very highest. It is, moreover, 
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because of this need of the body for the perfection of its activities that 
the human body is constituted just as it is, for the body exists for the soul 
and not the soul for the body. It was not to ennoble the human body that 
God joined the two together, but it was because the soul is a human soul, 
not a pure spirit, and as such, receives its full perfection in no other way 
than by its union vnth a human body. 
A body so essential to the soul in this life is not really a burden to 
it, but because of sin, the body vms deprived of those gifts, which by a 
supernatural favor, would have made it more perfectly proportionate to its 
incorruptible form. By its conquest over the defects of the body, in so far 
as these defects may be overcome, the rational soul now reaches up to its 
final beatitude, and when it has attained it, it does not forget the human 
body in which it dwelt in its struggle towards its goal. ~fuat is natural to 
the soul once is natural to it always, according to the Angelic Doctor, and 
since the soul will live forever, the body will be alvmys a natural comple-
ment of the soul, and, therefore, we can say that it is true that the body 
must be reunited to it, and this body must be essentially the same as that 
to whiCh it was joined while on earth. In a certain sense, we have seen, the 
body is even necessary for happiness of the separated soul, and by an over-
flow into itself from the glory of its beatified form, it will be rewarded 
for its vital share in the life of the pilgrirr, soul. 
Far from being an evil, a burden, or an obstacle and prison of that 
noble and immortal creature, the rational soul, the human body is a real 
good and a source of development in that it is through it that the rational 
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soul attains its substantial, accidental, and its final perfection. Our 
reason, as well as our faith in the wisdom and power of the Divine Artist 
Creator assures us that so it must be, and we are grateful to the Angelic 
Doctor for his establishment of the human body in its rightful place in the 
scheme of the universe and his bestowing on it, by rational justification, a 
dignity and usefulness, unmatched in any other corporeal being. 
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